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Chapter 1
General Introduction
”Omnium Rerum Principia Parva Sunt”. Cicero stated that all things have small
beginnings. In the context of this doctoral dissertation, the ”small” would point
to innovating firms, small in size and in age and the ”things” would point to in-
ventions or new products, encompassing technological progress. Although one
should be careful generalizing and it has to be acknowledged in this context that
certainly not all important progress flows from small young innovators, some of
the major novelties came out of the smallest and youngest firms an economy holds,
as Baumol (2002) illustrated and described, ”from A to Z, from the Airplane to the
Zipper”. These not only enabled growth of the firms themselves, but also impacted
other firms’ activities and social welfare.
Small young innovators as driving forces of technological progress and growth.
It is an increasingly embraced point of view in academic literature and in pol-
icy guidelines. In this context, several measures towards small young innova-
tors, aimed at facilitating their activities, color the political and economic land-
scape. This is mainly incorporated in the European strategy ’Europe 2020’, the
reworked Lisbon Agenda, to increase technological performance and productivity
of its member states.
Following the increased attention of policy makers and the recent evolutions in
1
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academic literature, this dissertation looks deeper into the growth opportunities
of small young innovators and also assesses the role of targeted subsidies, both
with respect to innovative input and output of firms. In addition, as the academic
literature has elaborated upon several methods to evaluate policy measures such
as targeted subsidies, one of the chapters extends upon existing methodologies.
This introductory chapter gives a broad overview of the dissertation. Sections 1.1
and 1.2 discuss the general literature on which this thesis builds, and section 1.3
provides an introduction to the research questions tackled in the different chapters.
1.1 Firm heterogeneity and economic growth
Amongst all firms in the economy, some specific subsets gained increasing atten-
tion over the past decades. An important group of firms in this respect are the
ones that are small, young and engaged in innovation activities. They are assumed
to contribute both directly and indirectly to technological progress and economic
growth. The rationale to consider the combination of these different firm charac-
teristics as crucial determinants or indicators of the possibility of progress is rooted
in a long-standing literature discussing the impact of each of these factors individ-
ually on technological progress and growth.
A main factor in this respect is innovation, a buzz word of the current era. The
view that innovation activities constitute a main driving force of the economic
system in terms of welfare, economic competitiveness and sustainable economic
growth is not new in itself, see e.g. Schumpeter (1934). However, only since
the early 1950s, the growth theory explicitly nullified the view that technologi-
cal change is exogenous to the economic system and incorporated this as an en-
dogenous factor at the heart of economic growth (Solow, 1956). In later studies,
technological change as an endogenous growth factor was supported and fur-
ther exploited by Romer (1990); Grossman and Helpman (1991a,b) and Klette and
Griliches (1997). In line with this, attention has been increasingly drawn to the
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driving forces behind innovation activities of firms, the many different aspects of
doing it and the results these generate. The increasing attention of scholars to in-
novation as a driving force of growth is not only limited to the macro level, but is
also investigated empirically especially at the microeconomic, i.e. firm level (see
e.g. Geroski and Machin, 1992; Geroski and Toker, 1996 focusing on turnover and
profitability and Griliches, 1986; Hall and Mairesse, 1995 on productivity).
The focus on small young firms within the category of innovative firms is rooted
in the assumption that these are more likely to behave ’entrepreneurial’ and do
not refrain from challenging the status quo with their innovation activities.1 Small
young innovators are assumed to induce technological change and growth by en-
larging the existing innovation base.2 On the one hand, these effects lead to expec-
tations on growth of these firms themselves as they might prove to be so-called
gazelles or high-growth enterprizes (for a survey of the literature on gazelles, see
a.o. Henrekson and Johansson (2010) and Mazzucato and Parris (2014) for a re-
cent contribution). On the other hand, they are assumed to more broadly impact
progress by shaping new markets, creating further opportunities and triggering
follow-up innovations, thereby potentially creating social value.
Following upon a.o. Schumpeter who introduced the idea that new entrepreneurial
innovators play a fundamental role in fostering progress, entailing ’creative de-
struction’3 and the increased attention towards subsets of firms such as the broad
1A focus on small and / or young firms in general is mainly rooted in the well-established
literature trying to understand firm growth dynamics (Gibrat, 1931; Sutton, 1997; Santarelli et al.,
2006; Evans, 1987a,b; Haltiwanger et al., 2013). See also the survey by Van Praag and Versloot (2007)
in this context.
2Note that they are also acknowledged to thereby disrupt the existing competitive and techno-
logical advantages of mature firms ((Malerba and Orsenigo, 1996); also see the well-known Arrow
(or replacement) effect, pointing to a low incentive of a monopolist to invest in innovations in con-
trast to competitive firms (Arrow, 1962)). The disturbance of existing markets might not only create
positive externalities but could of course also create negative externalities impacting some of the
(less efficient) market participants (Malerba and Orsenigo, 1996).
3This, in contrast to the concept of ’creative accumulation’ also introduced by Schumpeter and
pointing to large industrialized concerns as drivers of innovation and thus economic growth. Note
in this context that, although this dissertation focuses mainly on small young innovators, the po-
tential role of large firms in innovation activities is not nullified by doing so (Baumol, 2002, 2004).
Next to this, in the context of this dissertation, the potential effects of innovation activities of small
young innovators on other actors such as large firms in the economy are acknowledged and sug-
gestions for further research in order to incorporate this are given in chapter 5.
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group of Small-and Medium-sized Enterprizes (SME’s), several types of firms were
defined that explicitly incorporate the characteristics of size, age and innovation.
The Arthur D. Little Consulting group, for instance, awakened the interest in the
so-called New Technology Based Firms (NTBF) (Little, 1977). The aim of this re-
port was to provide a first attempt to survey the existing stock of young inde-
pendent firms engaged in innovation activities involving substantial technological
risk in Europe (based upon Germany and the UK) and the US, finding evidence
that the analyzed European countries were lagging behind in terms of formation
and performance of these firms. A lot of work has been done so far confirming
the economic potential and importance of similar firms. In this line of research,
Westhead and Cowling (1995) and Almus and Nerlinger (1999) found also that
NTBFs, defined by them as independent firms in high-tech sectors, showed the
highest growth rates.4 Increasingly, scholars focused on these firms in high-tech
sectors as incubators of economic progress (see e.g. Bartelsman et al., 2004; Calvo,
2006; Colombo and Grilli, 2010; Cozza et al., 2012). More recently, Young Inno-
vative Companies (YIC) were defined as an important subgroup of the broader
group of Small and Medium-sized enterprizes (SMEs), acknowledging the large
heterogeneity in terms of innovation within this broad class of firms (Veugelers,
2008; Schneider and Veugelers, 2010). They are small, young and have as main
specificity that they are intensively engaged in innovation activities. They are con-
sidered as being the firms which are most likely to be radical innovators (Baumol,
2002; Veugelers, 2009). It is important to note again that attention to these firms
is not only based upon their assumed direct growth potential, but also upon the
indirect and long-term benefits that breakthrough innovations might bring.
Nevertheless, in spite of the appealing characteristics of these firms and their pre-
sumed technological and growth potential, both directly and indirectly, the EU is
recognized as lacking small young innovators, which are, if present, less engaged
in innovation activities than their US counterparts.5 Europe is thus considered as
4Research on NTBFs often deviates from how the concept was initially introduced either due to
data limitations or more general perceived definitional unclarity.
5A main explanation for the lower presence is that EU firms face higher barriers to entry, growth
and exit as compared to their US counterparts (Bartelsman et al., 2004; Aghion et al., 2008). The
US is in that sense acknowledged to be more open to experimentation, which is more likely to lead
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benefiting less from both the direct and indirect effects that innovation activities of
these firms might bring. In Europe, several scholars argue that the lack of activity
of these types of firms might exactly be the reason for the lagging behind of the
EU as compared to its main competitors, the United States and Japan, posing an
important challenge for Europe (Veugelers, 2009). Figures on R&D spending show
that in spite of the target of 3% R&D spending relative to GDP, the EU ratio seems
to stagnate at the lower border of 2%, in contrast to the US and Japan, which are
at approximately 2.8% and slightly above 3% respectively (OECD, 2013). These
findings and both the studies on NTBFs and the findings of Veugelers (2008) were
instrumental in highlighting the importance of support infrastructures for the cre-
ation and growth of small young innovators in Europe.
1.2 Fostering innovation-induced growth?
Following the increased evidence on their potential role on growth and technolog-
ical progress as discussed in the previous section, ”small young innovators” are
increasingly incorporated into policy guidelines around the globe. One aspect of
this increased attention is the fostering of innovation activities of these firms (see
e.g. the SBIR program in the US (Lerner, 2000; Audretsch, 2003) and the recent
guidelines of the EC within the flagship initiative ’Innovation Union’ under the
’Europe 2020’ targets, the reworked Lisbon Strategy goals (EC-DG Research and
Innovation, 2011)).
The justification for policy makers to intervene in fostering innovation activities of
firms in order to entail economic growth is rooted in a number of characteristics
of R&D activities and market failures related to these activities. For innovating
firms in general, it is widely acknowledged that the road both towards and under-
to radical innovations. It has to be noted that this dissertation does not focus on entry and exit of
these firms, apart from correcting for a potential survival bias in chapter 2 and the more detailed
discussion of market failures related to R&D activities, which are often recognized not only as
growth but also as entry barriers, especially for small young firms, and which are one of the main
rationales to grant R&D subsidies as certain projects of high value might be foregone (see chapters
3 and 4 below).
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taking R&D might be a bumpy one. While the indispensable role of technological
progress in firm growth is emphasized in many studies, it is important to take a
step back and recognize the fact that R&D activities themselves are often highly
uncertain and risky. It is not always straightforward to, first of all, invest in R&D
and second, stipulate a successful roadmap that depicts the most efficient way to-
wards a successful innovation. One can never know whether the planned outcome
of a new technology will be achieved, and even if this is the case, market success
remains uncertain (Arrow, 1962). In addition, once the R&D investment is effec-
tuated, it is to a large extent irreversible, no matter what the outcome is, because
R&D investments encompass a large share of sunk costs (Pindyck, 1991; Dixit and
Pindyck, 1994). Not only equipment can be highly project-specific, but also the
human capital and the tacit knowledge that this entails.
Closely linked to these specific characteristics of R&D activities, innovative firms
often face financial constraints for innovation activities. The uncertain and risky
nature of R&D investments described above lead to information asymmetries be-
tween firms and external suppliers of finance. In addition, the high amount of
sunk costs and thus low collateral value could hamper external financing even if
information is shared. As a consequence, it might turn out to be difficult for a firm
to find external lenders to finance its R&D activities resulting in underinvestment
in R&D (Arrow, 1962; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981).
Another problem, at least from the investing firm’s point of view, could emerge,
even if a firm was able to finance its projects. The generated knowhow by R&D ac-
tivities could spill over to competitors, hindering the appropriation of the returns
from the initial investment (Schumpeter, 1942; Nelson, 1959; Arrow, 1962). This is
rooted in the rationale that knowledge is a non-rival and non-exclusive good.
These characteristics of R&D activities and market failures described above, i.e.
uncertainty, lack of appropriability and financial constraints, will lead to an in-
vestment level into R&D below what would be done without these problems. It
is often posed that this leads to underinvestment into R&D from a social point of
view, i.e. social returns to R&D are assumed to be generally higher than private
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returns. In this context, it is often posed that a lack of appropriablity by the funded
firm could for example lead to positive spillovers and consumer surplus.
While also prevalent for the mature innovators, these issues are found to be more
substantial for young and small firms than for larger and more mature firms. As
already specified above, small young innovators are assumed to be more likely to
invest in radical innovations, which are often more uncertain and risky. When it
comes to spillovers, the former are often less able to effectively defend their intel-
lectual property or to extract most of the rents in the product market (Mansfield
et al., 1977; Lanjouw and Lerner, 2000; Lerner, 2002). Access to external finance is
also found to be more difficult for the young and small firms (see e.g. Himmelberg
and Petersen, 1994 and Hall and Lerner, 2010 for a recent survey). Young and small
firms usually lack the experience and necessary relationships that could reduce
problems of asymmetric information between themselves and potential debthold-
ers. In addition, especially small young firms have limited access to internal funds
as they cannot use earlier profit accumulations or a steady cash inflow from a
broad and established product portfolio for financing their R&D projects (see e.g.
Himmelberg and Petersen, 1994; Carpenter and Petersen, 2002; Cassar, 2004). Re-
search of Berger and Udell (2002) and Mu¨ller and Zimmermann (2006) for example
suggests that a limited access to finance might be a major reason why there would
be lower entrepreneurial activity in Europe than in the US.
Governments can design and implement several policy measures in an attempt
to circumvent these issues. One set of policy tools is direct and at the firm level
and consists of for example tax credits or public funding of private R&D activ-
ity. Another type of policy interventions is indirect. Examples are amongst others
patent policies, competition policies or trade policies (Aghion et al., 2005; Veugel-
ers, 2010; Bartelsman et al., 2004; Santarelli and Vivarelli, 2007; Mazzucato and
Parris, 2014; Furman et al., 2002). In the context of this dissertation, attention is
limited to project-specific innovation subsidies granted to firms. This policy tool
is fairly ’narrow’ in that it is a selective policy tool.6 The main argument is to get
6Note that, as mentioned in chapter 2 and in chapter 5, this government intervention to over-
come financial constraints should be seen next to private venture capital, a topic not explicitly
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projects with a high social value initiated that would not have been started as the
private value is considered too low by the firm. This type of support can effect
both the marginal rate of return (MRR) and marginal cost of capital (MCC) curves
of firms. The specificity of selective R&D subsidies is that firms have to go through
a selection procedure, they are thus not granted automatically. In general, all se-
lective subsidy schemes evolve along the following lines: after having applied for
a subsidy, the government agency decides upon the subsidy to be granted. If a
positive decision is made, the government usually funds only a part of the pro-
posed project (see e.g. Jaffe, 2002 for a general description of the subsidy granting
process).
Within this framework, several European countries specifically target small young
innovators in R&D subsidy programmes. In Germany for example, the ’high-tech
strategy 2020’ explicitly focuses on small young innovators active in key tech-
nologies as being the so-called ’drivers of innovation and the basis for new prod-
ucts, processes and services’ (BMBF (Federal Ministry of Education and Research),
2010). Similarly, the Flemish agency in Belgium, IWT, has preferential granting
schemes for SMEs and firms active in basic research.
There is a broad literature trying to evaluate the way in which firms make use of
these subsidies. In this context, especially the effect on R&D spending of firms has
been assessed. This is done as a main concern when granting R&D subsidies is that
this might as well entail crowding-out effects. This refers to the situation in which
innovation projects are subsidized that would also have been carried out without
public subsidies. So far, the main focus in subsidy evaluation literature was on
these input additionality effects, i.e. whether R&D subsidies increase investment
in R&D of firms (see David et al., 2000; Cerulli, 2010; Zu´n˜iga Vicente et al., 2014 for
surveys).
Another, but nevertheless less investigated aspect of R&D subsidies is the ability
to create additional output (Czarnitzki and Hussinger, 2004; Czarnitzki and Licht,
tackled in this dissertation (Bottazzi and Da Rin, 2002; Veugelers, 2011; Grilli and Murtinu, 2014)
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2006; Hussinger, 2008).7 It is in general questionable to what extent the induced
private R&D investments, if any, stimulate innovative output and thus lead to new
technologies at the firm level and if so, do this differently than private R&D (David
et al., 2000; Griliches, 1979). In general, research in this field cannot reject an equal
productivity of publicly induced R&D as compared to private R&D.
In general, the subsidy evaluation literature calls for a better understanding of
subsidy effects on small young innovators, next to some existing studies (Wallsten,
2000; Reinkowski et al., 2010; Colombo et al., 2011; Grilli and Murtinu, 2012). In
addition, as the previous paragraph suggests, this field would also benefit from
further research assessing both input and output additionality effects.
1.3 Overview of the different thesis chapters
While the above sections provide an overview of the general literature on the
growth of small young innovators and the fostering of progress by inducing in-
novation activities, the sections below will give a brief overview of the contribu-
tion of this dissertation to these specific topics. The thesis can be broadly divided
into two main parts. The first part investigates the growth of young innovative
companies (chapter 2) and the second part extends upon the evaluation of R&D
subsidies (chapters 3 and 4). More specifically, the latter two chapters look into
input and output additionality effects of subsidies on the firms under considera-
tion. The first of these chapters focuses more specifically on firm heterogeneity in
subsidy evaluation while the second one presents a new methodological approach
to estimate input and output effects of subsidies.
7It is important to note that this dissertation is only concerned with output effects for the sub-
sidized firm itself and abstracts from any positive or negative externalities created by subsidized
R&D activities such as e.g. a positive effect consisting of potential spillover effects that subsidies
might generate, increasing the performance of other players in the market. For a recent contribu-
tion in terms of estimating social value of R&D subsidies, see e.g. Takalo et al. (2013)
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1.3.1 Growth
Chapter 2 of this thesis assesses whether ’Young Innovative Companies’, as fos-
tered by the European Commission, have the presumed growth potential. The
aim of this chapter is thus to critically evaluate whether a current focus on young,
small and highly innovative companies is actually warranted and whether YICs
may hold the promise of higher growth rates than other firms.
Next to a first-time assessment of the growth of YICs, an important contribution
of this study is the explicit analysis of complementarity of the different factors,
size, age and innovation activities. This is assessed by comparing YIC growth to
growth of other types of small young firms that differ in terms of their intensity
of R&D activities. Finally, this chapter also analyzes the potential variability of
the growth of YICs over different points of the growth distribution by means of
quantile regressions. This is rooted in the premise that one might expect high
variability in growth of these firms as there is presumable a high heterogeneity
within the class of firms that can be categorized as YICs.
1.3.2 R&D subsidies: firm and method heterogeneity
Firm heterogeneity
As already introduced above, policy makers in Europe did not remain indifferent
to the specific constraints faced by small young firms and the presumed beneficial
effect of subsidies. Therefore, this chapter analyzes the impact of targeted R&D
subsidies to small young innovators. Within this relatively broad class of firms
some subsets, such as high-tech and independent firms, are acknowledged to suf-
fer even more from market failures related to innovation activities (Carpenter and
Petersen, 2002; Westhead and Storey, 1997; Hoshi et al., 1991; Schaller, 1993). This
literature suggests that small young independent high-tech firms are most in need
of external funding. In line with these findings and the objectives of the European
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Commission to provide less and better general state aid, several governments ac-
knowledge the specificity of specific subsets of small young firms (see e.g. the
high-tech strategy 2020 in Germany (BMBF (Federal Ministry of Education and
Research), 2010)). However, although the literature suggests a higher need for
support by these firms and governments seem to acknowledge this, there is no
conclusive evaluation yet on whether firm heterogeneity within broader sets of
firms should be a determining factor of policy stipulations.
In order to assess the efficacity of R&D subsidies targeted towards subsets of small
young innovators, Chapter 3 of this dissertation focuses on both input and output
additionality effects of subsidies granted to these firms in Germany. Next to the
main contribution of this chapter, distinguishing between the effects of subsidies
on different subsets of small young innovators, in line with the detailed focus of
scholars and policy makers, this chapter also questions the need for evaluating
R&D subsidies at a finer-grained level. Most of the subsidy evaluation literature
so far focuses on only one (sub)set of firms. However, it might well be important
to be more careful when assessing the impact of funding.
Method heterogeneity
The analysis on input additionality in chapter 3 is conducted by the method of
matching, a modern micro-econometric technique in order to address selection
bias and endogeneity of subsidies (see Heckman et al., 1999; Imbens and Wooldridge,
2009). Research in chapter 3 also adds to the less researched output evaluation
by estimating the effect of subsidies in a patent production framework using the
estimated treatment effects obtained from matching in order to reflect subsidy in-
duced R&D and the identified counterfactual reflecting private R&D, i.e. what the
firm would have invested without receiving subsidies.
Chapter 4 adds to the existing literature by constructing a structural model in
which both input and output effects are estimated in a simultaneous equations
model, which is not the case in chapter 3. In order to do so, subsidies are for the
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first time added to the Cre´pon, Duguet, Mairesse framework (Cre´pon et al., 1998),
which is essentially a refinement of the traditional knowledge production function
framework (Griliches, 1979). Integrating subsidy evaluation in this framework,
this setup acknowledges the inextricable nature of input and output stages in the
innovation process and presents a new approach for estimating output additional-
ity and assessing whether there is a discount or premium of subsidy induced R&D
compared to purely private R&D in terms of output.
1.3.3 Only the beginning of a roadmap
The different chapters of this dissertation raise attention towards studying (subsets
of) small young innovators and emphasize the importance of redirecting atten-
tion towards these firms both when studying general performance indicators and
when assessing the impact of specific policies. In addition, this dissertation shows
that not only firm heterogeneity should be taken into account, but also draws at-
tention to the fact that research should be increasingly involved with alternative
estimation methods.
Providing more detailed conclusions is beyond the aim of this introductory chap-
ter, but will be given in Chapter 5. This last chapter provides an overview of the
main results and the key insights of the thesis and provides an overall conclusion.
It also identifies and presents limitations of the presented chapters. In addition and
following upon the raised limitations, suggestions for further research are also for-
mulated in this concluding section, because after all, this dissertation is only one
point in the roadmap towards a deeper understanding of economic realities.
Chapter 2
Young Innovative Companies: the
new high-growth firms?
2.1 Introduction
As already touched on in the introductory chapter policy makers and scholars got
worried about the emerging gap between the United States and Europe in terms
of labor productivity over the past decades. In the mid–nineties, the European
Commission identified the ’European Paradox’ as a reason for this phenomenon.
They stated that Europe plays a leading role in top–level research output around
the world, but fails to convert this strength into technological innovation reaching
the market. In this view, the ‘upstream’ production of knowledge and technology
is thus considered as being world–class but the corporate sector, the ‘downstream’
market, is responsible for Europe’s productivity slowdown. In the recent past,
scholars rebutted this view on the world–class top–level research, finding that the
statistics indicating top–level European science were misleading and incomplete
(see e.g. Dosi et al., 2006, 2009). According to more intelligent bibliometric and
other related measures, European science is by no means world–leading in most
This research is based on the paper: Czarnitzki, D. and Delanote, J. (2013), Young innovative
companies: the new high-growth firms?, Industrial and Corporate Change 22, 1315-1340.
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areas. Nevertheless, a lack of entrepreneurial dynamics of the European corpo-
rate sector in comparison to the US has been assumed by multiple scholars. For
instance, as Veugelers (2009) argues, EU start–ups face higher entry and growth
barriers than their US counterparts. A major reason for this is limited access to
finance of European companies (see e.g. Berger and Udell, 2002, Mu¨ller and Zim-
mermann, 2006), such as e.g. the underdeveloped European venture capital mar-
ket as compared to the US (see e.g. Bottazzi and Da Rin, 2002). This Europe–US
disparity has, according to Veugelers (2009) serious consequences for economic
growth and therefore, she calls for policy initiatives aiming at young, innovative
companies — those which presumably radically innovate and allow reaping the
fruit of breakthrough innovations. In contrast to incumbent firms which focus
more on incremental innovations in order to protect their current market shares
and competencies rather than on developing radically new technologies having
the potential to create new markets (Henderson and Clark, 1990; Henderson, 1993),
small and young firms are less concerned with safe–guarding their current assets.
The view that such firms are more likely to introduce radical innovations and to
create new markets is confirmed by Baumol (2002) and Veugelers (2009) who re-
ported that major innovations have been introduced by small US firms during the
last century.
Given these stylized facts on limited access to capital, and, as a consequence sup-
posed lacking entrepreneurial dynamics, the European Commission has recently
reinforced the policies towards small and medium–sized firms and entrepreneurs
by introducing measures to facilitate the creation and growth of these companies.
With the revised state–aid rules for innovation support, the European Commission
especially reinforces policies towards potential radical innovators by introducing
the concept of Young, Innovative Companies (YICs) (see EC-DG ENTR, 2009, for
an overview). By the European definition, these companies are less than six years
old, have less than 250 employees and are highly R&D intensive, that is, they have
an R&D intensity larger than 15% as measured by R&D spending relative to total
operating expenses. Despite this increased attention by policy makers and schol-
ars, surprisingly little attention has been paid to the question whether YICs may
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actually hold the promise of higher growth than other firms. Therefore, this chap-
ter provides an empirical analysis on the growth potential of the existing YICs.
Although YICs are currently a rare species in European economies, it is highly in-
teresting to investigate whether the few existing YICs do actually show superior
growth patterns compared to other companies. If not, it would be questionable if
the revised state–aid rules for preferred subsidy treatment of these types of compa-
nies are justified. If no higher growth could be identified, European policy should
rather question other institutional barriers and regulatory burdens.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. The second section reviews
some literature on growth of small, young, technology–based companies in order
to motivate our specification of the growth equations, section 2.3 discusses the
data used and presents descriptive statistics, section 2.4 outlines the econometric
methods and presents the empirical results and section 2.5 contains some robust-
ness checks. Finally, a concluding section summarizes the findings and discusses
policy implications.
2.2 Theoretical background
2.2.1 The growth of companies
Investigating the growth of firms does not only shed light on the performance of
firms in the economy, but also on growth of the economy as a whole. As a con-
sequence, the growth of firms is already intensively investigated, both to evaluate
firm performance, and to assess the aggregate economic growth. As the growth of
YICs is investigated, incorporating the factors of size, age and innovation, some
of the studies that analyzed the influence of each of these factors on growth are
discussed.
The earliest contributions focusing on firm growth developed around the law of
proportionate effect, more commonly known as Gibrat’s Law, and related the size
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of the firm to growth. According to this law, the expected value of a firm’s growth
rate is independent of its current size (see also Sutton, 1997). In general, this law
was rejected in empirical studies. However, some of these studies pointed to the
fact that the law does hold for the larger firms in the economy but not for the small-
est firms (Evans, 1987a; Hall, 1987; Dunne and Hughes, 1994; Lotti et al., 2006). For
an overview of the literature building upon Gibrat’s law, see Sutton, 1997 and
Santarelli et al., 2006. Several studies acknowledged the particularity of smaller
firms and focused on this type of firms when analyzing growth. Some of these
studies found, although often only weakly, an inverse relationship between firm
size and firm growth, which was often also weakly confirmed for the larger firms
(Mansfield, 1962; Hall, 1987; Evans, 1987b; Lotti et al., 2006).
Next to size, age was also considered as an important determinant of company
growth. Jovanovic (1982) predicts that firm growth decreases with firm age if firm
size is held constant. Fizaine (1968), Evans (1987a,b), Geroski and Gugler (2004)
and Yasuda (2005) for example showed that age has, as predicted, a negative im-
pact on firm growth. In line with this, several scholars found extra variability in
firm growth for younger firms (Fizaine, 1968; Evans, 1987a,b). Many of the au-
thors testing Gibrat’s Law, also included age in their regressions, confirming the
negative relationship between this latter factor and growth. Evans (1987a), Fizaine
(1968) and especially more recent evidence of Haltiwanger et al. (2013) even sug-
gested that, if age was taken into account, size lost all of its effects, if any, on firm
growth. Haltiwanger et al. (2013) thereby question the main focus on small firms
instead of on young firms in literature and policy stipulation.
The quest to the determinants of firm growth came not to an end and several au-
thors extended their scope beyond solely size and age. Geroski (2000), for exam-
ple, pointed to the unpredictable, stochastic and idiosyncratic nature of growth
itself and concluded that this might be owing to the nature of innovation. The
outcome of innovations is highly unforeseeable and firm-level innovations could
thus be the key determinant of the growth of companies. The attention towards the
link between technical progress and growth was already elaborated in the macro-
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economic model of Romer (1990). According to this model, higher prosperity of
a country is positively related to the resources spent on R&D. Several scholars
investigated the influence of innovation on the growth at the company level (for
an overview of the theoretical models, see Aghion and Howitt, 1998). Mansfield
(1962), Scherer (1965), Geroski and Machin (1992) and Geroski and Toker (1996)
for example found a clear positive effect of innovation on growth.
2.2.2 The growth of Young Innovative Companies
The previous section clearly indicates that it is impossible to hold only one com-
pany characteristic responsible for the growth pattern of a firm. Instead, as several
of the above-mentioned authors showed, it is essential to investigate the combina-
tion of several factors in order to explain firm growth. The first scholar that can
be considered as explicitly linking two factors, in this case innovation and size,
is Schumpeter. Schumpeter’s Mark I scenario describes how new entrants are in-
volved in innovation activities in order to gain new market shares in function of
a longer survival and a successful growth. Many scholars followed Schumpeter’s
path and tried to find evidence of an interdependence between size, the share of
technological advances in the economy and growth. Mansfield (1962) for exam-
ple not only limited his research to the sole effect of innovation on growth, but
also oriented his attention towards smaller firms. He found that the positive effect
of innovation activities on growth was larger for smaller firms. In general, sub-
sequent studies confirmed this finding (Storey, 1994; Roper, 1997; Heunks, 1998;
Freel, 2000). Other scholars such as for example Baumol (2002) and Vaona and Pi-
anta (2008) point to the importance of small young firms, being the roots of radical
innovation, the source of future growth.
The fact that the individual firm characteristics were found to be complementary
in their influence on growth attracted the attention of scholars. As a consequence,
as already introduced in chapter 1, new ‘firm-type labels’ incorporating these char-
acteristics were defined and further investigated. The Arthur D. Little Consulting
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group, for example, awakened the interest in the so-called New Technology Based
Firms (NTBF), a combination of young and innovative firms (Little, 1977). How-
ever, it always remained unclear what the exact definition of a NTBF is. Numerous
scholars investigated these firms, defining them as a certain combination of being
young and/or active in high-tech sectors (Storey and Tether, 1998; Colombo and
Grilli, 2010; Licht and Nerlinger, 1998; Almus and Nerlinger, 1999). In general, the
evidence suggests that these firms grow above average.
More recently, the attention shifted to the Young Innovative Companies (YIC)
(Veugelers, 2008; Schneider and Veugelers, 2010). These firms combine several
characteristics and are small, young and highly intensively engaged in innovation
activities. As Veugelers (2008) argues, these YICs are exactly the ones more in-
clined to exploit a newly found concept, and not the incumbent firms. Incumbent
firms mostly introduce incremental innovations because they want to safeguard
existing profits and do not want to face the burden of an important restructuring
in order to being able to introduce a more radical innovation. YICs on the other
hand do not have to care as much as incumbent firms about these issues. Similarly,
Baumol (2002) and Vaona and Pianta (2008) argued that firms not concerned with
safeguarding existing skills or their market position are more inclined to introduce
radical innovations. Consequently, they might grow faster than other firms.2
2The European governments acknowledged the growth potential of these firms and conse-
quently several of the EU member states introduced special measures in order to facilitate the
creation and the growth of this type of firms. Article 35 of the General Block Exemption Regulation
(GBER) defines advisory conditions for aid to YICs (European Commission, 2008) by defining spe-
cific categories of state aid for which no notification to the Commission is necessary. The support
granted to YICs should be compatible with articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty, declaring certain
categories of aid compatible with the common market.
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2.3 Data and descriptive statistics
2.3.1 Data sources
This study investigates growth of YICs in Flanders, the northern part of Belgium.
Two different databases are combined: the Flemish part of both the Community
Innovation Survey (CIS) and the Eurostat/OECD Research & Development (R&D)
survey. The CIS is a survey that is largely harmonized across European member
states in order to get a coherent view on innovation inputs and outputs, and is car-
ried out in every odd-numbered year since 2005 (beforehand it was only carried
out every fourth year). Similarly to the CIS, the R&D survey collects harmonized
information about innovation and R&D activities across OECD member states and
is carried out in every even-numbered year. Although the foci of the surveys dif-
fer to some extent, we can use the combination of these data to construct a panel
covering firms in manufacturing and business services during the period 2001 -
2008.3 Besides information on R&D activity both surveys also include general in-
formation on the respondent firms, such as sales, number of employees, founding
year and so forth.
After dropping outliers and missing values in the variables of interest for this
study, we end up with an unbalanced panel of 7,888 firms-year observations cor-
responding to 3,537 different firms.4 Of these 3,537 different firms, about 45% are
only observed once. As a consequence, panel econometric approaches are ruled
out as this would significantly reduce the number of observations in our sample.5
3The CIS mainly collects information about firms’ innovation activities in general. The R&D sur-
vey focusses in more detail on R&D (and thus the main innovation input) and different dimensions
of R&D activities, such as financing, outsourcing etc.
4Due to some additional missing values in the sales variable we can only use 6,110 observations
when sales are considered as dependent variable.
5In addition, about 22% of the firms are observed twice, 16% are observed in three years, 7%
in four years, about 4% are observed five times, 2% six times and less than 2% are observed over
seven years. Only about 1% of the firms is observed in all years of the analysis.
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2.3.2 Variables
As already mentioned above, we measure annual growth both in terms of turnover
[(TURNit+1 − TURNit)/TURNit × 100]
and employment
[(EMPit+1 − EMPit)/EMPit × 100].
The turnover values used in this analysis were adjusted for inflation using a GDP
deflator as published by EUROSTAT.6 The use of both growth measures allows
us to shed a clearer light on the growth of the YICs. The literature is in general
ambivalent when it comes to determining which growth measure to use.
Employment growth is of high interest for policy makers as job creation is highly
important for a society. In addition, the focus on employment growth could be
especially relevant in the context of the current study as we focus on small, young,
R&D intensive firms. For these types of firms, it is possible that employment grows
before any potential sales even occur (Delmar et al., 2003). However, measuring
growth in terms of employment also has an important drawback closely related
to the previous statement. It is possible that no additional employees are hired
as technological progress is often labor-saving (Harrison et al., 2008). As Delmar
et al. (2003) remark, a company might grow considerably in output while no em-
ployment growth is occurring. For this reason, Coad and Rao (2006), for example,
prefer turnover as a growth measure in their empirical analysis. They state that it is
reasonable to expect a higher sales growth from successful innovators. Freel (2000)
favors turnover growth, as this is often considered as being precisely the reason for
increasing the number of employees in a company. Freel (2000) compared studies
using turnover and employment as a growth measure for small firms and found
that the studies using turnover growth to evaluate small firm innovation were far
less ambivalent in their results than the studies using employment growth as a
measure.
Delmar et al. (2003) state that one should use several growth measures in the same
6Source: ‘http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=prc hicp aind&lang=en’.
2.3. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 21
explanatory model in order to get a more complete picture of the underlying rela-
tionship. Consequently, and as already stated above, we will analyze the influence
of YICs on both growth measures in order not to focus on a single growth variable.
Our main independent variable of interest is the dummy indicating whether a
company is a YIC or not. We use the European definition as specified in article 35
of the General Block Exemption Regulation (GBER). This latter definition deter-
mines YICs as having fewer than 250 employees, being less than 6 years old and
spending at least 15% of its operating expenses on R&D. This definition is also
used by Schneider and Veugelers (2010), although they do not define R&D inten-
sity in terms of expenditures but in terms of turnover. As the European definition
explicitly defines the R&D intensity of YICs in terms of expenditures, we follow
the European R&D intensity specification.
For our subsequent analysis, we define a company as a YIC once it meets the cri-
teria for the first time in the period under review. As we are interested in studying
how these firms evolve over time, we do not define the YIC dummy on an annual
basis but fix it to the value of one once the YIC criteria have been fulfilled for the
first time in the sample period. This allows investigating the (long term) growth
of YICs compared to other companies even if these YICs exceeded the size thresh-
old of the YIC definition because they conducted business successfully. We will
present regression results with alternative YIC definitions as robustness checks in
a subsequent section of this chapter.
We include two additional independent variables in order to analyze the decisive
influence of being a YIC on growth. We question whether YICs can really be dis-
tinguished in terms of growth from small young innovators in general and small,
young firms, the latter not having any requirement with respect to innovation ac-
tivities. Therefore, we create two additional dummy variables, one identifying
Small Young Innovators (SYI) and the other indicating small, young firms (SY).
The SYI variable is analogous to the YIC-variable except with respect to the inten-
sity of R&D.7 While a YIC company is highly R&D intensive, the only requirement
7In the published version of this chapter, we label SYIs by the more widely-known term ’NTBF’.
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we set for a SYI is to have R&D spending above zero. With this SYI variable, we
control whether young, small, R&D performing firms grow differently than YICs.
The SY companies are small and young, specified according to the YIC definition,
but do not have any R&D requirements. We check thus whether it are not solely
the size and age requirements that significantly influence the growth of compa-
nies. We also adopt the longer-term view for SYIs and SY firms by specifying that,
once a company classifies as a SYI or SY, the firm stays a SYI or SY for the rest of
the sample period. YICs are defined as a subset of SYIs, which are in turn a subset
of SYs. In the regression analysis we code these dummies as mutually exclusive
variables (this eases the comparison of growth coefficients in the regression tables):
YICit =
{
1 if ageit < 6 & EMPit < 250 & RDintit > 15%
0 otherwise
SYIit =
{
1 if ageit < 6 & EMPit < 250 & RDintit > 0
0 otherwise or if YICit = 1
SYit =
{
1 if ageit < 6 & EMPit < 250
0 otherwise or if SYIit = 1 or if YICit = 1
In addition to these variables of main interest, YIC, SYI and SY, we include other
control variables commonly used in other studies on firm growth. We control for
the influence of innovation on growth by including RDint as a measure for the
R&D intensity of the firms. The R&D intensity variable is constructed as used
in the YIC definition and measures the R&D intensity as the proportion of R&D
expenditures to operating expenditures. RDint is measured in percentages and has
thus values between 0 and 100. We allow for a non-linear relationship by including
the squared R&D intensity in the regression (RDint2).
We control for age with the log of age, ln(AGE), and expect to find a negative
We relabeled this in the context of this dissertation as this labeling might be confusing compared
to how NTBFs are defined in chapter 3.
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effect of the age on growth, as discussed above. Similarly, we use the log of emp,
ln(EMP), in order to control for initial size in t-3.
Delmar et al. (2003) point to the potential important, but ambiguous influence of
the independence of firms on growth. While firms that are part of a group might
have the advantage of getting the necessary support to exploit new opportunities
from the parent company, these firms might lack the necessary flexibility to find
these new opportunities (see also Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000 and Barney et al.,
2001). Consequently, we include a group dummy (GROUP) indicating whether a
firm is part of a group. In addition to the group variable, a dummy is added taking
the value 1 if the home base of the company is not situated in Belgium (FOREIGN)
in order to control whether foreign ownership has an influence on growth.
Another dummy included in the regressions is EXPORT, taking the value 1 if the
firm exports to other countries, both within and outside Europe. We expect to find
a positive relationship between being an exporter and growth. Exporters might
learn from their presence in other markets. On the one hand, spillovers are more
likely to occur, which enables the exporting firm to perform better. On the other
hand, exporting allows the exploitation of economies of scale. However, the ev-
idence is not unambiguous with respect to this relationship (see Castellani, 2002
for a survey).
In addition, we control for differences in technological opportunities with industry
dummies. It is realistic to assume that unique attributes of a certain industry affect
the development of the firms in that industry (Delmar et al., 2003). These industry
dummies are based on the NACE codes, the Statistical Classification of Economic
Activities in the European Community. This classification is a European industry
standard classification system. Table A2.1 in the appendix shows the industry
structure of our sample. In addition, time dummies are constructed in order to
control for business cycle effects and four region dummies control for unobserved
heterogeneity across the different Flemish regions.
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2.3.3 Descriptive statistics
Table 2.1 shows the descriptive statistics of the different variables used in the re-
gressions for respectively YICs, SYIs, SYs and all other firms that can not be cat-
egorized as one of these firm types.8 The descriptive statistics reveal that YICs
grow, on average, more than all other firm types, both when growth is measured
in terms of employment and when measured by the change in sales.
In terms of sales growth, SYIs grow, on average, faster than both SY firms and other
firms. Similarly, SY firms have, on average, a higher sales growth than the other,
non-categorized, firms, which show an average negative sales growth. For em-
ployment, results are different and only YICs have, on average, a positive growth
in employment. Although YICs grow, on average 3.32% in terms of employment,
SYIs face an average loss of 0.44% and SYs even have a negative average growth
of 4.26%, which is lower than the average negative employment growth of 3.12%
of the other, non categorized, firms.
In line with the definition of the different firms, both YICs, SYIs and SYs are, on
average, younger than the other, non-categorized firms. Although the same result
holds for size, this difference seems to be less pronounced for SYIs, which are, on
average, clearly larger than YICs and SYs.9 In terms of R&D intensity, results are
also in line with expectations, as YICs have an average R&D intensity of 40.02%,
more than 35% points higher than the average R&D intensity of SYIs, which have
the second largest R&D intensity of the different firm types.
8Correlations between the variables are given in Table A2.2.
9This result is possible as both YIC, SYI and SY variables do not cover the exact YIC, SYI and
SY definition anymore. We specified that once a company classifies as a YIC, it remains a YIC
throughout the rest of the sample period.
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2.4 Empirical analysis
2.4.1 The growth of Young Innovative Companies: pooled OLS
To evaluate the growth of YIC companies, pooled OLS regressions are used. We
specify the following equation in order to estimate the growth of YICs, SYIs and
SYs separately10:
GROWTHi,t+1 =β0 + β1YICit + β2ln(EMP)it + β3ln(AGE)it + β4RDintit + β5RDint2it
+ β6FOREIGNit + β7EXPORTit + β8GROUPit + industry dummies
+ time dummies+ region dummies+ eit (1)
To control to what extent the growth of the different firm types can be really distin-
guished, we estimate a similar equation, with dummies of all mutually exclusive
firm types included:
GROWTHi,t+1 =β0 + β1YICit + β2SYIit + β3SYit + β4ln(EMP)it + β5ln(AGE)it
+ β6RDintit + β7RDint2it + β8FOREIGNit + β9EXPORTit
+ β10GROUPit + industry dummies+ time dummies
+ region dummies+ eit (2)
We use a cluster-robust covariance matrix in order to account for heteroskedastic-
ity and for arbitrary autocorrelation within a firm, as the errors of the same firm
observed over multiple years might be correlated.11
Table 2.2 presents the regression results. Columns 1 to 4 show the results when
employment growth is used as dependent variable and the results for sales growth
are presented in columns 5 to 8.
10To measure the growth of SYIs and SY firms, the YIC dummy inserted in the equation is re-
placed by the SYI and SY dummies respectively.
11Note that results are robust to regression-to-the-mean effects, in line with the remarks raised
by a.o. Davis et al. (1996); Haltiwanger et al. (2013).
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We find for both growth measures that YICs grow significantly more than any
other type of firm, while both pure SYIs and SYs, so without the YIC category and
without the YIC and SYI categories respectively included, have an insignificant
or negative coefficient. Column 3 shows that being a YIC increases employment
growth with almost 5%, all else equal. Similarly, column 7 indicates that YICs
achieve a higher expected sales growth of approximately 7.5%, ceteris paribus.
Columns 4 and 8 assess to what extent the growth of YICs can be really differenti-
ated from the growth of firms with the same age and size requirements but with a
lower R&D intensity, SYIs, and with no innovation activities, SYs. In other words,
is it really the combination of the three factors of size, age and R&D intensity that
gives the YICs a higher growth capability or can the same growth pattern be found
for firms that do not combine these factors? For both growth measures, we find a
positive confirmation of the superior growth of YICs compared to the other firms.
Although the SYI and SY dummies are insignificant in both regressions, the YIC
dummy stays positive and significant.
The importance of the combination of different factors in YICs is further confirmed
by the results of the inclusion of the individual size, age and R&D intensity vari-
ables in the regressions. For both growth measures, size and age have a significant
negative effect on growth which is in line with the literature. The estimation re-
sults reveal that there is an inverted u-shaped relationship between R&D intensity
and sales growth. The estimation results do not reveal a significant effect of R&D
intensity on employment growth. This result is in line with the findings of Har-
rison et al. (2008) who argue that technological progress is often labor-saving. A
higher R&D intensity in itself is thus not leading to higher employment if not seen
in combination with the factors age and size.
We cannot find a significant relationship between being part of a group and growth,
and between foreign ownership and growth. For the export variable, however, we
find a negative significant relationship. This implies that an exporting firm would
grow less than the other firms. Although this result may seem counterintuitive,
similar negative results with the export dummy have been found in productivity
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studies. Clerides et al. (1998), Bernard and Jensen (1999) and Bernard and Wagner
(1997) studied the influence of export on productivity and find at best an insignifi-
cant influence and otherwise a negative impact of export on productivity growth.
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2.4.2 Quantile regressions
Ordinary least squares estimations as used above represent average effects of the
covariates, and thus only give a partial insight in the relationship between depen-
dent and independent variables. As the effect of a covariate might be heteroge-
neous across the distribution of the dependent variable, we also estimated quan-
tile regressions taking the distribution of the underlying dependent variable into
account (Buchinsky, 1998; Koenker and Hallock, 2001; Koenker, 2005; Angrist and
Pischke, 2009). Quantile regressions shed a more complete picture of the relation-
ship between employment growth and the different regressors at different points
of the conditional distribution of the dependent variable, y. Instead of minimizing
a sum of squared residuals as in OLS estimations, quantile regressions solve the
minimization of a sum of asymmetrically weighted absolute residuals (symmetric
at the median). The θth quantile regression solves:
min
βθ
1
n
{ ∑
i:yi≥x′i βθ
θ|yi − x′iβθ|+ ∑
i:yi<x
′
i βθ
(1− θ)|yi − x′iβθ|} = min
β
1
n
n
∑
i=1
ρθ(eθi),
where x
′
iβθ is the linear prediction and different weights are given to absolute er-
rors, i.e. over- and underpredictions get different penalties. The last term of this
equation is just an alternative representation where ρθ(eθi) = (θ − I(eθi < 0))eθi is
a so-called check function with I(·) an indicator function and eθi corresponding to
the error term.
Quantile regressions are appealing to analyze the growth of the YICs, as Mansfield
(1962) found an, on average, higher but also more variable growth of small firms.
Presumably, YICs show the same pattern as found by Mansfield and the higher
growth of YICs as compared to the other firms could be even more pronounced
in the higher quantiles, whereas the opposite could be true in the lower quantiles.
In other words, there is probably a high variation in the growth of YICs over the
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distribution and consequently, a difference in the estimated slope parameters at
different quantiles of the conditional growth rate distribution. If this is the case,
this can be attributed to the high heterogeneity within the class of firms that are
categorized as YICs. Scatterplots of size on growth and age on growth give a first
indication that it is good to perform quantile regressions (see figure 2.1). Both
the youngest and the smallest firms show a high variability in growth, both when
growth is measured in terms of employment as when sales growth is measured.
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Figure 2.1: Variation of size and age over the growth distribution
We estimate quantile regressions at each decile of the distribution and correct the
estimated standard errors for heteroskedasticity by bootstrapping. Bootstrapping
is used instead of the calculation of asymptotic standard errors, as this would re-
quire the estimation of the conditional density of the error term (Angrist and Pis-
chke, 2009). We use a bootstrapped quantile regression estimation with 500 repli-
cations.
Table 2.3 shows the result of the quantile regressions on the sales growth of YICs.
The nine different columns refer to nine different deciles for which the quantile
regression was performed, with the first decile presented in column 1 and the last
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decile presented in column 9. In the first two deciles, the sign of the YIC coeffi-
cient is negative but insignificant. Consequently, there is no evidence that YICs
would be performing worse than the other firms in the lowest growth quantiles,
thus compared to other low performers. Only from the fifth decile onwards, the
coefficient for YICs becomes significant and positive. Until the sixth decile, how-
ever, the growth rate of YICs remains below the average growth rate found in the
OLS regressions. From the seventh decile onwards, the growth rate of YICs sur-
passes the growth rate that was found in the OLS regressions, evolving from a 15%
higher growth rate in the seventh decile to an approximately 30% higher growth
rate in the ninth decile, ceteris paribus. Consequently, we find that firms having
the YIC characteristics in the higher growth quantiles, show a superior growth as
compared to the other categories of firms. The other main finding is that there is
no evidence of a slower growth of the YICs in the lowest quantiles. This is remark-
able, as one could have expected that YICs that fail perform poorer than the other
firms due to their high-risk factor.
The quantile regression results in table 2.3 also show the evolution of the firms that
categorize as pure SYIs and SYs over the different quantiles. For SY firms, we find
significant results at different points of the distribution. However, the sign of the
significant coefficients is always negative. As a consequence, the relevance of the
combination of the different factors in YICs is strongly confirmed. The quantile
regressions also reveal that size has a positive significant effect on growth in the
first two deciles. This indicates that, among the least-growing firms, being a larger
firm is beneficial for growth, at least in terms of sales. This result can be related to
the result of the SY dummy, indicating that especially small young non-innovating
firms grow less than the other least-growing firms. Among the bulk of not or
slowly growing firms, it is reasonable to expect that the small young firms, not
heavily involved in innovation activities, will grow even less as they might not
have built up valuable resources yet.
2.4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 33
Ta
bl
e
2.
3:
Q
ua
nt
ile
re
gr
es
si
on
s
on
sa
le
s
gr
ow
th
(6
,1
10
ob
se
rv
at
io
ns
)
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
10
%
20
%
30
%
40
%
50
%
60
%
70
%
80
%
90
%
Y
IC
-1
2.
18
5
-1
.7
04
2.
33
3
3.
55
3
5.
53
4*
*
7.
17
2*
*
14
.7
30
**
*
21
.5
10
**
*
29
.4
45
**
*
(7
.4
76
)
(4
.7
66
)
(2
.9
61
)
(2
.9
79
)
(2
.6
28
)
(3
.5
87
)
(5
.1
60
)
(4
.9
17
)
(7
.6
44
)
SY
I
2.
46
8
0.
55
2
1.
01
4
-0
.0
20
-1
.0
92
-2
.0
39
-1
.5
06
-2
.0
23
0.
00
1
(2
.5
67
)
(1
.7
32
)
(1
.2
96
)
(1
.3
79
)
(1
.1
91
)
(1
.2
50
)
(1
.3
75
)
(2
.5
86
)
(4
.2
73
)
SY
-7
.3
26
*
-6
.8
54
**
-2
.7
39
-4
.6
99
**
*
-4
.9
72
**
-2
.3
99
-0
.5
68
0.
07
3
8.
60
9
(4
.1
84
)
(3
.2
04
)
(2
.2
40
)
(1
.4
86
)
(2
.3
45
)
(2
.8
19
)
(2
.5
38
)
(3
.7
26
)
(1
0.
94
8)
ln
(E
M
P)
0.
83
7*
0.
54
8*
0.
32
6
-0
.0
04
-0
.2
76
-0
.6
88
**
*
-1
.1
48
**
*
-1
.4
54
**
*
-2
.8
23
**
*
(0
.4
33
)
(0
.2
88
)
(0
.2
28
)
(0
.2
01
)
(0
.1
77
)
(0
.1
99
)
(0
.2
36
)
(0
.2
98
)
(0
.5
29
)
ln
(A
G
E)
-0
.0
02
-0
.5
98
-0
.0
77
-0
.3
15
-0
.6
82
**
-0
.9
97
**
*
-0
.8
52
**
-1
.5
67
**
*
-2
.2
98
**
(0
.8
76
)
(0
.5
09
)
(0
.3
67
)
(0
.3
82
)
(0
.3
40
)
(0
.3
41
)
(0
.4
12
)
(0
.5
74
)
(1
.0
30
)
R
D
in
t
-0
.1
74
-0
.0
48
0.
07
0
0.
10
4
0.
11
5*
0.
13
4*
*
0.
24
2*
**
0.
19
6*
*
0.
44
0*
*
(0
.1
66
)
(0
.1
03
)
(0
.0
81
)
(0
.0
66
)
(0
.0
64
)
(0
.0
59
)
(0
.0
77
)
(0
.0
97
)
(0
.1
93
)
R
D
in
t2
0.
00
1
-0
.0
01
-0
.0
02
-0
.0
02
*
-0
.0
02
**
-0
.0
02
**
*
-0
.0
04
**
*
-0
.0
02
-0
.0
05
*
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
03
)
FO
R
EI
G
N
3.
19
0*
*
1.
65
7*
0.
77
0
0.
11
2
0.
36
7
1.
03
9*
0.
52
0
0.
81
5
0.
48
1
(1
.4
89
)
(0
.9
38
)
(0
.6
69
)
(0
.6
37
)
(0
.6
93
)
(0
.6
13
)
(0
.6
89
)
(0
.9
21
)
(1
.7
18
)
EX
PO
R
T
-4
.7
01
**
*
-2
.6
52
**
*
-2
.6
53
**
*
-1
.2
87
**
-0
.9
46
-0
.7
52
0.
07
6
-0
.4
14
1.
40
3
(1
.3
16
)
(0
.9
40
)
(0
.6
30
)
(0
.6
40
)
(0
.6
56
)
(0
.6
55
)
(0
.6
87
)
(0
.8
67
)
(1
.6
54
)
G
R
O
U
P
-5
.2
26
**
*
-2
.8
41
**
*
-2
.4
21
**
*
-1
.6
60
**
-1
.2
61
**
-0
.9
72
-0
.2
21
0.
24
1
2.
78
9*
(1
.3
27
)
(0
.8
58
)
(0
.6
52
)
(0
.6
51
)
(0
.6
04
)
(0
.6
16
)
(0
.6
64
)
(0
.8
50
)
(1
.5
75
)
C
on
st
an
t
-2
7.
15
7*
**
-1
8.
55
2*
**
-1
3.
60
9*
**
-7
.4
17
**
*
-1
.2
43
5.
71
3*
**
9.
53
9*
**
18
.3
51
**
*
31
.0
14
**
*
(3
.5
70
)
(2
.3
03
)
(1
.7
19
)
(1
.7
80
)
(1
.6
97
)
(1
.4
41
)
(1
.7
35
)
(2
.4
42
)
(3
.9
52
)
*
p
<
0.
10
,*
*
p
<
0.
05
,*
**
p
<
0.
01
N
ot
e:
Bo
ot
st
ra
pp
ed
st
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
ar
e
gi
ve
n
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s
(5
00
re
pl
ic
at
io
ns
).
R
eg
re
ss
io
ns
co
n-
tr
ol
fo
r
ti
m
e,
re
gi
on
an
d
in
du
st
ry
du
m
m
ie
s.
34 CHAPTER 2. YOUNG INNOVATIVE COMPANIES: THE NEW HIGH-GROWTH FIRMS?
Ta
bl
e
2.
4:
Q
ua
nt
ile
re
gr
es
si
on
s
on
em
pl
oy
m
en
tg
ro
w
th
(7
,8
88
ob
se
rv
at
io
ns
)
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
10
%
20
%
30
%
40
%
50
%
60
%
70
%
80
%
90
%
Y
IC
6.
68
3
5.
20
8*
*
3.
63
7*
*
2.
07
9*
*
1.
64
2
4.
21
5*
*
6.
05
1*
**
9.
72
2*
**
11
.6
11
**
*
(5
.1
05
)
(2
.4
45
)
(1
.8
51
)
(1
.0
59
)
(1
.0
33
)
(2
.0
92
)
(2
.1
89
)
(3
.0
91
)
(3
.4
08
)
SY
I
5.
23
2*
**
1.
67
6
1.
67
2*
0.
26
5
0.
20
5
0.
37
5
0.
00
0
0.
22
4
-0
.5
19
(1
.8
56
)
(1
.2
48
)
(0
.8
80
)
(0
.6
35
)
(0
.7
62
)
(0
.7
38
)
(0
.8
45
)
(1
.5
37
)
(2
.0
06
)
SY
-6
.4
41
*
-4
.7
03
**
-3
.2
69
**
-1
.3
40
-0
.8
06
-1
.0
23
-0
.7
81
0.
08
7
2.
74
2
(3
.5
29
)
(2
.0
70
)
(1
.6
52
)
(1
.3
26
)
(0
.8
35
)
(0
.7
01
)
(1
.4
03
)
(1
.7
42
)
(3
.0
79
)
ln
(E
M
P)
1.
73
2*
**
1.
05
0*
**
0.
46
1*
**
0.
00
9
-0
.2
52
**
-0
.3
41
**
*
-0
.6
71
**
*
-1
.2
07
**
*
-2
.4
04
**
*
(0
.2
85
)
(0
.1
87
)
(0
.1
56
)
(0
.1
10
)
(0
.1
05
)
(0
.1
02
)
(0
.1
19
)
(0
.1
85
)
(0
.2
36
)
ln
(A
G
E)
0.
98
5*
-0
.1
18
-0
.1
99
-0
.4
13
**
-0
.3
29
*
-0
.3
91
**
-0
.6
06
**
*
-1
.3
63
**
*
-2
.1
75
**
*
(0
.5
90
)
(0
.2
87
)
(0
.2
21
)
(0
.1
76
)
(0
.1
86
)
(0
.1
72
)
(0
.2
16
)
(0
.3
09
)
(0
.5
32
)
R
D
in
t
-0
.2
60
**
*
-0
.1
94
**
*
-0
.0
35
0.
03
1
0.
04
3
0.
06
0*
0.
11
7*
*
0.
27
7*
**
0.
30
6*
**
(0
.0
94
)
(0
.0
74
)
(0
.0
58
)
(0
.0
34
)
(0
.0
31
)
(0
.0
36
)
(0
.0
46
)
(0
.0
61
)
(0
.0
95
)
R
D
in
t2
0.
00
2
0.
00
1
0.
00
0
-0
.0
00
-0
.0
01
*
-0
.0
01
**
-0
.0
02
**
*
-0
.0
03
**
*
-0
.0
03
**
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
01
)
FO
R
EI
G
N
1.
03
6
1.
42
9*
*
0.
92
3*
*
0.
48
7
0.
41
7
0.
17
1
0.
26
9
0.
48
8
0.
55
8
(0
.9
62
)
(0
.5
74
)
(0
.4
15
)
(0
.3
59
)
(0
.3
46
)
(0
.3
13
)
(0
.3
64
)
(0
.5
05
)
(0
.7
31
)
EX
PO
R
T
-2
.8
86
**
*
-3
.1
94
**
*
-2
.9
94
**
*
-3
.0
53
**
*
-2
.8
37
**
*
-2
.3
34
**
*
-1
.6
65
**
*
-2
.5
62
**
*
-2
.3
13
**
*
(1
.0
43
)
(0
.6
45
)
(0
.4
37
)
(0
.4
42
)
(0
.3
61
)
(0
.3
70
)
(0
.3
93
)
(0
.4
73
)
(0
.8
34
)
G
R
O
U
P
0.
00
9
0.
07
6
0.
21
3
0.
24
2
0.
17
2
0.
16
5
0.
07
3
-0
.0
54
0.
35
8
(0
.8
83
)
(0
.6
13
)
(0
.4
49
)
(0
.3
53
)
(0
.3
38
)
(0
.2
75
)
(0
.3
58
)
(0
.5
23
)
(0
.8
27
)
C
on
st
an
t
-3
4.
03
9*
**
-1
8.
95
0*
**
-1
1.
55
9*
**
-5
.1
32
**
*
-1
.5
53
1.
58
6*
*
4.
91
3*
**
13
.2
76
**
*
27
.0
74
**
*
(2
.6
64
)
(1
.5
28
)
(1
.3
23
)
(0
.9
46
)
(1
.0
43
)
(0
.6
55
)
(1
.0
49
)
(1
.5
25
)
(1
.9
62
)
*
p
<
0.
10
,*
*
p
<
0.
05
,*
**
p
<
0.
01
N
ot
e:
Bo
ot
st
ra
pp
ed
st
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
ar
e
gi
ve
n
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s
(5
00
re
pl
ic
at
io
ns
).
R
eg
re
ss
io
ns
in
-
cl
ud
e
ti
m
e,
re
gi
on
an
d
in
du
st
ry
du
m
m
ie
s.
2.4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 35
Table 2.4 presents quantile regression results for employment growth. These re-
sults confirm even more the superior performance of YICs as compared with the
other types of firms, having lower innovation intensities, SYIs, or no innovation
activities, SYs. Except for the first and fifth decile, the YIC coefficient is positive
and significant over all quantiles. Again, we see that the highest significant growth
difference between YICs and other companies is situated in the upper quantiles.
The growth rate surpasses the average OLS growth rate from the seventh quantile
onward.
In the first and third decile, the SYI coefficient is positive and significant. However,
in the third decile, the dummy is only weakly significant and the coefficient is far
below the positive significant coefficient of YICs. In addition, it is only among the
least-growing firms that the SYI coefficient is higher and more significant than the
YIC coefficient. When we focus again on the higher quantiles, the fast-growing
firms, no significant effect of SYIs can be found. With respect to the other con-
trol variables, the results presented for the quantile regressions on employment
growth largely confirm the results found for sales growth.
In figure 2.2, we show a graphical representation of the evolution of the YIC co-
efficient over the distribution of growth as presented in the quantile regressions.
The solid line and the gray area present the YIC coefficient of the quantile regres-
sions and its confidence interval. The dashed line represents the OLS coefficient,
while the dotted lines below and above present the confidence interval of the OLS
estimator.
For sales growth, we see a clear, upward trend of the YIC coefficient over the
growth distribution. Although the coefficient is still negative in the first decile,
it increases steadily till the last deciles, largely surpassing the OLS estimator and
its upper bound of the confidence interval. A test on the differences between the
YIC coefficients over the different quantiles shows that they are significantly dif-
ferent from each other, showing that the slope of YICs is indeed different over the
different quantiles.
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Figure 2.2: Quantile regression representation of the YIC coefficient
For employment growth this trend is, in general, less upward. However, while the
coefficient stays close the OLS estimator in the first and middle quantiles, it sur-
passes the OLS estimator in the last deciles, the deciles of the fast-growing firms.
Another finding is that the YIC coefficient never goes below zero. Consequently,
although the results are very variable in the first deciles, YICs never perform sig-
nificantly worse than the other companies at any point of whole growth distribu-
tion. Estimates of the difference between the YIC coefficients over the different
quantiles show that they are significantly different at the 5% level. When disen-
tangling these differences further, results indicate that these differences are solely
driven by the upper quantiles (80% and 90%) which are significantly different from
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the lower and middle quantiles.
2.5 Robustness checks
2.5.1 YIC growth in the short and medium term
In the previous section, we investigated the long-term growth of YICs.12 However,
one could question how the growth pattern evolves if shorter time spans are taken
into consideration. Therefore, we also investigate the growth of YICs (and of SYIs
and SY firms) in the short and medium term. In order to do so, we restrict the time
span of the initial definition of YICs, SYIs and SY firms. Instead of considering
a YIC, SYI or SY firm as belonging to the respective firm group for the rest of
the sample period after the respective criteria have been met once, we set shorter
thresholds. To measure short-term growth of YICs, we only allow a firm to be
a YIC maximum three years after it had actually fulfilled the criteria of the YIC
definition. Medium-term growth is measured by setting this maximum allowed
time span to five years. For both short-term growth and medium-term growth, the
definitions of SYIs and SY firms are adjusted analogously.
Table 2.5 presents the short-term and medium-term growth rates of the covered
firm types as specified above. Columns 1 and 2 reveal that, in the short-term, YICs
grow significantly faster than all other firms, both in terms of employment and
sales. This superior growth of YICs is also confirmed when measuring medium-
term YIC growth. In addition and in line with the previous results, YICs outper-
form SYIs and SY firms over both alternative time spans considered. In general,
the growth measures do not seem to vary a lot depending on the different YIC
definitions used. This confirms the high growth capacities of YIC companies in
the short, medium and long term.13
12Closely related to this, table A2.3 in appendix 2.B shows an extension on the ’durability’ of
growth
13An alternative extension would be to vary the YIC definition in terms of its R&D intensity
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Table 2.5: Short-term and medium-term YIC growth
Short-term YIC growth Medium-term YIC growth
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Emp Growth Sales Growth Emp Growth Sales Growth
YIC 4.348** 7.95** 4.286** 8.051**
(2.189) (3.687) (2.109) (3.491)
SYI 1.277 1.196 1.148 0.337
(1.141) (1.916) (1.069) (1.730)
SY -1.668 -1.212 -1.925 -2.143
(1.476) (3.036) (1.408) (2.890)
ln(EMP) -0.336* -1.080*** -0.334* -1.079***
(0.185) (0.285) (0.185) (0.285)
ln(AGE) -0.718*** -1.352*** -0.746** -1.490***
(0.298) (0.515) (0.301) (0.520)
RDint 0.052 0.138 0.051 0.132
(0.051) (0.143) (0.052) (0.093)
RDint2 -0.001 -0.002** -0.001 -0.002**
(0.001) (0.045) (0.001) (0.001)
FOREIGN 0.762 0.691 0.769 0.696
(0.563) (0.434) (0.562) (0.882)
EXPORT -2.704*** -2.032** -2.716*** -2.045**
(0.490) (0.864) (0.490) (0.864)
GROUP 0.635 -0.898 0.624 -0.915
(0.510) (0.830) (0.510) (0.830)
Constant -2.618 4.683** -2.510* 5.195**
(1.410) (2.241) (1.424) (2.266)
N 7888 6110 7888 6110
R2 0.057 0.075 0.058 0.075
F-statistic 16.53*** 13.55*** 16.528*** 13.545***
F-test on joint significance of
-industry dummies 4.38*** 7.97*** 4.40*** 7.96***
-time dummies 28.84*** 39.16*** 28.66*** 39.12***
-region dummies 2.05* 0.85 2.04* 0.88
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Note: Cluster-robust standard errors are given in parentheses.
Short-term YIC definition: Once a company classifies as a YIC, it is only considered as being a
YIC for a maximum of three further years after fulfilling the criteria of the YIC definition.
Medium-term YIC definition: analogous to the short-term definition but the threshold of elapsed
years is set to five instead of three.
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2.5.2 Controlling for a potential survival bias
As we use survey data to investigate the growth of YICs, our regressions might
suffer from a potential survivor bias. If YICs are more likely to exit the market
than other firms, we would overestimate their growth rate as the surveys can only
account for firms that have survived until the date of the data collection. There-
fore, we have tried to control for firm survival by employing a Heckman selection
model. First, we estimate the probability of survival using a Probit model with the
population of firms as obtained from the ‘Belfirst’ database14, or more precisely,
for that part of the population where we have information on determinants possi-
bly influencing survival as described below. From the Probit model, we obtained
the predicted propensity score of survival that we used to compute Heckman’s
inverse Mills ratio (see e.g. Heckman, 1979). Then we included the inverse Mills
ratio in the growth equations as reported above.
The Belfirst database contained 38,438 observations that could be used for the first
stage regression, the survival equation. According to the Belfirst database, about
10% of the 38,438 observations exited the market. The reasons can be summarized
as liquidation, bankruptcy and being absorbed in a merger. The latter is not nec-
essarily a “negative exit” as selling the firm to another owner might actually be
a highly profitable business strategy and may happen because of doing business
successfully. Therefore, we ran different versions of the Probit model. In one ver-
sion we included all types of exits, and in another we dropped all firms that were
absorbed in a merger (2,254 observations, i.e. about 5.9% of the data). This change
in sample specification did not have any effect on the conclusion as reported be-
low.
threshold. Appendix 2.B, table A2.4 shows the relevance of this threshold.
14The Belfirst database is published by Bureau van Dijk and basically contains accounting data
for the population of Belgian firms.
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As the Belfirst database provides mainly accounting information, we cannot iden-
tify YICs in the first stage regression on survival because of missing R&D informa-
tion. Therefore, we tried to explain survival by the following determinants: firm
size, labor productivity, capital intensity, cash flow, debt ratio, industry, region and
time dummies. We also experimented with a number of interaction terms and dif-
ferent functional forms as well as different lag structures and changes in variables
rather than using levels. Although the estimated coefficients had largely the ex-
pected signs in the survival regressions, it turned out that the explanatory power
of these regressions was low. This resulted in the following problem: whenever
we estimated the growth equation augmented with the inverse Mills ratio, we only
got insignificant results concerning the selection term, and all results we reported
earlier in this study persisted. This does, however, not convincingly reject the idea
that the growth equations might suffer from a survival bias. It rather turns out
that our first stage regression might not fit the data well enough to estimate the
possible bias to a satisfactory extent. Our first stage regression never predicted a
probability of survival lower than 93%. This owes to the limited availability of
regressors having decent explanatory power on future exit. We believe that one
would need a more targeted, forward looking measure, such as a credit rating (see
e.g. Czarnitzki and Kraft, 2004, 2007), to forecast exits and eventually account for a
survival bias convincingly. Unfortunately, we do not have credit ratings or some-
thing comparable available for these data. Therefore, our robustness check on a
potential survival bias in the growth regression remains somewhat inconclusive.
2.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, the growth of Young Innovative Companies (YICs) is analyzed.
Governments seem to have high expectations of these firms. However, we ques-
tion whether these expectations are, in general, reasonable. In addition, it is not
clear to what extent the combination of size, age and R&D intensity is a crucial
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combination determining firm growth. We question whether YICs show higher
growth rates than firms encompassing only part of the factors that determine YICs.
Therefore, we compare YIC growth to the growth of both small, young (SY) firms
and small young innovators (SYIs). SYIs have the same size and age requirements
as YICs, but their R&D criterion is less strict, as their R&D intensity should just be
higher than zero percent. We question whether the R&D requirement matters at
all in order to explain growth by comparing YICs to small young firms (SY), only
incorporating the size and age requirements of YICs.
In general, we find that YICs grow more than other firms, both when measuring
growth in terms of sales and in terms of employment. In addition, our results con-
firm the relevance of combining the different factors incorporated in YICs. When
combined in the regressions, the positive significant growth result of YICs holds,
whereas no positive, significant result can be found for SYIs and SY firms. As a
consequence, the combination of the factors age, size and R&D intensity seems to
be crucial for the superior growth of YICs.
We also analyzed the growth of YICs by means of quantile regressions in order to
address the possibly high variation in YICs’ growth. We find evidence that there
is indeed a high variation in the growth rates of YICs at different points of the
growth distribution, that is, the estimated coefficients of the quantile regressions
are sometimes significantly different from the coefficient obtained with OLS re-
gressions. However, YICs show a superior growth in the highest growth quantiles
indicating that these firms grow even more than the already fast growing firms.
Another important finding is that we do not find, at any point of the growth dis-
tribution, a negatively significant effect of being a YIC on growth (both when sales
growth and employment growth are analyzed). This indicates that the growth of
YICs does not vary to that extent that YICs dramatically ’fall harder’ as compared
to the other slow-growth firms.
In general, this study reveals that the expectations on growth of YICs (mainly put
forward by European policy makers) might be justified, as their growth appears
to be higher than that of other firms, on average. As a consequence, the reinforce-
42 CHAPTER 2. YOUNG INNOVATIVE COMPANIES: THE NEW HIGH-GROWTH FIRMS?
ment of state aid programs towards YICs, as defined in the EC’s General Block
Exemption Regulation (GBER) might foster growth and job creation. Especially
the higher growth of YICs compared to SYIs and SY firms may well affirm the
relaxed limitations on national state aid by governments in the European Union.
Re-directing increased state aid to YIC is also in line with economic arguments
on market failure in the context of R&D activities. The literature has suggested
that young, highly innovative companies suffer more from financial constraints
than other firms (see e.g. Himmelberg and Petersen, 1994, or the recent survey
by Hall and Lerner, 2010, for an overview on the financial constraints literature).
In addition, both positive sales and employment growth suggest that the innova-
tion activities of YICs are successful to a certain extent at least. In the long-run,
other companies are likely to benefit from successful R&D activities of highly in-
novative companies by building further on promising innovations. Governments
should thus not only focus on the growth potential of YICs as isolated cases, but
should view the results in a broader context, acknowledging the potential social
value of YICs. Note that the ’validity’ of any policy recommendation deserves
further analysis as this chapter has no prescriptive role in this respect.
In terms of further research, it would be highly interesting to trace YICs over
longer periods of time than we could do in this chapter with our data in order
to study the possible higher exit rates of YICs when compared to other companies.
In addition, the current estimations disregard other firm characteristics that were
recognized to determine growth such as for example the already in the introduc-
tory chapter discussed financial constraints (in this context, see e.g. Carpenter and
Petersen, 2002). Similarly, several scholars found above-average education and
skills of founders and employees of these small young innovators. In accordance
with competence-based theories, these latter factors are recognized as key determi-
nants of growth (see e.g. Colombo and Grilli, 2005 discussing these determinants
in the context of growth of young high-tech firms). In line with this, other factors,
such as industry dynamics are also acknowledged as impacting growth dynam-
ics (e.g. Mazzucato and Parris, 2014 for some recent research on the competitive
environment as impacting the R&D–growth relationship). Furthermore, it would
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have been interesting to derive the macroeconomic potential for job creation. This
has unfortunately not been possible in this study, as we cannot identify how many
YICs exist in the population because we have to rely on our sample from the sur-
veys for calculating the R&D intensity. It would have been required to have R&D
information for the whole population of firms in order to define the YICs also in
the population and not only in the sample. Note that more general limitations to
this dissertation that also apply to this chapter are discussed in chapter 5.
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Chapter 3
R&D subsidies to small young
companies: should the independent
and high-tech ones be favored?
3.1 Introduction
As already introduced in the previous chapters, expectations on the creation of
valuable new knowledge are especially high for small and young firms (Veugelers,
2008; Schneider and Veugelers, 2010; Czarnitzki and Delanote, 2013). Performance
effects of these firms have been found to be even more pronounced in high-tech
sectors. Audretsch (1995) for example, following upon Dunne et al. (1988) who
found differences in growth rates across different industries, touches upon the im-
portance of sectoral differentiation. The small start-ups active in a highly innova-
tive environment seem to perform better than the ones in a low-tech environment.
In this line of research, Westhead and Cowling (1995) and Almus and Nerlinger
(1999) found also that the new technology based firms (NTBFs), thus independent
firms in high-tech sectors showed the highest growth rates. Increasingly, schol-
Joint work with Dirk Czarnitzki
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ars focused on these firms in high-tech sectors as incubators of economic progress
(see e.g. Bartelsman et al., 2004; Calvo, 2006; Colombo and Grilli, 2010; Cozza et al.,
2012).
Before introducing an innovation on the market, these small young firms need to
invest in R&D. However, as is widely known, investment in R&D suffers from
market failures, as already introduced in chapter 1. These will be briefly reca-
pitulated here. First, firms might be reluctant to invest in R&D as the generated
knowhow by R&D activities can spill over to competitors, hindering the appropri-
ation of the returns from the initial investment (Schumpeter, 1942; Nelson, 1959;
Arrow, 1962). In addition, innovative firms often face financial constraints for
R&D activities. Funding R&D projects is risky, as the outcome of R&D invest-
ments is often very unclear and once the R&D investment is effectuated, it is to a
large extent irreversible, no matter what the outcome is (Pindyck, 1991; Dixit and
Pindyck, 1994) because R&D investments encompass a large share of sunk costs.
Not only equipment can be highly project-specific, but also the human capital and
the tacit knowledge that this entails. These specific characteristics of R&D invest-
ments lead to information asymmetries between firms and external suppliers of
finance, resulting in underinvestment in R&D (Arrow, 1962; Stiglitz and Weiss,
1981).
While also prevalent for the mature innovators, these problems are found to be
worse for young and small firms than for larger and more mature firms. When it
comes to spillovers, the former are often unable to effectively defend their intellec-
tual property or to extract most of the rents in the product market (Mansfield et al.,
1977; Lanjouw and Lerner, 2000; Lerner, 1999, 2002). In addition, access to exter-
nal finance is also found to be more difficult for the young and small firms (see
Evans and Jovanovic, 1989; Holtz-Eakin et al., 1994b,a; Czarnitzki and Hottenrott,
2011 and Hall and Lerner, 2010 for a recent survey). Young and small firms usu-
ally lack the experience and necessary relationships that could reduce problems
of asymmetric information between themselves and potential debtholders. Him-
melberg and Petersen (1994) and Carpenter and Petersen (2002) focus more specif-
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ically on independent high-tech small young firms and conclude that these firms
are more financially constrained. Westhead and Storey (1997) explicitly compare
the extent to which most technologically sophisticated small firms are more finan-
cially constrained than less technologically sophisticated ones. They find that the
high-tech, technology sophisticated firms were more impeded in growth due to
financial constraints than the comparison group. Goodacre and Tonks (1995) state
that innovation in high-tech industries is more likely to be of a new sort because
of which it is more difficult to evaluate the investment by financiers. Storey and
Tether (1998) focus more specifically on NTBFs, corresponding to the class of small
young independent high-tech firms in this study and emphasize their higher need
of external financing. Based upon this literature, we would expect that the small
young independent high-tech firms are most in need of external funding as they
are more likely to lack internal financing. In the same vein, most of these scholars
focus on independent small young innovators, the rationale being that group firms
have the advantage of their parent while the non-group counterparts on the other
hand, lack the critical mass and the experience to access funds for their high-risk
R&D projects. That independent firms would be more in need of external funding
is already suggested multiple times in literature. In general, Hoshi et al. (1991),
Schaller (1993) and Czarnitzki and Hottenrott (2011) confirm that large internal
capital resources reduce underinvestment problems, suggesting that this is even
more true for R&D investments.
Ever since Schumpeter, who emphasized the necessity of temporary monopoly
profit for financing of future R&D, economists acknowledged the importance of in-
ternal finance for funding R&D investment and further elaborated upon this topic
(Schumpeter, 1942). In the context of small young firms, several scholars found a
positive relationship between R&D investment and internal finance (Himmelberg
and Petersen, 1994; Czarnitzki and Hottenrott, 2011). However, as pointed out at
the same time by these scholars, especially small young firms have limited access
to internal funds as they cannot use earlier profit accumulations or a steady cash
inflow from a broad and established product portfolio for financing their R&D
projects (see also e.g. Berger and Udell, 2002; Carpenter and Petersen, 2002; Cas-
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sar, 2004).
Policy makers in Europe did not remain indifferent to the specific constraints faced
by small young firms and the presumed beneficial effect of subsidies. As a con-
sequence, they are heavily engaged in providing support to innovation activities
of this type of firms. The increased attention towards small and young firms fits
within the flagship initiative ’Innovation Union’ under the ’Europe 2020’ targets,
the reworked Lisbon Strategy 2010 goals (EC-DG Research and Innovation, 2011).
One of the main objectives of the European Commission is to provide ’less and
better’ general state aid. Moncada et al. (2010) state that at least size, age, innova-
tiveness and sectoral differentiation should play an important role in the choice of
policy measure targets. The authors claim that the granting process of innovation
subsidies should be oriented towards small, young, high-tech innovators. The fo-
cus on high-tech firms gained increasing attention by some European countries. In
Germany for example, the country analyzed in this study, the ’high-tech strategy
2020’ explicitly focuses on key technologies as being the so-called ’drivers of in-
novation and the basis for new products, processes and services’ (BMBF (Federal
Ministry of Education and Research), 2010).2 In addition, the European Commis-
sion specifies that autonomous SME’s should be distinguished from group firms
and the focus of different policy measures is on the former group (European Com-
mission, 2008). However, although both the literature suggests a higher lack of
financing for these firms and the government seems to acknowledge this, there is
no conclusive evaluation yet on whether these firms show higher treatment effects
when receiving subsidies.
In order to evaluate whether the subsidy granting process of small, young firms
should be determined by independence and sectoral differentiation, we compare
the impact of subsidies on small young firms that are either independent or part of
a group and active in high-tech or low-tech sectors. In order to do so, we analyze
2Some policies are designed and implemented focusing on R&D intensity of firms instead of on
sectoral differentiation (see also chapter 2 of this dissertation). In the current setting of Germany
however, we follow the stipulations by the BMBF.
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the subsidy impact on New Technology Based Firms (NTBF), group NTBFs, Low
Technology Based Firms (LTBF) and group LTBFs. NTBFs are, since their introduc-
tion by the Arthur D. Little Consulting Group a well-known type of firms (Little,
1977). Several scholars investigated this type of firms and found, in general, a
high innovative performance and growth (Storey and Tether, 1998; Colombo and
Grilli, 2010; Licht and Nerlinger, 1998; Almus and Nerlinger, 1999). In this study,
NTBFs refer to small, young, independent firms active in high-tech sectors. LTBF
is a concept coined by us in order to denote the ’counterparts’ of NTBFs with re-
spect to sector of activity. While NTBFs are active in high-tech sectors, LTBFs are
small, young indepedendent firms active in low-tech sectors. We also evaluate the
subsidy impact on firms that have all characteristics of how LTBFs and NTBFs are
defined in this study, except for the independence component. In other words,
we also evaluate the impact on these so-called group NTBFs and group LTBFs,
that are thus part of a group, in order to assess the relevance of current policies to
mainly target independent firms. Table 3.1 graphically presents the four groups of
firms analyzed in this study and recapitulates the differences between the different
types of firms.
We evaluate the impact of direct R&D subsidies granted to companies on several
R&D input measures and in a second step on output. In order to evaluate the
impact of subsidies on the R&D investment of the different categories of small
young firms, we perform caliper matching with replacement. However, it is a pri-
ori unclear, if additional R&D due to subsidies is found in the first place, whether
this also leads to technological progress of the subsidized firm. Thus, even if no
crowding out can be found in the first place, it remains questionable what the
technological (and thus economic) benefits of public funding are. In this study,
technological performance is measured by patent applications and analyzed in a
patent production framework, with the private and publicly induced R&D effort
taken from the results of caliper matching in the first step.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: sections 3.2 and 3.3 review
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Table 3.1: Overview of the firms studied, embedded in the full sample
NTBF
Small, young independent
firms, active in high-tech
sectors
Group NTBF
Small, young group firms,
active in high-tech sectors
Small Old firms
LTBF
Small, young independent
firms, active in low-tech
sectors
Group LTBF
Small, young group firms,
active in low-tech sectors
Large young
firms
Large old firms
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the evaluation literature and outline the econometric method used for both the in-
put and output analysis, section 3.4 discusses the data used and presents descrip-
tive statistics and section 3.5 presents the empirical results. Finally, a concluding
section summarizes the findings and discusses policy implications.
3.2 Subsidy input evaluation
In this study, we first evaluate the impact of direct subsidies on innovation in-
put. It is an empirical question how firms that receive these subsidies react to
this support. It is possible that the subsidies are subject to crowding–out effects.
This might happen if firms replace their privately financed R&D projects by the
publicly subsidized ones. Furthermore, the empirical analysis could reveal het-
erogeneity in subsidy effects among the different firm types. For instance, many
innovation subsidies to young, small firms are oriented towards firms that are not
part of a group. If our results, however, would show higher treatment effects for
firms associated with groups, it would suggest a current misallocation of public
resources.
In order to measure the effect of public support on R&D input, several econometric
models were proposed. However, estimating the effect of public subsidies is not
that straightforward as subsidies are likely to be endogenous. Firms that receive
a subsidy are presumably different from companies that do not receive a subsidy.
A first difference already emerges at the application stage as some firms might be
more likely to apply for public funding than others. Indeed, some firms might con-
sider the administrative burden or the information sharing conditional upon being
subsidized as important reasons to restrain from applying for a subsidy. In addi-
tion, there is a possibility that the funding agencies follow a picking-the winner
strategy with respect to the firms that applied for a subsidy. In other words, firms
might have some characteristics that make them more attractive to governments
for funding. As a consequence, funding cannot be considered as a random pro-
cess and this selection should be accounted for when evaluating subsidy schemes.
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Comparing subsidized and unsubsidized firms based on random samples would
thus lead to biased results. In order to evaluate the impact of subsidies on the
R&D investment of the different firm types, caliper matching is performed in this
study. Doing so, we do not use a random control group, but firms that are actually
similar to the subsidy recipients in observed characteristics.
3.2.1 Literature review
The impact of R&D policies on firms’ innovation behavior has already been ex-
tensively covered in the economic literature. The main focus in the literature is
on the input additionality of subsidies. As a consequence, most of the literature
addressed the issue of crowding-out effects of subsidized R&D. David et al. (2000)
and Cerulli (2010) survey the literature on subsidy effects and find that, in general,
the results of the reviewed literature vary a lot and only a limited number of au-
thors effectively tackles the selection bias described above. Zu´n˜iga Vicente et al.
(2014) provide the most recent literature survey on the effect of public subsidies
on R&D investment.
Busom (2000), for example, applied a selection model and excluded total crowding-
out. Lach (2002) and Gonzales et al. (2005) reject total crowding-out by analyz-
ing the effect of subsidies using difference-in-differences and simultaneous equa-
tion models with threshold, respectively. A lot of studies applied matching, the
method that is also used in this chapter, in order to evaluate the input effect of
R&D subsidies. Almus and Czarnitzki (2003), for example, reject crowding out
as they find that Eastern German firms that received public R&D subsidies in-
creased their innovation activities. Similarly, Aerts and Czarnitzki (2004); Duguet
(2004); Czarnitzki and Hussinger (2004) and Gonzales and Pazo (2008) reject (full)
crowding out in Belgium, France, Germany and Spain, respectively. Czarnitzki
and Lopes Bento (2010) apply matching in a cross-country comparative evalua-
tion and also reject total crowding out.
In line with policy attention, several scholars shifted their attention towards sub-
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sets of firms, by focusing on younger and/or smaller firms when evaluating the
effect of public subsidies on R&D input. Wallsten (2000), for example, uses a 3SLS
approach in order to evaluate the effect of grants to small firms in the context of the
SBIR program. At first sight, he finds crowding–out of firm–financed R&D spend-
ing dollar for dollar. However, Wallsten (2000) remarks that this result could be
simply due to the fact that firms would have cut back their R&D expenditures in
case no public funding was available. In other words, the R&D grants may have
allowed firms to continue their R&D at a constant level rather than cutting it back.
Reinkowski et al. (2010) apply matching and specifically focus on SMEs. They find
that SMEs, and especially the micro firms show an increase in R&D intensity as a
result of the subsidies. Reinkowski et al. (2010) also find that subsidies increase
the probability of patent application for small and medium sized firms.
While the above studies already focus on subsets of firms, the impact of subsi-
dies on the group of NTBFs and its counterparts has not been discussed exten-
sively in the literature so far. Some studies evaluated the effect of subsidies on
output measures. Colombo et al. (2012) for example show that NTBFs grow most
after receiving public funds and especially if these are allocated through a selec-
tive evaluation process. Colombo et al. (2011) and Grilli and Murtinu (2012) focus
more specifically on R&D subsidies and find that TFP growth of NTBFs is only en-
hanced if subsidies are provided competitively and if they aim at enhancing R&D
investments.
Apart from the current study, there are, to our knowledge, no papers that study
the effect of innovation subsidies on R&D input of NTBFs. Neither exist studies
that investigate the different subsidy effects on NTBFs, Group NTBFs, LTBFs and
Group LTBFs, evaluating that way whether the current policy focus towards non-
group firms in high-tech sectors is really as fruitful as presumed.
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3.2.2 Methodology
In this study, we apply Caliper Matching. The technique of matching has, among
others, been discussed by Angrist (1998); Dehejia and Wahba (1999); Heckman
et al. (1998); Lechner (2000). In the context of this chapter, matching tries to ad-
dress the following question: “What is the effect of a subsidy grant on a subsidized
firm?”. In general, we want to observe the difference between the actual observed
R&D of the subsidized firms and the counterfactual situation. The average treat-
ment effect αTT of firms receiving a subsidy, the treated firms, (T) relative to firms
receiving no treatment, the counterfactual situation, (C) can be written as:
E
(
αTT
)
= E
(
YT|S = 1
)
− E
(
YC|S = 1
)
(1)
In this equation, YT denotes the outcome of the treated firms and YC the outcome
of the untreated firms. S takes the value 1 if the firm is subsidized and zero oth-
erwise. However, it is impossible to observe the outcome YC in the counterfactual
situation because it is impossible to observe the actual behavior of the same firm
without treatment. Therefore, this counterfactual outcome of treated firms has
to be estimated and is in this context constructed based upon the control group
of non-subsidized firms. The idea is to balance the sample of subsidized firms
and comparable non-subsidized firms. The remaining differences between the
matched firms can then be fully attributed to the received treatment, a subsidy
in this case.
It already became clear above that comparing the subsidized and unsubsidized
firms based on random samples would lead to biased results because of the pos-
sible selection bias. When performing matching, we replicate the conditions of
an experiment to the best possible extent. Therefore, we determine a broad set of
characteristics, X, that should be equal among the compared firms. In other words,
we compare the treated firm with an untreated firm that is identical to the treated
firm with respect to the characteristics that we define. This set of characteristics
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should be exhaustive. Rubin (1977) introduced this as the Conditional Indepen-
dence Assumption (CIA), which stipulates that the treatment and the outcome of
this treatment are independent for the observations having the same set of exoge-
nous characteristics. If this CIA is satisfied, the following equation is valid:
E
(
YC|S = 1,X
)
= E
(
YC|S = 0,X
)
(2)
Based upon this equality, the outcome of the non-subsidized firms can be used
to estimate the counterfactual situation of the subsidized firms and the treatment
effect can then be written as:
E
(
αTT
)
= E
(
YT|S = 1,X=x
)
− E
(
YC|S = 0,X=x
)
(3)
Usually, X contains many different variables in order to satisfy the Conditional
Independence Assumption. This makes it almost impossible to find control vari-
ables that exactly fit the characteristics of the subsidized firm. In other words, the
so-called curse of dimensionality enters because the more dimensions that are in-
cluded, the more difficult it becomes to find a good match. Rosenbaum and Rubin
(1983) showed that it is possible to reduce X to a single index -the propensity score-
and match on this index instead of on all the individual X. The propensity scores
are constructed based upon a probit model of treatment, in this case subsidies, on
the exogenous variables and then used as matching argument.
It is necessary that the propensity scores of the treatment group and the control
group coincide. In some cases, however, this is not the case. This problem is re-
ferred to as the ’common support problem’. It is crucial that the sample of unsubsi-
dized firms contains at least one observation similar to each subsidized firm. This
requirement is imperative, as, when performing matching, we restrict the sample
to firms with common support.
In this study, we evaluate the effect of subsidies by applying caliper matching
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with replacement (Cochran and Rubin, 1973). This method is similar to the near-
est neighbor matching method but it adds an additional restriction. In this case,
treated units are selected to find their closest match in terms of the propensity
score, but only if the propensity score of the control is within a certain, pre-specified,
distance. Thus, by applying this method, it is possible that a treated observation
cannot be matched to a control. The matching routine used in this study is pre-
sented in table 3.2. In addition, as an additional restriction, we require the firm
observations in the control group to belong to the same year and the same region
(Eastern versus Western Germany) as the corresponding firm in the group of sub-
sidized firm observations.
Table 3.2: The matching protocol
Step 1 Specify and estimate a probit model to obtain the propensity scores Pˆ(X).
Step 2 Restrict the sample to common support: delete all observations on treated firms with prob-
abilities larger than the maximum and smaller than the minimum in the potential control
group. (This step is also performed for other covariates that are possibly used in addition
to the propensity score as matching arguments.)
Step 3 Choose one observation from the subsample of treated firms and delete it from that pool
Step 4 Find an observation in the sub-sample of subsidized firms that is as close as possible to the
one chosen in step 3 in terms of the propensity scores, but only if the propensity score of the
control is within a certain, pre-specified, distance. Closeness is based on the Mahalanobis
distance between this firm and all non-subsidized firms in order to find the most similar
control observation. MDij=(Zj-Zi) Ω−1 (Zj-Zi) where Ω is the empirical covariance matrix
of the matching arguments based on the sample of potential controls. Do not remove the
selected controls from the pool of potential controls, so that it can be ued again
Step 5 repeat steps 3 and 4 for all observations on subsidized firms
Step 6 Compute the estimate of the treatment effects using the results of step 5. This can be done
with a t–test on mean differences between treated firms and selected controls.
Step 7 As we perform sampling with replacement to estimate the counterfactual situation, an or-
dinary t-statistic on mean differences is biased, because it does not take the appearance of
repeated observations into account. Therefore, we have to correct the standard errors in
order to draw conclusions on statistical inference. We follow Lechner (2001) and calculate
his estimator for an asymptotic approximation of the standard errors.
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3.3 Subsidy output evaluation: the patent production
function
Even if we can reject crowding-out, this does not imply that public efforts lead
to new technologies of the subsidized firm itself.3 The projects that were not car-
ried out yet might be associated with a higher chance of failure and/or lower ex-
pected revenues (going down the MRR curve) and might thus also not be the most
promising projects in terms of technological output (David et al., 2000). However,
if the additionally induced projects do not have lower chances to succeed, but
could not be started due to a lack of financing, there is a likelihood that the project
leads to positive technological output. Another consideration with respect to the
question whether output additionality can be expected is closely linked to the ra-
tionale to look at input additonality at the level of R&D employees (see below)
(Goolsbee, 1998; Howells, 2008). Suppose that the additional money is redirected
to increase wages of the existing staff, this will then presumably also not be trans-
lated in output (unless staff becomes more productive). This is another reason
why a focus on R&D employment is crucial. Another argument is related to the
peer review process. Assuming the selection process is fully efficient, the most
promising, high quality projects might have been selected, which would increase
the expectations that an effect on technological performance is found due to this
subsidized R&D. In addition, this process might also entail a possible monitoring
process effect, i.e. management of projects, potentially increasing the likelihood
of successful R&D (Lerner, 1999; David et al., 2000; Barney et al., 2001; Colombo
and Grilli, 2005; Teece and Pisano, 1994). The subsidy grant might also serve as
a signal to potential investors and clients (certification effect), which might on it-
self increase the likelihood that the technological output of firms increases (Lerner,
3The focus in this chapter is only on technological performance of the subsidized firm itself.
This cannot account for any effects subsidies might have on technological performance of other
firms via potential spillover effects that occur between the subsidized firm and other firms in the
economy. It might well be the case that some additional R&D of the firm will thus not lead to
beneficial private effects, but will impact other firms’ innovation activities and thus maybe lead to
beneficial social effects via these other market players (or negative if this has a negative effect on
too many efficient competitors).
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1999).
In order to assess the effect of both private and publicly induced R&D on techno-
logical performance, we estimate their effect on patent applications. Patents are
already extensively discussed and acknowledged as an indicator of technological
performance (see Pakes and Griliches, 1984; Griliches, 1990, 1998 or OECD, 1994).
More specifically, they point to immediate output of the R&D process, i.e. point to
successful R&D.
In order to estimate the patent production function, count data models are usually
used and in this study, a QMLE (Quasi-Maximum Likelihood Estimator) Poisson
model is estimated in order to to analyze the impact of R&D on the number of
patent applications.4 In this setting, R&D is split into two components, purely pri-
vate R&D (the counterfactual situation) and publicly induced R&D (referring to
both the effect of subsidies and the increase in private R&D due to subsidies). Un-
fortunately, one cannot observe this breakdown based upon the datasets at hand.
Therefore, we construct these measures based upon the previous matching pro-
cedure by disentangling the R&D input into the research engagement of the firm
in the absence of a treatment, R&DCi , and the additionally induced R&D by the
subsidy (including the subsidy itself), αTTi . Note that the observed R&Di is thus
decomposed according to eq. 3: R&Di = R&DCi + α
TT
i . Thus, the second equation
to be estimated can be written as
PATENTi = f
(
R&DCi ,α
TT
i ,other firm characteristics
)
(4)
If subsidies have a positive effect on technological performance of the firm under
consideration, αTTi should positively influence the patent outcome.
5
4An assumption of the poisson model is E(Yi|xi) = Var(Yi|xi) (Wooldridge, 2002). If the latter
is not the case, there is over- or underdispersion. Implementing a statistical test of overdispersion
in line with Cameron and Trivedi (1990, 2005) shows that there is overdispersion in the model.
As a consequence, QMLE poisson is implemented which has no specific requirements about the
functional form of overdispersion, but corrects for wrong SE in a poisson model by using robust
SE (Wooldridge, 1997).
5Note that contemporaneous R&D is inserted in this equation as this has been found to have
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Although, as shown above, several scholars already investigated input addition-
ality effects, not that many studies tried to establish an explicit link between a
certain (government) intervention and patenting behavior. Branstetter and Sakak-
ibara (2002) do not focus on government subsidies as in the current chapter, but on
the effect of being a member in a subsidized research consortium. They find that
being member of such a consortium has a positive effect on patenting. Czarnitzki
et al. (2007) focus on the effect of subsidies and collaboration on patent outcome,
but as an output variable in the matching routine, thus not disentangling the coun-
terfactual and publicly induced R&D. In line with the current study, but focusing
on all types of firms in the economy, Czarnitzki and Hussinger (2004) implement a
matching estimator in order to estimate innovation input additionality and output
additionality based upon the matching estimators in a second step.
3.4 Data, variables and descriptive statistics
3.4.1 Data sources
The data used in this chapter stem from the Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP),
the German part of the Community Innovation Survey. Next to information on
general firm-level characteristics, this database contains specific information on
innovation activities and the receipt of subsidies. Our database is a pooled cross–
section including the following years of observations (these years of the MIP data
include information on subsidies): 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2003, 2004 and
2006. Patent data are taken from the German Patent and Trade Mark Office (GPTO).
Our version of the database contains information on all patent applications in Ger-
many from 1979 to 2005. Patent and firm data were linked using a computer-
supported text search algorithm and potential matches were checked manually.
Our sample includes NTBFs, Group NTBFs, LTBFs and Group LTBFs. All these
the strongest effect on patenting (Hall et al., 1986; Pakes and Griliches, 1984).
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firm classes have less than 250 employees and are less than 10 years old. In addi-
tion, all the firms in the sample are innovative and have thus introduced at least
one new or significantly improved product or process, or have ongoing or aban-
doned innovation projects over the period covered in the survey. While NTBFs
and LTBFs are not part of a group, their Group counterparts are. NTBFs and
Group NTBFs belong to the high-tech or key-tech technologies as defined in the
high-tech strategy (BMBF (Federal Ministry of Education and Research), 2010),
while LTBFs and Group LTBFs belong to medium low-tech and low-tech sectors
(for an overview of the industry classification, see table A3.1 in appendix).6 Table
3.3 presents the sizes of the different samples before and after matching. As can
be derived from the table, the sample initially consists of 1228 NTBFs, 609 Group
NTBFs, 965 LTBFs and 470 Group LTBFs. Each time, a part of the firms are sub-
sidized and a part not. All non-subsidized firms can potentially serve as controls
for matching. Table 3.3 shows that, in line with expectations, a larger share of
NTBFs receive subsidies than LTBFs. After matching, the sample of subsidized
firms is slightly reduced to 605 subsidized NTBFs, 262 subsidized Group NTBFs,
283 subsidized LTBFs and 95 subsidized Group LTBFs, to which an equal number
of non-subsidized firms were matched.
Unfortunately, we can use the data only as pooled cross-sections, but not as a
panel: of the total initial sample of 3,272 observations, corresponding to 2,399 dif-
ferent firms, about 72% of the firms are only observed once. As a consequence,
panel econometric approaches are ruled out as this would significantly reduce the
number of observations in our sample.
6this distinction between high-tech and low-tech industries coincides with distinguishing be-
tween the most and least R&D intensive sectors in the German economy, based upon the survey
data.
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Table 3.3: The samples further unfolded
NTBF
subsidized 649
potential controls 579
Matched subsidized firms: 605
Group NTBF
subsidized 306
potential controls 303
Matched subsidized firms: 262
Old firms (< 250
employees, ≥ 10
years old)
6432 obs
LTBF
subsidized 328
potential controls 637
Matched subsidized firms: 283
Group LTBF
subsidized 120
potential controls 350
Matched subsidized firms: 95
Large firms (≥ 250
employees, < 10
years old)
695 obs
Large and Old
firms (≥ 250
employees, ≥ 10
years old)
2936 obs
3.4.2 Variables
This study investigates the influence of subsidies on various outcome variables.
The receipt of subsidies over the covered survey period is denoted by a dummy
variable SUB. The subsidy dummy covers subsidies from the national or regional
governments and from the EU. In order to evaluate the effect of subsidies on the
innovative behavior of firms, we investigate the impact on R&D intensity of these
firms, RDint. This variable is constructed as the ratio of internal R&D expenditures
to turnover (multiplied by 100). Next to the R&D intensity, we also evaluate the
subsidy effect on R&D expenditures (R&D).
A large part of R&D spending consists of salary payments for R&D employment.
If companies increase their R&D expenditures after receiving R&D subsidies, a
large fraction of these increased spending might be distributed towards hiring new
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R&D employees, enlarging that way the inventive capacity. However, as Gools-
bee (1998) and also more recently Howells (2008) states, R&D labor supply might
be quite inelastic and thus the increased spending might be redirected to higher
wages for the existing staff instead of resulting in new human capital, which is not
the direct aim of government subsidies. Similarly, Hall and Lerner (2010) empha-
size that R&D employees form a real resource base with high adjustment costs.
In order to evaluate the impact of innovation subsidies on R&D employment, we
investigate the impact of R&D subsidies both on the number of R&D employees
(RDemp) and on the R&D employment intensity (RDEint), measured as the num-
ber of R&D employees over the total number of employees (multiplied by 100).
In the second stage, we disentangle R&DEint into the counterfactual situation
RDEintCi and the additionally induced R&D employment intensity, αTT,i for all
four firm groups. The dependent variable in this stage is the number of patent
applications (PAT).
We use a number of control variables: a first variable that is included is size. Al-
though we are already focusing on small firms, there might still be differences
between the larger and smaller firms in this subset. We measure size by total em-
ployment both in its logarithmic form (ln(EMP)) and as a square of this logarithm
(ln(EMP)2) in order to capture possible nonlinearities. Similarly, although we are
already focusing on the smallest firms of the economy, we include the logarithm
of age (ln(AGE)) in the analysis in order to capture differences between start–ups
and older firms.
Firms that export to other countries might be more innovative than other com-
panies. The chance that they apply for innovation subsidies is thus also higher.
As a consequence, a dummy indicating whether a firm is an exporter or not, EX-
PORTER, is included in the analysis. Another variable that is assumed to be pos-
itively correlated with subsidy receipt is capital intensity (CAPINT). Capital in-
tensive firms supposedly rely more heavily on innovation activities than the less
capital intensive ones (fixed assets/EMP).
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Another variable that is included is the price-cost margin (PCM). Firms with a
higher price-cost margin are more likely to have financial resources for internal
funding of R&D projects, which is positive in light of financial constraints as dis-
cussed above. As a consequence, they might apply less for subsidies. On the other
hand, a high price-cost margin might be the result of successful past innovation ac-
tivities and the likelihood to receive subsidies might thus increase. The price-cost
margin is constructed as suggested by Collins and Preston (1969) and Ravenscraft
(1983): ((sales - staff cost - material costs)/sales).
The history of (successful) R&D activities is likely to strongly influence both the
probability to receive subsidies, R&D expenditures and R&D employment. If a
firm already has a lot of experience in R&D activities, this firm is more likely to
know how to apply for subsidies and to invest more in new R&D activities. In
addition, governments often adopt a picking-the-winner strategy and firms with
previous successful innovations might thus be favored in the granting process. In
order to capture the influence of past R&D, we include the patent stock in our
regression as patent stock per employee (PS/EMP). We divide by employees in
order to reduce potential multicollinearity with firm size. Patent stock is defined
as
PSit = (1− δ)PSi,t−1 + PAit,
where PS is the patent stock of firm i in period t and t-1 respectively, PA is the
number of patent applications filed in period t. The patent stock in period t-1 is
depreciated at a constant rate, with δ set to 0.15 (see e.g. Jaffe, 1986; Hall, 1990;
Griliches and Mairesse, 1984).
As already elaborated upon above, credit constraints might also have an influence
on subsidy receipt and the outcome variables. In order to capture the access a firm
has to external capital, we use the firm’s credit rating, RATING, lagged one period.
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The credit rating is obtained from Creditreform which is the largest German rating
agency. The rating is an index ranging from 100 to 600, where 600 is the worst and
essentially corresponds to bankruptcy of the firm.
The dummy variable EAST indicates firms that are located in Eastern Germany.
Eastern Germany is still in transition from a planned to a market economy, and
firm behavior may thus be different. In addition, Eastern German firms are pre-
ferred in the policy incentive schemes, and special schemes have been launched
exclusively for these firms in order to accelerate the catching up process in this
region.
In addition, we control for differences in technological opportunities with industry
dummies. The complete industry structure for the medium high-tech and high-
tech industries on the one hand and the medium low-tech and low-tech industries
is presented in table A3.1 in appendix. These industry dummies are based on the
NACE codes, the Statistical Classification of Economic Activities in the European
Community. This classification is a European industry standard classification sys-
tem. Finally, seven time dummies are constructed in order to control for business
cycle effects.
For the variables PCM, CAPINT and RATING, we have some missing values. In
order to account for these missing values, we construct dummy variables equal to
1 if the values are missing (D(PCM), D(CAPINT) and D(RATING)). In addition,
we set the missing values in the original variables to zero. Including both the
dummy variable and the adjusted original variables in the analysis corrects for
missing values and avoids the imputation of unknown values. Also note that all
time-varying variables enter the regression as lagged values to avoid simultaneity
bias. The only exception is AGE, as we consider this as truly exogenous.
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3.4.3 Descriptive statistics
Table 3.4 displays the descriptive statistics of the variables used in order to eval-
uate subsidies for the four different firm classes. The t-tests reveal that there are
some significant differences between the group of subsidized firms and the poten-
tial control group. The subsidized firms are, on average, more export-oriented,
are more often situated in Eastern Germany and have more patents per employee.
Some average differences are only significant for specific firm types. For example,
only the independent subsidized firms have, on average, significant more employ-
ees than the non-subsidized independent firms. Similarly, only the class of high-
tech firms has, on average, a significant lower credit rating (thus higher values of
the RATING variable) for subsidized firms than for the potential control group.
Next to the summary statistics of the control variables, table 3.4 reports the sum-
mary statistics and t-tests on mean differences between the outcome variables. In
general, these variables have the highest values for both NTBFs and Group NTBFs.
In addition, all outcome variables differ significantly between subsidized firms
and the control group. In all cases, the subsidized firms have higher intensities
and more R&D expenditures and employees. From the descriptive statistics, it is
unclear whether these differences can be attributed to the receipt of subsidies. We
will apply a matching estimator, as outlined in the previous section, in order to
unravel this question.
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3.5 Estimation and results
3.5.1 Subsidy effect on small young firms
When applying a matching estimator, we estimate in first instance a probit model
on the receipt of subsidies. This probit model is estimated in order to obtain the
propensity score. Table 3.5 presents the results of this estimation in columns 2, 3,
4 and 5 of this table for the different firm categories. The first column estimates
the likelihood of receiving subsidies for the full sample, introducing the different
firm class dummies, with NTBF as reference category, in the estimation. This re-
veals that NTBFs are most likely to receive subsidies as compared to all other firm
categories defined. In addition, when testing the equality of the coefficients of the
other firm categories, we find that high-tech firms in general are more likely to
receive subsidies. Within each broader group of high-tech and low-tech firms, the
independent ones also seem to be more likely to receive subsidies.
The other results obtained from the probit estimation are in line with the results
from the descriptive statistics. We find that companies located in East-Germany
have a higher probability to receive subsidies. In addition, the results also confirm
the higher probability of receiving subsidies if the patent stock is larger. Except for
Group LTBFs, being an exporter has a positive effect on subsidy receipt. Other av-
erage significant differences in the descriptive statistics however are not apparent
anymore in the probit estimation.
Having obtained a propensity score based on the estimation results of the probit
estimation on subsidy receipt for each of the firm categories, we restrict the sample
to common support.7 In the previous section, we already stated that the matching
7The propensity scores based upon the different samples allow for more flexibility in the esti-
mation as it might be the case that the coefficients of the different probit estimations have different
effects for the different samples. A test on the equality of the main explanatory variables over the
different probit regressions shows that the equality of coefficients is rejected. The results of match-
ing based upon the propensity score of the full sample are nevertheless shown in appendix A3.3
and show that results remain stable even when matching is based upon the propensity score of the
full sample. All further results presented in this chapter are also confirmed.
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Table 3.5: Probit estimation on subsidy (SUB)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
full sample NTBF Group NTBF LTBF Group LTBF
ln(AGE) -0.084 -0.128 -0.262* -0.135 0.215
(0.063) (0.099) (0.143) (0.121) (0.190)
EXPORTER 0.407*** 0.547*** 0.416*** 0.394*** -0.028
(0.059) (0.089) (0.143) (0.105) (0.162)
ln(EMP) 0.037 0.022 -0.055 0.028 0.329
(0.116) (0.170) (0.280) (0.211) (0.391)
ln(EMP)2 0.001 0.004 -0.001 0.015 -0.036
(0.017) (0.026) (0.038) (0.031) (0.053)
D(CAPINT) -0.281*** -0.169 -0.220 -0.315* -0.416
(0.092) (0.144) (0.226) (0.185) (0.268)
CAPINT -0.010 -0.148 0.879 0.396 -0.179
(0.036) (0.342) (0.902) (0.357) (0.217)
PCM 0.003 0.000 -0.008 0.009 -0.074
(0.002) (0.003) (0.032) (0.013) (0.078)
D(PCM) -0.161* -0.190 -0.117 -0.356* 0.124
(0.093) (0.147) (0.206) (0.198) (0.261)
EAST 0.965*** 1.003*** 1.092*** 1.053*** 0.966***
(0.065) (0.092) (0.132) (0.134) (0.174)
PS/EMP 3.948*** 3.406*** 3.565*** 5.362*** 8.982***
(0.584) (0.729) (1.258) (1.290) (2.808)
RATING -0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.002* -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
D(RATING) -0.203 0.208 -0.637 -0.443 -0.555
(0.169) (0.259) (0.448) (0.315) (0.504)
GNTBF -0.175**
(0.080)
LTBF -0.465***
(0.166)
GLTBF -0.650***
(0.170)
Constant -0.276 -0.091 -0.120 -0.537 -3.075**
(0.303) (0.424) (0.777) (0.678) (1.243)
Test on joint significance of
-industry dummies χ2(11) = 37.80*** χ2(4) = 6.49 χ2(4) = 5.84 χ2(8)= 25.25*** χ2(8)= 13.06
-time dummies χ2(7) = 47.55*** χ2(7) = 47.59*** χ2(7) = 4.66 χ2(7) = 24.30*** χ2(7) = 7.81
test: GNTBF = LTBF = GLTBF χ2(2) = 9.73***
test: GNTBF = LTBF χ2(1) = 2.87*
test: GNTBF = GLTBF χ2(1) = 7.69***
test: LTBF = GLTBF χ2(1) = 4.37**
N 3272 1228 609 965 470
Log-Likelihood -1788.480 -696.468 -337.828 -490.201 -212.636
Pseudo R2 0.20 0.18 0.20 0.21 0.20
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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estimator is non applicable if the overlap between the different subsamples is too
small in terms of the characteristics controlled for. Table 3.6 shows how many
observations have to be dropped for each firm class in order to assure a sufficient
overlap between the treated and untreated firms under consideration. Next to the
restriction to common support, we also impose a caliper threshold as we apply
caliper matching. This caliper threshold of 0.05 serves as a maximum distance
between treated and untreated firms. The third column of table 3.6 presents the
number of observations that are lost after setting this threshold. The last column
of that table shows how many treated observations can be successfully matched.
Table 3.6: Loss of subsidized observations due to a lack of common support and
due to caliper threshold
sample Initial sample
size of subsi-
dized firms
lack of common
support
out of caliper
threshold 0.05
final sample
size of subsi-
dized firms
NTBF 649 -2 -42 605
Group NTBF 306 -11 -33 262
LTBF 328 -7 -38 283
Group LTBF 120 -8 -18 95
After setting the different thresholds, we pick the nearest neighbor out of the con-
trol group to find the best match for the treated firms. After matching, there are
no statistically significant differences in the exogenous variables anymore. In line
with this, the propensity score is also not significantly different between subsi-
dized and non-subsidized firms for all groups of firms (results not shown here).
Table 3.7 shows the outcome of the tests on overall model significance of the probit
models on subsidy receipt after matching. As can be seen in the table, the null hy-
pothesis that all coefficients in the regressions are jointly zero cannot not rejected
for any type of firm, as expected in case of successful matching.
Table 3.8 presents the treatment effects on the outcome variables after matching by
propensity score. As can be seen, almost all treatment effects are positive and sig-
nificant. After matching, these significant results can be attributed to the receipt
of subsidies. As a consequence, full crowding-out with regard to public fund-
ing can be rejected for all firm types studied. Nevertheless, the treatment effects
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Table 3.7: Significance of probit regressions after matching
sample # obs Wald χ2(23) p-value
NTBFs 1210 5.56 0.9999
Group NTBFs 524 5.38 0.9999
Low-tech NTBFs 566 12.71a 0.9910
Group low-tech NTBFs 190 15.99a 0.9531
a: Due to different industry classification of low-tech NTBFs: Wald χ2(27)
differ between the different groups of firms. While crowding-out can be rejected
for NTBFs, the effect of subsidies on R&D expenditures is insignificant for Group
NTBFs. In addition, while for LTBFs, the treatment effects are at least significant at
the 5% level, the treatment effect on R&D intensity for Group LTBFs is only signif-
icant at the 10% level and only the treatment effect on R&D employment is highly
significant for these firms.
Table 3.8: Treatment effects after matching
NTBF
Matched subsidized firms: 605
R&Dint 15.361***
R&DEint 21.231***
R&D 0.717***
R&D emp 5.428***
Group NTBF
Matched subsidized firms: 262
R&Dint 7.267**
R&DEint 11.775***
R&D 0.365
R&D emp 8.258*** Small Old firms
LTBF
Matched subsidized firms: 283
R&Dint 3.087***
R&DEint 3.558*
R&D 0.093***
R&D emp 1.519***
Group LTBF
Matched subsidized firms: 95
R&Dint 1.628*
R&DEint 3.934***
R&D 0.205**
R&D emp 1.897**
Large young firms Large old firms
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This table would suggest that high-tech small young firms make more effective
use of subsidies than low-tech small young firms, whether they are independent
or part of a group. Within the group of high-tech firms, the independent ones,
NTBFs, seem to have higher treatment effects, except for R&D employment, which
increases slightly more for Group NTBFs after subsidy receipt.8 The difference
between independent and group firms in high-tech sectors cannot be found within
the group of low-tech firms. While R&D intensity seems to be slightly higher after
receiving subsidies for LTBFs, the other treatment effects are higher for Group
LTBFs. This suggests that the factor being independent or being part of a group
has different effects for high-tech and low-tech firms. However, especially for the
latter firms, these differences are only small and it is questionable whether they
are also significant.
The main conclusion that can be drawn from table 3.8 is that R&D subsidies seem
to trigger input into R&D for all types of firms studied. At first sight there is thus
no rationale for governments to restrict funding to one of the firm types under
consideration. Nevertheless, the table also shows that the treatment effects differ
over the different firm categories. However, solely based upon these treatment
effects at ’face value’, it is highly questionable whether these differences are also
significant and whether it is thus correct to pose that high-tech firms and especially
NTBFs make more efficient use of subsidies than other small young firms. The next
section will elaborate upon this question.
3.5.2 Further evaluation of the treatment effects
As already stated above, the results shown above give an overview of the treat-
ment effects for the different firm classes. However, it remains unclear whether
the differences are also significant across firm types. This can be assessed by re-
gressing the individual treatment effects (αTT,i), reflecting subsidy induced R&D,
8However, one has to be careful as we can only assess the effect of R&D subsidies on the firm
itself and not on its group members. It might be the case that spillovers occur between subsidized
group members and other group members, which would underestimate the effect of subsidies on
group firms in our study.
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on dummies referring to the different firm types, with NTBF as the reference group
for all firms that received subsidies.
αTT,i = β0 + β1GroupNTBFi + β2LTBFi + β3GroupLTBFi + ei (5)
The constant term β0 then reflects the treatment effect for NTBFs and the other
coefficients show the difference in treatment effects relative to NTBFs. In order to
evaluate the differences of the treatment effects with respect to other firm types,
we perform F-tests on the equality of the different coefficients of the firm types we
want to compare.
While simply regressing the treatment effect on the different firm type dummies
indicates to what extent the differences in treatment effects are significant, this
does not account for other effects that might influence these differences. In order
to control for other effects and thus to assess whether the differences in treatment
effects are really the result of subsidies, we include extra control variables, Xi, in
the regressions on the treatment effects.
αTT,i = β0 + β1GroupNTBFi + β2LTBFi + β3GroupLTBFi + βXXi + ei (6)
As already shown above, high-tech small young firms seem to be more likely to re-
ceive subsidies. If these firms thus get funding from multiple sources, it might ac-
tually explain why they seem to have higher treatment effects than low-tech firms.
All firms included in the estimation of the treatment effect are subsidized firms,
having received funding from at least one source. However, it is possible that some
firms included in the sample received subsidies from both the European Union, the
federal government and local governments. Similarly, some firms might have been
subsidized by two different funding sources. Czarnitzki and Lopes Bento (2011)
differentiate between firms having received national funding, European funding
and funding at both the national and the European level and find that, in terms
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of input, getting funding from both sources yields the highest impact. As a con-
sequence, we should control for these multiple sources of subsidies. We do so by
including two dummies 2SUB and 3SUB, referring to firms that received subsidies
from 2 funding sources and all 3 funding sources respectively, with firms that re-
ceived funding from only one source as the reference group (based upon national,
regional and EU funding).
Another factor, very specific to the German case is the difference between Eastern
and Western Germany. Czarnitzki and Licht (2006) found that input additionality
has been more pronounced in Eastern Germany during the transition period than
in Western Germany. In addition, Eastern German firms were preferred in several
subsidy schemes in order to accelerate the transition process since the German
re-unification in 1991. It is thus possible that the differences between treatment
effects between different firm types can be attributed to the fact that the firm type
with higher treatment effects is mainly present in Eastern Germany. In order to
control for potential different location effects, we include a dummy EAST in the
regressions.
Although we already focus on small firms, we still control for heterogeneity in total
employment. Next to controlling for size, we also control for age by including age
in the estimation. Finally, we include time dummies in the estimation in order to
control for business cycle effects. 9
9Information on the different subsidy sources is not available for all years in the analysis. As
a consequence, we had to drop one year (1996) because of missing information on the subsidy
sources.
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Table 3.9 presents the results of the treatment effect regressions on R&D inten-
sity, R&D employment intensity, R&D expenditures and R&D employment. For
each treatment effect, both the basic regression without additional control vari-
ables and the extended regression are presented. Note that all standard errors are
clustered at the firm level. The table reveals that the differences between high-tech
and low-tech small, young firms in table 3.8 are only confirmed for independent
firms. NTBFs always have a higher input additionality than both LTBFs and Group
LTBFs, even after including the control variables in the regressions. For Group
NTBFs, we initially also find significant differences compared to LTBFs and Group
LTBFs for all treatment effects. However, after including the additional control
variables in the regression framework, these results change. First, the significant
higher increase in R&D intensity that was found for Group NTBFs compared to
LTBFs and Group LTBFs after receiving subsidies becomes insignificant. Similarly,
the higher treatment effect for RDEint when comparing Group NTBFs and Group
LTBFs becomes insignificant. Only the subsidy induced increase in R&D employ-
ment remains significantly higher when comparing Group NTBFs to all low-tech
firm categories.
When focusing solely on low-tech firms, we find at most a very weak significant
difference between effects of subsidies on independent and group firms (see tests
on differences in coefficients at the bottom of table 3.9). As a consequence, for
low-tech firms, a policy focus on independent small young firms does not seem to
be warranted. For high-tech small young firms, on the other hand, the differentia-
tion between independent firms and group firms seems to matter, although not for
all treatment effects. In the basic regressions, the differences are only significant
for the treatment effects on the intensity measures (see coefficient of Group NTBF,
indicating the relative difference in treatment effects to the reference category of
NTBFs, in columns 1 and 3 of Table 3.9). In the extended regressions, the differ-
ence between the R&D expenditures’ treatment effect also become significant (see
column 6 of table 3.9). The results also reveal that the lower treatment effect that
was found on R&D employment for NTBFs as compared to Group NTBFs is in-
significant in the basic regression (see column 7). This suggests that Group NTBFs
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do not make more effective use of R&D subsidies in terms of R&D employment,
as was initially indicated by the treatment effects. 10
In general, the above findings suggest that high-tech firms and especially the in-
dependent ones within this category have higher treatment effects. These find-
ings are re-assuring, as policy makers often target small, young independent firms
when selecting subsidy recipients. Here it is also revealed that it might be relevant
to base this decision in a first stage on sector of activity. Only when the focus shifts
to high-tech firms, results suggest that NTBFs make more effective use of subsidies
than Group NTBFs. However, this latter result should be interpreted with caution
as spillovers to other group members could not be taken into account. In addition,
table 3.8 revealed that full crowding out could be rejected for all firm types stud-
ied. As a consequence, although results suggest that high-tech firms increase their
R&D inputs more after receiving subsidies, none of these groups seem to merely
replace their private R&D inputs by public money or seem to simply give higher
wages to existing staff without increasing current R&D employment.
3.5.3 The effect on technological progress
Above, we have shown that full crowding-out can be rejected for all firm types
studied. A regression of the individual treatment effects on the different firm cat-
egories showed that it are especially the high-tech and independent firms that
seem to increase their R&D inputs most after receiving subsidies. We now turn
to the second major research question in this chapter, that is, if additionally in-
duced R&D input leads to technological progress. As already explained above, it
is not because R&D inputs increase that this unambiguously leads to technolog-
ical progress of the firm. We measure technological progress or performance as
10It has to be noted that the differences between group and independent firms have to be inter-
preted with caution, as we can only assess the effect of subsidies on the firm surveyed, independent
of its other group members. It might well be the case that the effect of subsidies reaches beyond the
single group member surveyed and also has an effect on R&D input of other group members. It is
very difficult to evaluate this, however, as we do not have complete information on all other group
affiliates. In addition, spillover effects are difficult to tackle in input additionality studies and they
might as well flow from independent firms to others.
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the patent activity at the firm level, i.e. the number of patent applications per year
(PAT). In this setting, we use R&D employment intensity as an input factor for the
patent production function.
The R&D employment intensity input factors are based upon the estimated treat-
ment and counterfactual from the matching procedure. RDEintCi represents the
part of the total R&D employment intensity that the firms would have held any-
way, that is, in absence of subsidies. This component of R&D employment in-
tensity is just equal to the total R&D employment intensity for the non-recipient
firms. In addition, the treatment effect on the treated αTTi is the additionally in-
duced R&D employment intensity, as was already introduced in section 3.5.2. For
the non-subsidized firms this variable straightforwardly takes the value zero by
construction. Although a patent production function usually does not contain a
lot of variables next to R&D, in addition to these two R&D-related variables, we
control for industry differences in patenting behavior, and also include time dum-
mies. In addition, we include the log of lagged employment, log(EMP), and log
of age, log(AGE), to take possible size and age effects into account. The dummy
variable EAST is also inserted in this framework in order to take into account that
patenting activity in the still developing Eastern German region might be lower.
In addition to a pooled cross-sectional QMLE Poisson model, we also estimate
the so-called pre-sample mean QMLE poisson model (henceforth PSM) (Blundell
et al., 1995, 2002). Unlike in the R&D input equation where we cannot control for
firm-specific effects due to the cross-sectional nature of our database, we can do so
when the patents are considered, as we were able to collect information on firms’
pre-sample patenting activity. One can control for unobserved time-invariant firm-
heterogeneity if pre-sample information on the dependent variable is available.
Blundell et al. (1995, 2002) showed that the unobserved heterogeneity can be ap-
proximated by implementing the pre-sample mean of the dependent variable as an
additional regressor. This basically amounts to controlling for ’quasi fixed effects’.
The pre-sample mean patenting is denoted by PSM in table 3.10.
Table 3.10 shows the results of this estimation. Note that we lose some observa-
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tions due to the fact that we currently only have access to the patent data until
2005. Columns 1-2 show results when not differentiating between different firm
categories and columns 3-4 show results when measures of the counterfactual and
treatment are inserted separately for the different firm categories. We present boot-
strapped standard errors as the R&D measures of the treated firms are estimated.
We used 200 replications of the procedure to estimate the bootstrap standard er-
rors.
When first focusing on the broad results in columns 1-2, a similar picture as in
previous studies emerges (Czarnitzki and Hussinger, 2004). Counterfactual and
treatment effect are both significantly positive, both for QMLE poisson and PSM
QMLE Poisson estimation. Nevertheless, results in the current paper indicate that
the counterfactual is slightly more productive than the treatment, although this re-
sult is only weakly significant under the PSM QMLE poisson estimation as shown
by the χ2’s from a likelihood ratio (LR) test.
In columns 3-4, we make a distinction between the four different firm categories
as introduced above by introducing the treatment and counterfactuals for all firms
separately. We find that except for the category of Group LTBFs, both the R&D
employment intensity in the counterfactual situation (all c’vars’) and the treat-
ment effects (all a’vars’) show a statistically significant and positive impact on the
number of patent applications. Tests show that the hypothesis of equal coefficients
of counterfactual and treatment can in general not be rejected within the different
firm groups except for a weakly significant lower productivity of treatment of the
NTBF firms under QMLE poisson estimations. In general, results nevertheless
point to an equal importance, i.e. productivity, of private and publicly induced in-
novation input in terms of R&D employment. In addition, the treatment effect of
NTBFs is not significantly different from the at first sight higher treatment effect of
independent LTBFs, neither from the treatment effect of group LTBFs. With respect
to group NTBFs, results show that the treatment effect of independent NTBFs is
significantly higher than the one from group NTBFs. As a consequence and as
the treatment effect was shown to be higher for high-tech firms and especially for
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Table 3.10: Estimation of the patent equation for all firm groups (N=2296)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
αTTi 0.021*** 0.021***
(0.001) (0.001)
RDEintCi 0.025*** 0.025***
(0.001) (0.001)
αTTi NTBF 0.023*** 0.023***
(0.001) (0.001)
αTTi Group NTBF 0.016*** 0.016***
(0.001) (0.001)
αTTi LTBF 0.033*** 0.034***
(0.002) (0.002)
αTTi Group LTBF 0.023 0.022
(0.018) (0.018)
RDEintCi NTBF 0.029*** 0.027***
(0.003) (0.003)
RDEintCi Group NTBF 0.016*** 0.017***
(0.001) (0.001)
RDEintCi LTBF 0.039*** 0.039***
(0.001) (0.001)
RDEintCi Group LTBF 0.040*** 0.038***
(0.014) (0.015)
EAST -0.614*** -0.648*** -0.603*** -0.634***
(0.118) (0.119) (0.120) (0.121)
ln(EMP) 0.675*** 0.646*** 0.745*** 0.707***
(0.018) (0.022) (0.024) (0.027)
ln(AGE) 0.088 0.009 0.092 0.015
(0.153) (0.159) (0.147) (0.154)
PSM 0.232 0.220
(0.161) (0.174)
Constant -3.930*** -3.650*** -4.103*** -3.779***
(0.287) (0.311) (0.306) (0.333)
χ2 test on joint significance of time dummies 43.86*** 69.42*** 44.70*** 68.07***
χ2 test on joint significance of industry dummies 172.46*** 145.57*** 177.13*** 153.33***
χ2 LR test: αTTi = RDEint
C
i 4.24** 3.40*
χ2 LR test: RDEintCi NTBF = α
TT
i NTBF 3.35* 1.57
χ2 LR test: RDEintCi Group NTBF = α
TT
i Group NTBF 0.01 0.01
χ2 LR test: RDEintCi LTBF = α
TT
i LTBF 0.88 0.63
χ2 LR test: RDEintCi Group LTBF = α
TT
i Group LTBF 0.14 0.13
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NTBFs (see tables 3.8 and 3.9), the total effect on patents will also be higher for
these firms.11 In general, these results suggest that the evaluation of public subsi-
dies should happen at a more fine-grained level.
3.6 Conclusion
Governments acknowledge the fact that small young firms are in need of R&D
subsidies. However, in light of the ’Europe 2020’ strategy, they increasingly focus
on ’less and better’ state aid, thereby trying to target small, young firms that will
most effectively make use of their grants. Frequently firms in high-tech sectors
are preferred in public schemes. Furthermore, the European Commission since
recently also emphasizes that especially small, young, stand-alone high-tech firms
make possibly the most effective use of public funds. Thus, firms associated with
groups of firms have less access to subsidies than in the past. While these policies
thus give a clear preference to a certain type of firms, it is surprising that so far no
systematic impact evaluation of such policies exists. Consequently, in this study,
we compare the effect of innovation subsidies on New Technology Based Firms
(NTBF), Low Technology Based Firms (LTBFs) and their group counterparts for
a sample of German firms. NTBFs are small young independent high-tech firms,
while LTBFs are small young independent firms active in low-tech sectors. We
denote their group counterparts by Group NTBFs and Group LTBFs.
In a first stage, we estimate the input additionality effects for each of these firm
types, i.e. we analyze the policy impact on firms’ R&D intensity, R&D expendi-
tures, R&D employment intensity and R&D employment numbers. Considering
these firm types separately in our empirical analysis also enables us to compare
the estimated treatment effects among these groups. In a second stage we turn to
the effect subsidies have on innovation output as measured by patents.
11As already noted multiple times throughout this paper, we abstain from drawing any conclu-
sions on the potential spillover effects generated by subsidized firms.
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In order to evaluate the impact of innovation subsidies on the innovation input
of NTBFs, Group NTBFs, LTBFs and Group LTBFs, caliper matching with replace-
ment is applied in order to correct for a potential selection bias. In general, our
results reveal that full crowding-out with regard to public funding can be rejected
for all firm types studied.
In order to assess the potential differences in subsidy effects, we compare the treat-
ment effects of the different firm types by regressing the individual treatment ef-
fects on the different firm types and additional control variables. Our results reveal
that the treatment effects on independent NTBFs are actually highest, as presumed
by policy makers. Thus our empirical study does not only support the currently
common choice to give a preferential treatment to small, young and independent
firms active in high-tech sectors, but also provides evidence that previous esti-
mations of innovation policy impacts might have been partly misleading and/or
too broad as usually no distinction between preferential firm profiles in policy
schemes have been made.
In a second step, we carry the results of the treatment effects analysis over to the
estimation of a patent production function, where R&D employment intensity is
disentangled into two components: on the one hand, the purely privately R&D
employment intensity in the absence of subsidies and, on the other hand, the ad-
ditionally induced R&D employment intensity that is stimulated by the subsidy.
Results of this estimation reveal that we do not have to reject the expectations of
the different policy initiatives, especially for small young independent high-tech
innovators, as the regression analysis reveals that even the publicly stimulated
additional R&D leads to an increased patenting activity, especially for the inde-
pendent NTBFs.
Of course, our study has a number of caveats that remain for further research. We
will introduce some of them here but limitations of all chapters are mainly dis-
cussed in the concluding chapter, chapter 5. We were only able to assess whether
a firm received a subsidy or not, without being able to assess potential hetero-
geneities in the grants. With respect to the patent production function, while
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patent indicators are a broadly accepted concept to measure technological devel-
opment, it is a narrow measure of innovative output. Nevertheless, considering
other indicators that are effected by R&D further in the future would ideally re-
quire longer time series of data than we have currently available for our study.
In general, panel data would allow us to draw more robust conclusions on the
treatment effects found as unobservables could then also be taken into account
in the matching routine and subsequent regressions. Another important limit is
the lack of detailed information on group firms, as already touched upon several
times throughout this chapter. Next to assessing spillover effects, it would be very
informative to know what the ’group’ entails. If this would be known, this infor-
mation would allow us to draw more refined conclusions about the effect of group
membership depending on the type of integration or on the group size.
Chapter 4
Incorporating innovation subsidies in
the CDM framework: empirical
evidence from Belgium
4.1 Introduction
Throughout this dissertation, it has already been broadly introduced that the ben-
eficial effect of business R&D efforts on technological change and growth has been
widely acknowledged by scholars and policy makers (Romer, 1990; Mansfield,
1988, 1962; Aghion and Howitt, 1998; Scherer, 1965; Geroski and Toker, 1996). The
previous chapter for example redirected attention to the support of R&D activi-
ties of subsets of firms, mainly justified by the will to overcome presumed market
failures (Nelson, 1959; Arrow, 1962; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981).
Based upon policy and academic interest towards this topic, evaluating the effects
of such policy instruments has a long tradition in empirical innovation research
(see David et al., 2000; Cerulli, 2010; Zu´n˜iga Vicente et al., 2014 for surveys). So
far, the main focus in literature was on input additionality of R&D subsidies, while
Joint work with Dirk Czarnitzki
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only some studies assess the impact on output (see also chapter 3 of this disserta-
tion). Usually, as is also the case in chapter 3, the inextricable nature of these input
and output stages is not acknowledged and they are thus not estimated in a si-
multaneous equation model. Adding to this lack in the evaluation literature, this
chapter takes a structural approach in order to integrate both stages in one model.
This is done by a new setup in which innovation subsidies are integrated in the
Cre´pon Duguet Mairesse (CDM) framework (Cre´pon et al., 1998). The resulting
model allows to estimate input and output additionality effects of subsidies and
whether a firms’ subsidized projects generate a discount or premium in terms of
innovation outcome when compared to the non-subsidized projects. In addition,
both the setup and data allow the inclusion of detailed subsidy data, i.e. the ac-
tual amounts, instead of the commonly used dichotomous variable as also used in
chapter 3 (nevertheless, recent work increasingly exploits more detailed subsidy
information, see e.g. the recent contribution of Takalo et al., 2013).
As already posed in the introductory chapter, this part of the dissertation has
mainly a methodological focus and cannot add, in its current set-up, to the re-
search on small young innovators. That being said, it directs attention to an equally
important topic in the innovation literature, namely the possibilities and opportu-
nities in which subsidies can be evaluated in order to add evidence to current
research and set the stage for further possibilities in this line of studies.
The empirical study is carried out using Flemish innovation survey data coupled
with detailed data on subsidy grants. Our results largely confirm insights of the
recent literature, i.e. public subsides complement private R&D investment. Fur-
thermore, it is found that an increase in R&D inputs, both purely private R&D
and subsidy induced R&D, is generally associated with a higher innovation per-
formance in subsequent years. The model also suggests that it cannot be rejected
that subsidized R&D projects are not less productive in terms of generating sales
due to new products than purely privately financed R&D.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: the next section sketches
the framework to which we add in this chapter, both conceptually and method-
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ologically. The third section presents the model used in this chapter. Data and
variables used are discussed in section 4.4 and section 4.5 discusses the empirical
implementation and results before concluding.
4.2 Background
4.2.1 Conceptual background
All of the literature acknowledges that it is undeniable that R&D is a driving factor
of growth in industrialized economies (see e.g. Romer, 1990), but what is the actual
outcome of spurring innovation by means of R&D subsidies? What is the eventual
firm-level use of these important budgets devoted to subsidies?
Figure 4.1: subsidy-extension of CDM framework
Figure 4.1 gives a simple representation of how subsidies impact the input and
output stages of R&D. In a first stage, a firm can apply for a subsidy. In a second
stage, if a firm applied for a subsidy, the agency makes a decision on the sub-
sidy rate, i.e. the share of the R&D investment that will be covered by the agency
(which can also be 0 if a project was rejected by the agency). When learning about
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the subsidy decision, the firm will choose its R&D investment. R&D subsidies are
assumed to spur R&D spending of firms and thereby foster technological change.
However, it cannot be taken for granted that these effects are attained. In a first
step, when looking at R&D spending of firms, it is not always clear how firms
that receive these subsidies react to this support. It is possible that the subsidies
are completely inefficiently spent if no extra R&D is undertaken. This might hap-
pen if firms simply replace their privately sponsored R&D projects by the publicly
subsidized ones. This phenomenon is denoted as crowding-out, and refers to the
situation in which innovation projects are subsidized that would also have been
carried out without public subsidies.
In a next step, R&D input could to lead to innovative output. As already explained
in chapter 3, it is not straightforward that public efforts lead to innovative output
for the subsidized firm itself. In addition, it is questionable, if some additional
output is generated, to what extent the subsidy induced projects are stimulating
innovative output more or less than purely private R&D. In this chapter, we focus
on progress made by the firm itself and abstain thus from any effect a potential
increase in R&D spending might have on activities of other market players or on
society. Related to this, projects are assumed to be mainly selected based upon
their expected positive social value. There is thus no clear reason why publicly
subsidized R&D would entail an innovation premium over purely private R&D
at the firm-level. This is nevertheless an important question to be answered for
the firm receiving subsidies. In addition, not knowing how much social value is
actually created by subsidies, finding that subsidies are not less productive for the
recipient firm itself would at least already be reassuring in terms of how public
money is spent. Next to the fact that creating a premium in terms of firm-level
profits is not a main reason in itself to grant subsidies, there are other arguments
on why we would not necessarily expect subsidized R&D to entail a premium
over private R&D. For example, as already introduced before, going down the
marginal revenue (MR) curve, projects might be associated with lower expected
revenues and higher risks of failure (David et al., 2000). The additional conducted
projects would in this line of reasoning thus be less productive than the projects
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done privately. Another argument that rather suggests a productivity discount
of publicly induced R&D is related to wages of researchers. As Goolsbee (1998)
argues, the granted subsidies might be redirected to higher wages of researchers
instead of hiring new staff and/or investing this money in other research-related
assets. Another important factor that could influence the eventual effect of public
R&D spending is the peer review process. The subsidies analyzed in this study
are selective, i.e. they are not automatically granted but are assessed by govern-
ment experts who make the granting decision. On the one hand, as suggested by
a.o. Lerner (1999) and David et al. (2000), government officials might be selecting
firms out of personal interest. This could imply that they do not necessarily select
projects that would have very high productivity prospects. On the other hand,
if the selection procedure is done correctly, one might expect that it are actually
the most promising, high quality project proposals that are accepted. In addition,
after being selected, these projects might be closely followed and monitored by
the granting agency, which implies that there might be a better management of
the subsidized R&D projects and this might have a beneficial impact on the in-
novative output (Barney et al., 2001; Colombo and Grilli, 2005; Teece and Pisano,
1994). Another argument favoring a potential output premium of subsidized R&D
over private R&D is the fact that R&D subsidies might act as a signal to potential
investors and clients of the firm by implicitly signaling about its quality (Lerner,
1999).
4.2.2 Previous literature
The first quantitative evaluation of R&D policies has been carried out as early as
1957 by Blank and Stigler. After the US R&D budget was significantly raised dur-
ing the 1950s Blank and Stigler (1957) questioned the relationship between pub-
licly funded and private R&D. With a large sample of firms they tried to test for
a complementary or substitutive relationship between public and private R&D
investment. Since then, the literature on quantitative evaluation became vast, es-
pecially after the year 2000 when surveys about the current state of the art were
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published in a special issue of Research Policy (see the surveys by David et al.,
2000; Klette et al., 2000). The survey authors critically reviewed the literature and
identified methodological shortcomings in existing studies. In particular, selection
bias and endogeneity of subsidies in an R&D investment equation had not been
adequately modeled in many early empirical studies.2 Since then, the literature
on the evaluation of innovation subsidies was revived and many papers using
modern micro-econometric techniques were published (see Cerulli, 2010; Zu´n˜iga
Vicente et al., 2014 for surveys).
The main focus so far in literature has been on input additionality of subsidies,
mainly based upon a dichotomous subsidy variable (see e.g. Aerts and Czar-
nitzki, 2004; Busom, 2000; Lach, 2002; Gonzales et al., 2005; Almus and Czarnitzki,
2003; Duguet, 2004; Gonzales and Pazo, 2008; Czarnitzki and Lopes Bento, 2010).
Only a few focus on the effect of R&D subsidies on R&D output. Czarnitzki and
Hussinger (2004); Czarnitzki and Licht (2006); Hussinger (2008) and also the re-
search presented in chapter 3 for example, use the estimated private and treatment
effect obtained from a matching estimator or other selection model in an output
equation in order to measure the effect of private and public R&D on innovation
output. In contrast to these papers, the main contribution of this study is the in-
tegration of both input and output additionality estimations in one framework.
Thereby, this chapter not only adds to the subsidy evaluation literature, but also to
the models based upon the framework developed by Cre´pon et al. (1998). In addi-
tion, the presented framework allows making use of detailed subsidy information
instead of a dichotomous variable as was mainly used so far in a matching frame-
work, either due to data limitations or a non-exploitation of the richer subsidy
information.
2Firms that receive a subsidy might be different from companies that do not receive a subsidy.
A first difference already emerges at the application stage as some firms might be more likely to
apply for public funding than others. Some firms might consider the administrative burden or
the information sharing conditional upon being subsidized as important reasons to restrain from
applying for a subsidy. In addition, there is a possibility that the funding agencies follow a picking-
the winner strategy with respect to the firms that applied for a subsidy. In other words, firms
might have some characteristics that make them more attractive to governments for funding. As
a consequence, funding cannot be considered as a random process and this selection should be
accounted for when evaluating subsidies.
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4.3 Extending the CDM model: assessing output ad-
ditionality of subsidies
In order to integrate R&D input and output equations in a subsidy evaluation
framework, this study extends the Cre´pon Duguet Mairesse (CDM) model. The
CDM model introduced by Cre´pon, Duguet and Mairesse in 1998 (Cre´pon et al.,
1998) is essentially a refinement of the traditional knowledge production function
framework (Griliches, 1979). It does so by analyzing the different stages of the in-
novation process: the innovation choice, R&D intensity, innovation output and/or
labor productivity. The set-up of this model is one of the first ones to explicitly ac-
knowledge that all the innovation stages are inextricably connected. The most
basic representation of this model incorporates the R&D input (R&D) and output
(Output) stages.
R&D = z′2ω+ ε2
↘
Output = β1R&D + z′1θ + ε1
where z′1 and z
′
2 refer to explanatory variables of interest and z
′
2 includes an exclu-
sion restriction, as it is unlikely that R&D is exogenous in the output equation.3 ε1
and ε2 are the error terms.
Several extensions of this model have already been proposed, by e.g. explicitly
incorporating ICT investments next to innovation inputs (Hall et al., 2013), adding
competition conditions (Castellacci, 2011) or, more in line with the original model,
adding profitability next to productivity (Jefferson et al., 2006) to give some exam-
3See also table A4.4 in appendix, presenting an OLS regression of the output equation without
tackling the endogeneity of the R&D input (columns 1 and 4). Columns 1 and 3 in table A4.3 in
appendix present IV regressions taking into account the endogeneity of R&D input, but not the
heterogeneity of the R&D input variable itself.
90
CHAPTER 4. INCORPORATING INNOVATION SUBSIDIES IN THE CDM FRAMEWORK:
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM BELGIUM
ples.
The main contribution of this chapter to both the strand of subsidy evaluation
papers and papers implementing the CDM model is the incorporation of R&D
subsidies as an important determinant of the different innovation stages.4
In this study, we are mainly interested in the last step, the R&D output equation,
Output = β1R&D + z′1θ + ε1 (1)
R&D in this equation captures the full amount invested in R&D, i.e. both subsi-
dies and privately financed R&D. In this context however we are interested in the
effect of the components of this full R&D input, publicly induced R&D and the
counterfactual or purely private R&D.
In order to estimate the output additionality of subsidies, the current literature is
dominated by ad–hoc approaches instead of a more structural approach as sug-
gested in this paper. Before turning to the structural approach using the CDM
framework, we briefly discuss ad-hoc approaches which help to motivate our
model.
• Approach 1: Dummy variable approach
One intuitive starting point for estimating output additionality is a dummy
variable approach, where an (innovation) output measure is simply regressed
on R&D input and a dummy variable, DSUB indicating wether a firm re-
ceived a subsidy, as well as the interaction of the subsidy dummy and R&D
inputs.
4In spite of the appealing setting and the lack of attention in the literature (see nevertheless e.g.
Takalo et al., 2013), the application and granting processes can unfortunately not be incorporated
in the estimation framework as a subsidy granted in the beginning period is distributed to the
firm over subsequent years. Dependent upon applying, the granting agency will make a decision
on the total subsidies and thus subsidy rate granted to a firm. However, it is the yearly amount
of subsidies that will eventually have an effect on yearly innovation input and output of firms.
Nevertheless, results of these application and granting estimations are shown in appendix 4.B as
these inform us on the underlying process of applying by the firm and granting by the agency and
thus also on which variables can be used as an exclusion restriction in the subsidy equation.
4.3. EXTENDING THE CDM MODEL: ASSESSING OUTPUT ADDITIONALITY OF SUBSIDIES 91
Output = β1R&D + β2DSUB + β3DSUB× R&D + z′1θ + ε1 (2)
This approach is sometimes considered as allowing to conclude that a pre-
mium (discount) is present if β3 would turn out to be positive (negative),
that is, the subsidy would affect the marginal productivity of R&D upwards
(downwards). However, the dummy variable approach neglects that subsi-
dies are not constant across firms, and also that R&D is itself a function of
the subsidy. As subsidies are usually varying in terms of the absolute mone-
tary amount granted, this approach can in fact not allow to conclude whether
subsidized R&D is more or less productive then privately financed projects.5
• Approach 2: Separate R&D input from subsidized amount
Another intuition for estimating output additionality could be to subtract the
subsidies from the R&D input and to estimate two separate coefficients.
Output = β1(R&D− SUB) + β2SUB + z′1θ + ε1 (3)
where R&D denotes the amount of R&D input and SUB the amount of sub-
sidies received. This specification would, on first sight, allow to conclude
whether any output additionality is present, that is, if β2 is larger than zero,
and, moreover, if the subsidized R&D is, for instance, more productive than
the purely privately financed one if β2 > β1, and also vice versa. How-
ever, this approach still neglects that even the term (R&D− SUB) is a func-
tion of the subsidy as the whole literature about treatment effects revolves
around the question to what extent additional private investment is stimu-
lated by granting subsidies, especially as subsidies are typically distributed
as ‘matching grants’, that is, the government pays only a share of the total
cost of a project. 6
5Columns 2 and 5 in table A4.4 in appendix present a ’naive’ OLS estimation of equation 2
applied to the data and sample used in this chapter.
6Columns 3 and 6 in table A4.4 in appendix present a ’naive’ OLS estimation of equation 3
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In order to account for the existing treatment effects debate the estimation equation
has thus to be modified further. Therefore we suggest to estimate following output
equation
Output = β1(R&D− αSUB) + β2αSUB + z′1θ + ε1 (4)
where αSUB corresponds to a firm-specific treatment effect or subsidy induced
R&D spending, i.e. the amount received by the funding agency a´nd the additional
spending, if we find evidence for this at all, due to this subsidy. The α is estimated
in a previous equation by specifying that
R&D = αSUB + z′2ω+ ε2. (5)
In order to account for the literature on treatment effects estimation, it has to be
taken into account that SUB may itself be an endogenous regressor in the R&D
input equation and therefore, one would need to instrument this variable. Thus,
the final model is a recursive system of three equations, where the first equation
could be written as follows:
SUB = z′3δ+ ε3. (6)
4.3.1 Econometric implementation
If the error terms, ε1, ε2 and ε3 were not correlated with each other, this recursive
system of equations could be estimated sequentially by independent OLS regres-
sions. As this is unlikely to hold, though, consistent estimation requires an instru-
mental variable approach, i.e. it is required that z1 6= z2 6= z3 or in other words,
z3 must contain instruments that are not in z2 and both z3 and z2 must contain
applied to the data and sample used in this chapter.
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instruments that are not part of z1 for model identification. Then this system of
equations could be estimated using limited information estimator, such as 2SLS,
where each equation is estimated separately using the appropriate instruments.
Because of the recursive nature of the system, we opt here for the so-called control
function approach (which is in its base form identical to IV). We estimate the first
equation by OLS and obtain εˆ3. This is then used to estimate the 2nd equation
including the first stage residuals with OLS:
R&D = αSUB + z′2ω+ ρ1εˆ3 + ε2. (7)
In order to estimate the 3rd equation, we have to plug in the residuals of both
preceding stages, and we also re-arrange as follows:
Output = β1(R&D− αSUB) + β2αSUB + z′1θ + ρ3εˆ3 + ρ2εˆ2 + ε1 (8)
= β1R&D− β1αSUB + β2αSUB + z′1θ + ρ3εˆ3 + ρ2εˆ2 + ε1 (9)
= β1R&D + (β2 − β1)αSUB + z′1θ + ρ3εˆ3 + ρ2εˆ2 + ε1 (10)
= β1R&D + piSUB + z′1θ + ρ3εˆ3 + ρ2εˆ2 + ε1 (11)
where pi = (β2 − β1)α, and consequently the coefficient β2, pointing to any out-
put additionality is β2 = β1 + piα . For testing whether subsidies generate a pre-
mium over privately financed R&D, it needs to be tested whether β2 > β1, and
vice versa. The premium/discount component itself can be straightforwardly pre-
sented in line with Griliches (1986) who allowed different weighting of the differ-
ent components of R&D.7 β2 would then be equal to a premium/discount com-
ponent, let’s say (1 + γ2) in which γ2 represents the actual amount of the pre-
7Griliches allowed to look at the effect of different components of R&D by weighting one of
the terms (say R&D2) differently than the other, labeled as R&D1 in this example. The full R&D
term can then be decomposed as follows: R&D∗ = R&D1 + (1+ δ)R&D2, where δ corresponds to
a premium or discount of this second R&D term.
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mium/discount, times the slope of the private R&D, (R&D − αSUB), β1 (corre-
sponding to : β2 = (1+ γ2)× β1). Starting again from equation 8:
Output = β1(R&D− αSUB) + β2αSUB + z′1θ + ρ3εˆ3 + ρ2εˆ2 + ε1 (12)
= β1((R&D− αSUB) + (1+ γ2)αSUB) + z′1θ + ρ3εˆ3 + ρ2εˆ2 + ε1(13)
= β1R&D + γ2β1αSUB + z′1θ + ρ3εˆ3 + ρ2εˆ2 + ε1 (14)
= β1R&D + piSUB + z′1θ + ρ3εˆ3 + ρ2εˆ2 + ε1 (15)
This last equation 15 is exactly the same as equation 11. The γ2 can then be backed
out as follows: piβ1α . It is easy to see that this premium/discount component equals
β2
β1
− 1, as β2 = β1 + piα .
The model estimated by means of the control function approach will produce bi-
ased standard errors and as the coefficient α is only identified in the 2nd equation
where R&D inputs are a function of the subsidies, the standard errors in the se-
quence of innovation input and output equations will thus be computed via boot-
strapping, based upon 200 bootstrap replications.8
4.4 Data, variables and descriptive statistics
4.4.1 Data sources
The data used in this chapter combines firm-level data with detailed subsidy data.
The firm-level data consists of the Flemish Community Innovation Survey (CIS)
provided by the Centre for R&D Monitoring (ECOOM) from KU Leuven and ad-
ditional firm-level data obtained from the Belfirst database published by Bureau
van Dijk. The CIS is a survey that is largely harmonized across the different Euro-
8Simulations were performed in order to test the presented model and confirmed its validity.
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pean member states in order to get a coherent view on innovation inputs and out-
puts. Next to information on the innovative activity of the companies, the CIS data
also provide general information on the companies, such as sales, number of em-
ployees, founding year and so forth. The CIS data over the years 2004-2010 were
updated and complemented with the Belfirst database which basically contains
accounting data for the population of Belgian firms. As Belfirst does not contain
information on R&D activities of firms, our sample is limited to firms questioned
in the CIS survey.
These firm-level data have then been merged with detailed subsidy information
obtained from the agency ’Innovatie door Wetenschap en Technologie’ (IWT).9 All
subsidy information is assembled in the ICAROS database providing detailed in-
formation on subsidy grants for the population of Flemish firms. For all firms with
a successful application process and thus eventual subsidy decision, we know the
amount of subsidies granted and the duration of the funded projects.10
As only the CIS dataset contains detailed information on innovation inputs and
outputs, we base our analysis on this sample, restricted to innovators, i.e. firms
that have (a history of) innovation activities and/or (a history of) subsidy appli-
cations. After dropping outliers in relevant variables and missing data points in
all variables, we end up with an unbalanced panel of 2,472 firms corresponding to
1,521 different firms.
9The key organization for support and promotion of R&D and innovation in Flanders is IWT
(Innovatie door Wetenschap en Technologie). R&D subsidies in Flanders are granted and admin-
istered through this agency for Innovation by Science and Technology. The scope of its existing
funding programs is quite broad as it supports a wide range of activities of small as well as large
companies, universities, third level education institutions and other Flemish innovative organiza-
tions, individually or collectively.
10Some more information on the granting process can be found in appendix 4B. More ample
background information on the agency and its activities can be found on the website of the agency,
www.iwt.be, as well as in Larosse (2004)
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4.4.2 Variables
This study integrates innovation input and output additionality estimation of sub-
sidies in one framework. Innovation output is examined based upon a variable
reflecting the percentage of sales due to new products, TURNNEW, and thus cor-
responding to ( turnover new productsturnover × 100) in a later time period than the R&D input
measures.
The main determinants are R&D intensity measures. The CIS data give the oppor-
tunity to exploit different R&D input measures. On the one hand, it is possible
to focus solely on internal R&D expenditures. On the other hand, one can look
at total R&D expenditures of firms, so including both internal and external R&D.
While the main focus of input additionality studies is on private R&D expendi-
tures, the measure of total R&D expenditures is also included in this analysis as
there is in principle no restriction specified by the granting agency that subsidies
should only be used to fund internal R&D. Based upon both innovation input mea-
sures, intensity measures can be calculated which will be used in the regression
framework. RDint and RDtot reflect intensities in % on turnover of both inter-
nal R&D expenditures and total R&D expenditures respectively (corresponding to
R&D expenditures
turnover × 100).
Another important component in determining input and output is of course the
subsidy variable. As we have detailed information on the starting period of the
subsidization, the end period and the total amount granted, we can calculate yearly
subsidies, IWTSUB.11 Based upon this latter variable, subsidy intensity can be cal-
culated, similar to the output measure and R&D input intensity measures, so rela-
tive to turnover of the firm (x 100, thus in %) (IWTSUBINT).
As outlined above in the methodology section, exclusion restrictions will have
to be defined for both the subsidy and R&D input equations. In order to tackle
11The yearly amount of subsidies is calculated based upon a monthly redistribution of the total
subsidy grant. E.g. if a firm starts a subsidized project in April 2012 that ends in December 2013,
9/21 of the total amount will be allotted to 2012 and 12/21 to 2013.
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the endogeneity of subsidies, several relevant variables to be included in the ex-
clusion restriction are defined. One of these variables is the stock of past project
applications a firm has filed scaled by employment (APPSTOCK). This variable is
constructed using the perpetual inventory method applying a 15% discount rate.12
This variable accounts for the firm’s experience with the Flemish subsidy system.
In general, a firm that has applied before for a subsidy might be more likely to
apply again as that firm is acquainted with the application procedure. As a con-
sequence, its chances of getting a subsidy are in general higher than for a firm
that does not have a history of applying. In the same vein, SRATE FIRM reflects
the stock of success rates of previous applications (also using a 15% rate of obso-
lescence). This variable reflects to what extent a firm had a successful interaction
with the granting agency. SRATE OTHER is a similar variable to SRATE FIRM
but captures the previous success of application of all other firms within the same
industry, region and size group, the latter being defined by whether a firm can
be categorized as an SME or not. This variable is supposed to capture the effect
competitors might have on the application process of a firm. At the same time,
this variable reflects to what extent the firm is situated in a class of firms that are
more likely to get funding. The presented variables are all supposed to influence
the subsidy variable but not the firm’s investment decision or outcome.
In addition, as already touched upon above, exclusion restrictions will also be in-
serted in the R&D input equation, reflecting variables that are assumed to have an
impact on R&D input but that do not determine R&D output. Variables reflect-
ing the financial distress of a firm will likely influence the propensity to invest in
R&D, but will not determine the eventual innovative output of firms. Therefore,
the firm’s debt ratio (DEBT) (relative to capital and reserves) is included in the
input equations, but not in the output equations. Another exclusion restriction in-
serted in the R&D input equation is the past patent stock (PSold), thus the patent
stock of more than 5 years old, and its square PSold2. These will presumably deter-
mine R&D investments of firms, but will not, in later time periods, directly impact
12The perpetual inventory method calculates the stock of a specific variable (VARt) in time t, let’s
name this STOCKt as follows: STOCKt = (1− δ)× STOCKt−1 + VARt, where δ refers to the applied
discount rate.
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innovation output. In general, the patent stock reflects the history of innovation
activities or more specifically is an indicator of at least the engagement in innova-
tion activities which leads to some technological opportunity (independent of the
value of the latter). This involvement in innovation is likely to strongly influence
both the probability to receive subsidies and R&D expenditures. However, there is
no rationale why a firm with a larger history of R&D activities would have a higher
output in later periods. In line with this view, it has already often been argued that
a large fraction of patents are ”worthless” or become it in a short period of time
(Griliches, 1998). The old patent stock is thus considered to at most influence R&D
input in a later period but not the output further in time. Nevertheless, while sales
with new products should not depend on old patents as these are supposed to just
secure sales of older products, newer patents might impact the output induced by
new products. Therefore, we insert PSnew and its square (PSnew2) in all equa-
tions, referring to the part of the patent stock less than 5 years old. The patent
stock variables are constructed based upon the PATSTAT database, scaled by em-
ployment and constructed using the perpetual inventory method applying a 15%
rate of obsolescence of knowledge.
Of course, other explanatory variables are included in all of the regressions. A first
set of variables reflects size and age. Firm size is measured by the log of employ-
ment (lnEMP). In order to control for the firm’s age, the logarithm of this variable
is included in all estimations (lnAGE). As also argued in the other chapters, firms
of different age might have different innovation input and output effects.
The GP dummy indicates whether a firm is part of a group. As already intro-
duced in the previous chapter, group firms might be different from independent
firms when it comes to innovation input but also innovation output as they are
integrated in a broader group of firms and network effects might lead to higher
investments and output. At the same time however, this depends on the integra-
tion of the firm in the group and its flexibility. When it comes to subsidies, the
previous chapter extensively elaborated upon the fact that group firms might ac-
tually be less likely to receive subsidies. On the other hand, their probability of
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applying might be higher due to network effects. Group firms with foreign head-
quarters should be viewed independent of national groups as they are also present
on foreign territory, therefore a dummy FOREIGN is included (for a discussion on
multinationals and innovation see e.g. Castellani and Zanfei, 2006). In addition,
the dummy EXPORT reflects whether a firm is exporting in order to capture in-
ternational presence, which might be an indicator of innovativeness due to the
engagement in foreign markets.
Finally a set of province dummies captures location effects, industry dummies
account for other non-observed differences among industries and time dummies
capture business cycle effects.13 Note that all time-varying variables enter the re-
gression as lagged values to avoid simultaneity bias.
4.4.3 Descriptive statistics
Table 4.1 shows some descriptive statistics for the firms included in this study, split
by whether a firm received a subsidy or not.14
Column 3 presents the significance levels of two-sided t-tests of differences be-
tween mean values of the variables between subsidized and unsubsidized firms.
As can be seen, subsidized firms are, on average larger, more likely to be exporters
and part of a group. They are also more likely to have a history of innovation,
reflected by a larger patent stock. In line with expectations, the summary statistics
also show that subsidized firms have a larger stock of both past project appli-
cations and application success rates. On average, the subsidized firms are also
more likely to be part of a group of firms, defined as being within the same size
class, industry, region and year as the observed firm, which have in general higher
application success rates. With respect to the outcome variables, subsidized firms
seem to have higher R&D intensities as well as a larger innovation output.
13An overview of the industry structure is given in table A4.1 in appendix
14The IWTSUBINT variable is thus 0 for all unsubsidized firms by construction.
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Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics
(1) (2) (3)
Unsubsidized firms (n = 2154) Subsidized firms (n = 318) t-test, H0:mean (1) =
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Min Max Mean Std.Dev. Min Max mean (2)
DEBT 3.537 5.533 0 67.690 3.116 5.280 0 67.970
EMP 136.997 285.310 1 5820 383.261 808.290 1 5116 ***
PSnew 0.002 0.018 0 0.586 0.012 0.048 0 0.600 ***
PSold 0.002 0.015 0 0.320 0.012 0.037 0 0.400 ***
EXPORT 0.754 0.431 0 1 0.912 0.284 0 1 ***
GP 0.573 0.495 0 1 0.642 0.480 0 1 **
FOREIGN 0.308 0.462 0 1 0.267 0.443 0 1
AGE 27.788 20.451 1 225 27.420 23.588 2 147
APPSTOCK 0.007 0.049 0 1.445 0.044 0.094 0 0.680 ***
SRATE OTHER 0.561 0.443 0 1 0.687 0.392 0 1 ***
SRATE FIRM 0.002 0.053 0 1.85 0.255 0.574 0 1.85 ***
IWTSUBINT 0 0 0 0 0.971 2.267 0.001 19.555 NA
RDint 1.080 3.876 0 50 5.162 8.760 0 49.862 ***
RDtot 1.239 4.188 0 50 5.960 9.818 0 49.862 ***
TURNNEW 8.146 18.941 0 100 18.108 24.136 0 100 ***
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
4.5 Empirical implementation and results
4.5.1 Innovation inputs
In this section we focus on input additionality effects of subsidies on the innova-
tion input decisions of firms.
Table 4.2 presents the impact of yearly IWT subsidies as measured by subsidy in-
tensity on internal R&D intensity, RDint in column 1 and total R&D intensity, RD-
tot, consisting of both internal and external R&D investment relative to turnover
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Table 4.2: Innovation input equations
(1) (2)
RDint RDtot
IWTSUBINT 2.569*** 3.046***
(0.402) (0.593)
DEBT -0.038*** -0.038**
(0.012) (0.016)
lnEMP 0.198*** 0.238***
(0.073) (0.087)
PSnew 25.267** 28.960**
(10.950) (11.965)
PSnew2 -55.502*** -74.175***
(21.160) (23.633)
PSold 20.972* 34.118*
(11.726) (18.100)
PSold2 -95.165** -131.593**
(38.265) (54.596)
EXPORT 0.636*** 0.678***
(0.219) (0.236)
GP 0.329 0.394*
(0.206) (0.227)
FOREIGN -0.301 -0.226
(0.274) (0.309)
lnAGE -0.317*** -0.346***
(0.115) (0.131)
Constant 0.180 0.103
(0.484) (0.554)
N 2472 2472
residfirst -0.779* -1.156*
(0.460) (0.683)
Test on joint significance of
-Industry χ2(11) = 110.31*** χ2(11) = 111.64***
-Time χ2(2) = 1.94 χ2(2) = 1.59
-Region χ2(4) = 3.86 χ2(4) = 3.91
F test of excluded instruments 12.74*** 12.74***
Test on joint significance of
exclusion restriction 17.79*** 12.94***
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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in column 2.15
In general, the results shown in table 4.2 confirm that subsidy intensity has a pos-
itive significant impact on innovation input both when this latter is measured by
internal R&D intensity and total R&D intensity. Full crowding out can thus be re-
jected as subsidies do seem to stimulate the increase of innovation expenditures.
However, as there is always only a part of the projects subsidized (SR), it could be
the case that this estimated increase due to subsidies reflects a lower increase than
what would be expected if firms undertake the full project for which the subsidy
application was filed. In other words, we expect the R&D intensity to increase
at least to the extent that the initially proposed projects are undertaken. We can
assess this by comparing the coefficient for IWTSUBINT with the inverse of the
subsidy rate variable (1/SR). This subsidy rate variable can be constructed as we
have detailed information on the total project costs and the granted amount in the
subsidy database of IWT. The average subsidy rate in our framework is 43.395%,
implying that total R&D investment should be at least 2.304 times higher than
subsidies received. The results presented in table 4.2 suggest that this is indeed
the case. However, the IWTSUBINT coefficients are not significantly higher than
this ’private investment factor’. Nevertheless, based upon these results, we can-
not reject that firms would not invest that extra amount in R&D after receiving
subsidies.
The coefficients of the other control variables are, in general, in line with expecta-
tions. Patent stock, both old and new, seems to have a curvilinear effect on innova-
tion inputs. Larger firms seem to have a higher innovation input and in line with
expectations on their international presence, exporters invest more in innovation
15This step of the system of equations can be estimated by instrumental variables (IV) regres-
sions as the control function approach and IV regressions are identical in this setting in which
one endogenous variable enters linearly. Estimating this equation via IV and not via the control
function approach show that the instruments pass the over-identification test (Hansen J-test). As a
consequence, considering this and the significance of the instruments in the subsidy equation (see
bottom rows of table 4.2), the proposed instruments can be considered as valid, at least in terms
of statistical requirements. The first stage of the IV regression, namely the OLS regression of IWT-
SUBINT on the excluded instruments and all other control variables that are also included in the
regression on the R&D intensity measures is shown in table A4.2 in appendix (note that the first
stage coincides for both RDint and RDtot input equations).
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activities. In addition, the older the firm, the less it invests in innovation activi-
ties on average. Group firms in general seem to have a slightly higher total R&D
intensity.
In general, this section has shown that crowding-out can be rejected on average, i.e.
subsidies granted by the government do seem to trigger private R&D investment.
In the next section, the output stage, which is the focal point of this chapter, will
be discussed.
4.5.2 Innovation outputs
The innovation output stage will be estimated based upon the control function
approach, by including the residuals from the subsidy and R&D input stage in
this last stage, correcting standard errors by means of bootstrapping based upon
200 replications.16 Doing so, this section assesses the impact of private R&D inputs
on output and analyzes to what extent a premium or discount can be found of the
subsidized projects with respect to innovation output at the firm level.
Table 4.3 presents the results of this estimation. The first column presents results
when the calculation of the R&D variables is based upon internal R&D intensity
(RDint) and column 2 when this is based upon total R&D intensity (RDtot). Results
show that the private part of both total R&D expenditures and internal R&D ex-
penditures has a positive significant effect on innovation output as reflected by the
coefficient of RDint and RDtot respectively. IWTSUBINT is not significant. How-
ever, as extensively introduced before, this coefficient should not be evaluated ’as
is’. Instead, in a first step, the structural parameter, β2, referring to the coefficient
of subsidy induced R&D, can be calculated as introduced above: β2 = β1 + piα . Re-
16While the control function approach and IV estimations coincide for the second stage, the R&D
input equation, this is not the case for the output stage. IV estimations of the output stage also
insert the exclusion restriction of the subsidy equation in the R&D input equation, letting these
variables thus directly impact both stages. It would nevertheless be a robustness check to see
whether results are robust to estimation by IV. Table A4.3 in appendix (columns 2 and 4) shows
results for this estimation, confirming the results found for the output equation estimated by the
control function approach shown below. The similarity of IV and the control function approach for
this output equation was also confirmed in the simulations.
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Table 4.3: Innovation output equations
Output Equation
(1) (2)
RDint 3.559**
(1.641)
RDtot 3.410**
(1.571)
IWTSUBINT -3.883 -5.212
(4.449) (4.566)
lnEMP 0.878 0.757
(0.593) (0.622)
PSnew -17.320 -39.239
(76.823) (78.217)
PSnew2 -11.087 59.380
(194.907) (230.117)
EXPORT 2.574* 2.506
(1.551) (1.588)
GP -1.526 -1.752
(1.200) (1.361)
FOREIGN -1.072 -1.315
(1.477) (1.521)
lnAGE -0.832 -0.798
(0.794) (0.873)
Constant 3.853 4.273
(3.363) (3.394)
N 2472 2472
Bootstrap replications 200
β2 2.048** 1.699**
(0.960) (0.772)
γ2 (=discount/premium) -0.425 -0.502
(1.992) (0.660)
residfirst -0.623 0.632
(2.521) (2.617)
residsecond -2.801* -2.765*
(1.638) (1.569)
Test on joint significance of
- Industry χ2(11) = 44.32*** χ2(11) = 45.50***
- Time χ2(2) = 3.08 χ2(2) = 2.92
- Region χ2(4) = 3.29 χ2(4) = 3.32
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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sults in table 4.3 show that the subsidy induced R&D investment has a positive
significant effect on output. Both parts of total R&D seem thus to stimulate sales
due to new products.
A major question in this study is whether this at first sight lower coefficient of
subsidized R&D reflects a lower productivity of this latter R&D component com-
pared to the privately invested R&D in terms of output. Therefore, we are inter-
ested in the structural parameter capturing the discount of subsidy induced R&D
spending, which has to be calculated as presented above in section 4.3 (γ2 = piβ1α =
β2
β1
− 1).
For the output equation with R&D input measured as RDint, we find γ2 = ( −3.8833.559∗2.569) =
0.425, suggesting thus a discount of subsidized R&D of 42.5% with respect to in-
ternal R&D intensity in terms of innovative output. Similarly, a discount of 50.2%
is suggested with respect to total R&D intensity (γ2 = ( −5.2123.410∗3.046)). Nevertheless,
as shown in table 4.3, these coefficients are insignificant, indicating that in fact, no
loss in productivity can be observed due to subsidized R&D.
In sum, results point to a positive significant effect on output of both purely pri-
vate and subsidy induced R&D. Furthermore, we do not find evidence of a lower
productivity or higher profitability of this latter component compared to private
R&D in terms of generated sales due to new products. There is thus no conclusive
evidence supporting either one of the arguments outlined above, in favor of ex-
pecting a discount or suggesting a premium of subsidy induced R&D relative to
private R&D in terms of innovative output. 17
17A general problem in subsidy evaluation studies is the lack of a reliable control group. In the
above section, as in most of the subsidy evaluation studies, the control group consists of all firms
that did not get a subsidy in the period under consideration. However, Brown et al. (1995) suggest
that the control group of firms that received subsidies should only consist of firms with rejected
applications as they might, although not random, come as close to a reliable control group as one
might get. As we have information on all subsidy applications from 1984 onwards, our setting
would enable us to exploit a similar alternative control group. Instead of having all firms that did
not receive a subsidy in the period under consideration as controls, we could only keep those that
ever applied for a subsidy between 1984 and the year under consideration. Doing so however
reduces the number of observations in the sample to that extent that it is impossible to estimate the
model consistently. When more data becomes available over time, allowing a larger sample size
with various control groups, this could nevertheless be a viable extension.
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4.6 Conclusion
Taking a methodological approach instead of focusing on the literature on small
young innovators as in the previous chapters presented in this dissertation, this
chapter models input and output additionality in a structural framework. It ex-
tends the Cre´pon Duguet Mairesse (CDM) framework by incorporating subsidies
as a determinant of both the input and output equations. Thereby, this study adds
to the CDM framework and to the widely spread input additionality literature
and the less investigated output additionality strand of research. Doing so, this
chapter allows to investigate in more detail both input additionality and output
additionality by explicitly modeling the inextricable nature of this process. This
latter factor was mostly neglected by previous literature. In addition, the avail-
ability of detailed subsidy data enables us to take a step back from the commonly
used dichotomous indicator of public subsidies.
The empirical study is carried out using Flemish Innovation Survey data coupled
with detailed subsidy data. In line with a lot of the prevalent literature, the empir-
ical analysis finds evidence for input additionality of subsidies. In general, crowd-
ing out can thus be rejected and public incentive schemes seem to accelerate R&D
spending.
Implementing the method described in this chapter in order to investigate out-
put additionality, this analysis reveals that, in general, an increase in private R&D
inputs leads to higher innovative performance in subsequent years. In addition,
subsidy induced R&D, encompassing both the subsidy and the additional R&D
investment due to this subsidy, also increases sales due to new products. Further-
more, in spite of the at first sight lower output effect of subsidies, results do not
show any evidence of a lower profitability of subsidy induced R&D spending, sug-
gesting that both subsidy induced R&D spending and private R&D spending have
similar effects on output. There is thus no evidence suggesting that either policy
makers select projects with potential lower private value or that firms would get
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subsidies for projects with lower outcome expectations.
Of course, our study has a number of caveats that remain for further research and
these will be mainly discussed in the concluding chapter 5. A specific shortcoming
of this chapter is that application and granting decision stages could not be incor-
porated in the framework. In addition, it is worth mentioning that, in context of
this dissertation and the importance attributed to firm heterogeneity in the previ-
ous chapters, it would be valuable if further research could incorporate this latter
aspect in the more structural set-ups like the one presented here as well.18
18While it is beyond the scope of this chapter to insert firm heterogeneity in the model in its
current set-up, tables A4.6 and A4.7 in ’Appendix 4.B’ show results for a subset of small young
firms, confirming all results presented below.
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Chapter 5
General Conclusion
In brief terms, this doctoral dissertation elaborated upon the understanding of the
growth potential of small young innovators and looked into an important policy
tool, selective R&D subsidies that are often used to trigger innovation activities of
firms. A focus on small young innovators is not only relevant in terms of evalu-
ating the current policy stipulations of the European Commission (EC), but also
adds to the academic literature that in general increasingly emphasizes the impor-
tance of these firms in terms of technological performance and economic growth.
As measuring policy impacts remains challenging, the importance of evaluation
methods was also considered by dedicating a separate chapter to an alternative
methodology to analyze subsidy effects. The findings of the individual chapters
are briefly summarized before formulating a more general conclusion to this dis-
sertation. This chapter also extends upon the different limitations to this work and
formulates opportunities for further research.
In line with the increased focus on specific subsets of innovators, Chapter 2 of this
dissertation looked into the growth opportunities of small young innovators, and
more specifically of the ”Young Innovative Companies”, the so-called YICs, as fos-
tered by the EC. This analysis shows evidence that these firms, being small, young
and intensively engaged in innovation activities grow more than other firms, both
in terms of employment and in terms of sales. In addition, the study presented in
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chapter 2 confirms the complementarity of the factors size, age and R&D intensity
as incorporated in the YIC definition as the latter grow more than other subsets
of firms that have less strict innovation criteria. In general, these results confirm
the expectations on growth of YICs. The additional findings on complementar-
ity point to the importance of carefully defining subsets of firms. Furthermore, as
a main goal of policies is to foster growth, this study also seems to support the
reinforcement of state aid programs toward YICs.
Although the growth figures are supportive for YICs, one might wonder how YICs
perform over the growth distribution. Analyzing this by means of quantile re-
gressions shows that YICs grow especially faster than other, already fast-growing
firms. This result is fully in line with expectations on these firms. However, expec-
tations are also that these firms would, on the other end of the tail, perform much
worse than the other slow growers in the economy due to the presumed hetero-
geneity within this class of firms. Nevertheless, this study showed that, although
YIC growth is variable over different quantiles, YICs do not seem to perform sig-
nificantly worse than other firms at any point of the distribution of firm growth.
This suggests that they are on the one hand high performers and on the other
hand, do not ’fall harder’ than other players in the economy.
Following upon this, Chapter 3 assessed to what extent the recent orientation of
R&D subsidies towards small young, stand-alone high-tech firms (NTBFs) is war-
ranted by assessing both input and output additionality effects of subsidies on
these firms. This chapter not only analyzed these effects for NTBFs but compared
the effects on these firms to the effect on other small young innovators by defining
some additional firm categories, i.e. LTBFs (small young independent low-tech
firms) and their group, i.e. non-independent, counterparts. Matching results re-
vealed that full crowding-out with regard to public funding can be rejected for
all firm types studied, suggesting that public funding seems to attain its goals in
terms of innovation input. However, comparing the treatment effects of the differ-
ent firm types in a regression framework suggested that treatment effects of NTBFs
are actually highest. The latter finding is in line with stipulations of policy mak-
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ers. Nevertheless, this also suggests that previous estimations of innovation policy
impacts might have been partly misleading as in general, no distinction between
preferential firm profiles in policy schemes have been made.
Next to an assessment of the additional input in R&D triggered by subsidies, this
study looked into the ability of subsidized firms to generate additional output.
The analysis showed that for nearly all firm categories, both private R&D and
subsidy induced R&D lead to new patent applications. In addition, comparing
the effects of publicly induced R&D and private R&D does not point to a lower or
higher productivity of subsidy induced R&D as compared to private R&D. These
findings further suggest that, at least from the viewpoint of the subsidized firm
itself, subsidies are not inefficiently spent.
Building upon these subsidy evaluation studies, chapter 4 presented an entirely
new extension to both the CDM model and the subsidy evaluation literature by
incorporating subsidy evaluation in the CDM framework. The integration of input
and output additionality in one framework acknowledges the inextricable nature
of this process and thereby provides a new method to assess output additional-
ity and to estimate whether subsidies entail a premium over private R&D or a
discount in terms of innovative output. In addition, in contrast to the majority
of subsidy evaluation studies using propensity score matching, this set-up allows
to make use of more detailed subsidy data allowing to take a step back from the
commonly used dichotomous indicator of public subsidies. By adding to existing
models in several ways, this chapter mainly draws attention to both the possibil-
ities but also the further need to follow up upon different existing frameworks as
these might be highly instrumental in follow-up research tackling new research
questions.
Results of this chapter indicate that, in line with the prevailing literature, subsidies
trigger private R&D investment and crowding-out can thus in general be rejected.
In a next step, output additionality was assessed. Findings suggest that, in general,
both purely private R&D investment and subsidy induced R&D, the latter encom-
passing both the subsidy received and the additional R&D investment triggered
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by the subsidy, contribute to innovation performance at the firm level. Further-
more, the publicly induced R&D does not entail a significant discount or premium
relative to private R&D investments in terms of innovative performance. An equal
productivity of publicly induced and purely private R&D can thus not be rejected.
In sum, the different chapters presented in this dissertation add to the innova-
tion literature in different ways, extending upon the specific literature focusing on
small young innovators, and adding to the more general subsidy evaluation liter-
ature and the papers building upon the framework set up by Cre´pon, Duguet and
Mairesse.
In terms of the literature focusing on subsets of innovators, results confirm that a
refined focus might be warranted as the specific subset of YICs seems to stimulate
growth and job creation, more than other firms. Building upon this, this disser-
tation also suggests that the reinforcement of state aid programs towards specific
subsets of small young innovators might be beneficial and might help these firms
to overcome some of the market failures related to innovation activities, which are
acknowledged to be especially hindering the innovation activities of these firms.
At least, granting R&D subsidies to specific subsets of firms does seem to attain its
goal in terms of fostering both innovation input and output. The inclusion of sub-
sets in this context also has implications for policy recommendations; the increas-
ingly postulated view that an entrepreneurial state should be built at least to some
extent by specific and more refined intervention of public institutions can thus not
be rejected. In addition, although fostering innovation activities directly as as-
sessed in this dissertation is acknowledged to be a main instrument, the creative
destruction mechanism is presumably embedded in a wider set of instruments
that allow entry, growth, but also easy exit of firms engaged in these activities.
The EU-US gap for example might not solely be solved by subsidizing innova-
tion activities of these firms, but is probably rooted in deeper structural problems
hampering dynamics of these firms in the EU both related to regulations (some
examples are entry and exit regulations, competition policy, labor market regula-
tions, financial market regulations,...), as well as more cultural specificities of the
113
economic environment.
Next to adding evidence to the literature assessing the importance of small young
innovators, this work suggests that the innovation literature, more broadly, should
increasingly incorporate firm heterogeneity in its analysis as some general effects
found might differ between different firm types. In the context of this dissertation
for example, the majority of the subsidy evaluation literature has focused on very
broad sets of firms, while only some incorporated different subsets of firms, as
done in this work.
Next to adding to the literature on small young innovators and the general inno-
vation literature, this dissertation also adds to the methodologies used to evaluate
policy instruments. By adding to these existing methodologies, this thesis does
not only present possibilities to extend research in this respect, but also points to
further opportunities to incorporate existing methods in new settings or elaborate
upon new methods in order to validate (or question) existing findings in the inno-
vation literature.
As afore mentioned, it has to be acknowledged that this dissertation is only a
building block in the broader research field. In this context, it is important to
acknowledge that this work is definitely not without limitations. While most of
the chapter-specific limitations are discussed in the relevant chapters themselves,
below are some limitations listed that apply more generally to some or all of the
chapters incorporated in this doctoral dissertation. Nevertheless, some of the lim-
itations raised for this work not only lead to a critical reflection and a further ac-
knowledgement of the broader setting in which this dissertation should be embed-
ded, but also set the stage for further research, on which some suggestions will be
given in this concluding chapter.
All chapters suffer from inevitable data-limitations. One of the most obvious prob-
lems with the variables used in this doctoral dissertation that are based upon sur-
vey data is that the credibility of the responses reaches as far as the interpreta-
tion of the responding agent. The responses are thus always subjective to some
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extent. Next to this, the analysis of chapters 2, 3 and 4 is only based upon one
country and/or one region (the survey data used in chapters 2 (CIS and OECD
R&D survey) and 4 (CIS) only cover the Flemish region in Belgium, while chapter
3 only focuses on German CIS data, based upon the Mannheim Innovation Panel
(MIP)). In the different chapters, these countries are assumed to be representative
for other countries within the European Community. However, it needs no ex-
planation that within the EU, it might be incorrect to extrapolate results obtained
for individual countries to the more global European level. In addition, even if it
could be assumed that results would be representative for the EU, it would be in-
teresting to further investigate (policies towards) small young innovators in other
regions and especially the less researched less-developed regions in line with e.g.
Goedhuys and Sleuwaegen (2010) and Sleuwaegen and Goedhuys (2002) as other
environments and confounding factors might impact their growth and technolog-
ical progress. Related to this latter remark on confounding factors and as already
mentioned also in chapter 2, it has to be acknowledged that also within the context
of the current work, other confounding factors, not taken into account in this dis-
sertation, might impact the (technological) performance of small young innovators
(Carpenter and Petersen, 2002; Colombo and Grilli, 2005).
Next to this, the CIS, the R&D OECD survey and the MIP can only be used as
pooled cross-sections. In other words, panel data analysis is unfortunately impos-
sible as the same firm is not necessarily observed in several consecutive waves
of the surveys. One major advantage of panel data is the possibility to control
for time-constant fixed effects. In addition, although the cross-sections contain
answers to questions that cover different years, the use of a panel would further
enable us to elaborate a lag structure. Without a sufficient time-lag, it might be
hazardous to pose any statement on causality. In addition, some effects, e.g. on in-
novation output and growth, might show a large variability in terms of timing. It
would thus be highly interesting to trace the path of young innovative companies
over longer periods than what has currently been done in this dissertation. This
does not only apply to growth in chapter 2 but also to the output variables pre-
sented in the other chapters. Closely related to this, chapter 2 already suggested
115
another opportunity of having extended data, namely to study in more detail the
survival of for example YICs when compared to other companies and assess con-
founding factors to this in order to understand the exit dynamics because after
all, exits are also important vehicles of more general market dynamics (Bartels-
man et al., 2004; Haltiwanger, 2012). The latter could in a first step already be im-
plemented with the population information on Flemish firms taken from Belfirst,
containing detailed information on exit and the reason thereof. This opportunity
for further research is closely related to a limitation of our research setting that
could only be taken into account in chapter 2, but eventually applies to all chap-
ters. All results presented in the different chapters are conditional upon survival,
meaning that only firms that survived up till the survey period were included in
the sample. In chapter 2, the data could be merged with information on the full
population of Flemish firms in order to correct for this bias based upon a heck-
man selection model. Nevertheless, although the selection term, the Mills ratio,
was insignificant, this might rather point to difficulties in estimating the selection
equation rather than to a lack of survival bias. Together with a more detailed un-
derstanding of survival of these firms, both the entry and post-entry dynamics also
deserve further attention (for a recent survey on firm entry, growth and exit dy-
namics, see Santarelli and Vivarelli (2007) and see Fackler et al. (2013) for a recent
empirical contribution). In general, these suggestions for further research reveal
the need for theoretical models and empirical analysis to focus on the dynamics
of these small young innovators in order to add to the broader array of policy de-
signs, apart from the suggestions on innovation policy that could be raised in this
dissertation (see also further comments below).
In addition, as already mentioned multiple times throughout this dissertation, po-
tential indirect effects generated by small young innovators were not taken into
account. In this context it would for example be valuable to assess to what ex-
tent small young innovators create, as often postulated, beneficial effects in terms
of creating new markets that might incite research in other firms in the economy
(next to or in addition to the other stream of literature discussing the knowledge
spillover theory of entrepreneurship, explaining how entrepreneurial opportuni-
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ties themselves are shaped through other firms (Acs et al., 2009; Block et al., 2013)).
In line with this, collaboration activities of small young innovators are also a valu-
able avenue for further research: firms’ heterogeneity of collaborations (i.e. part-
ner type, asymmetric collaborations), and the effects on output of both the col-
laborating small young innovators and the other firms (Hagedoorn et al., 2000;
Belderbos et al., 2004; Veugelers, 1998; Veugelers and Kesteloot, 1996; Alvarez and
Barney, 2001). Related to this, as also already mentioned in chapter 3, research
on group participation of small young innovators would also be interesting to be
extended, both in context of the general spillover and subsidy evaluation litera-
ture. The broader collaboration setting can also be linked to the wide literature on
markets for technologies, which suggests an important role of small young tech-
nology suppliers in the innovation system (Arora and Gambardella, 2010). Thus,
although this dissertation focuses in chapters 2 and 3 only on small young inno-
vators, this should not be interpreted as denying the importance of other (more
mature) firms in the economy. Baumol (2002) for example stressed that society can
only benefit fully if it has an innovation system that effectively links small and
large firms, with the latter following-up and improving the breakthrough innova-
tions of the former. In line with these suggestions, it would also be informative to
assess the extent to which research subsidies granted create spillovers and have the
presumed additional social welfare effects. Next to exploiting patent data, which
in spite of its valuable contributions nevertheless generates limited measures in
this respect as at most spillovers to other firms can be measured, a road for fur-
ther research within that setting consists of focusing more on different structural
modeling types in line with e.g. Takalo et al. (2013). This setting aims at estimat-
ing broader spillovers, capturing both positive externalities from subsidized R&D
(e.g. consumer surplus, technological spillovers to other firms) but also potential
negative effects (e.g. cost duplication, business stealing (Aghion and Howitt, 1992;
Segerstrom, 1998)).
In addition, as already touched upon in the introduction, this dissertation only fo-
cuses on one type of innovation-fostering policies, selective R&D subsidies. It is
straightforward that complementary effects or substitution effects could emerge
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between different policy measures. It would be interesting to consider the whole
pallet of policy measures and the effect each of them has on economic growth. In
this context for example, attention has already been directed towards the combi-
nation of patent protection, often considered as important for small young firms
(de Rassenfosse, 2012), and public R&D subsidies. Scotchmer (2004) e.g. ques-
tioned the relevance of ’blending’ patent protection with public subsidies as this
might simply cause society to pay twice. In addition, further research could look
into complementarity of specific subsidies and the private venture capital mar-
ket in Europe, which is on itself acknowledged to be underdeveloped but often
raised as important fosterer of small young innovators (Bottazzi and Da Rin, 2002;
Veugelers, 2011; Da Rin et al., 2011; Grilli and Murtinu, 2014). It has to be kept in
mind that next to these innovation-related policies, as already mentioned in this
dissertation, other policies might also have a more indirect impact on innovation.
In this context it was already noted that competition policy, labor market regula-
tions, the education system and other institutional and cultural factors might have
an important impact on innovation activities, the creative destruction process and
growth (Aghion et al., 2005; Veugelers, 2010; Bartelsman et al., 2004; Meyer and
Peng, 2005; Peng, 2003; Santarelli and Vivarelli, 2007; Mazzucato and Parris, 2014;
Furman et al., 2002).
Another array for further research lays in the methodologies used to evaluate sub-
sidies. While chapter 4 already extends chapter 3 in important ways, by integrat-
ing input and output stages in a structural framework and using a more detailed
subsidy measure, it is not that straightforward to incorporate for example firm het-
erogeneity, as done in chapter 3, into this framework. Further research could build
upon this. Also note that not only firm heterogeneity might play an important role,
but also subsidy heterogeneity itself. While some attempts have been made to in-
corporate different types of subsidies (e.g. basic, applied) in a matching approach,
it would be valuable to also assess a more refined subsidy impact in this setting
(not based upon a dummy variable and assessing both input and output effects).
This suggestion could pave the way for an extension of the presented CDM frame-
work in chapter 4, but could also build further upon the structural framework of
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e.g. Takalo et al. (2013). In addition, future frameworks should, like the latter one,
incorporate the application and granting process in the analysis.
Next to this, all research in this dissertation is conducted at the firm level. It would
be valuable to have more detailed project-level information, especially in the set-
ting of subsidy evaluation, both with respect to input and output variables. All
data sources used in this dissertation were only available or could only be used at
the firm level. The fact that all studies are conducted at the firm level limits to some
extent the interpretation of results. Information at the project-level would enable a
more fine-grained approach towards subsidy effects. In the current setting, several
subsidized projects might have been merged and only the effect on the total R&D
spending of the firm can be assessed. This might be partly misleading. Finding
that there is no crowding-out at the general firm level for example does not give
any information on the exact use of the subsidies within the firm as well as on the
effect this might have on other projects. Chapter 4 already found a first indication
that it cannot be rejected that firms raise their firm-level R&D spending at least
with the amount as postulated in case of subsidy receipt. Nevertheless, this does
not shed any light on the distribution of projects over the firm’s portfolio. Even
if there would be evidence of (partial) crowding-out effects, it could be that what
is less invested, is invested in better projects. Takalo et al. (2013) for example do
focus at the project-level but cannot assess the full project portfolio of the firm in
their setting.
The paragraphs preceding this last one elaborated not only upon several limita-
tions, but also set the thesis in a broader context while adding on avenues for
further research. Wrapping up this thesis, it is important to acknowledge that the
limitations to the research presented in this dissertation should never serve as a
discouraging finding. They only point out the array of possibilities in which re-
search could be extended. Realizing this is very important and should serve as an
incentive to keep on going on the sometimes bumpy road of research, never stop
wondering and tackle new challenges on the way!
Appendices
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Overview of the different firm-types discussed in the
dissertation
Below, an overview is given of the different firm types discussed in this thesis. They are presented
per chapter and the firm-types that are fostered by policy makers and / or are part of the academic
literature are briefly discussed. While none of the chapters specifically discusses SMEs as a single
firm category, this firm type is also briefly introduced here due to its importance as overarching
firm category based upon which the attention towards subsets of firms increased (e.g. YICs).
SME Small- and Medium-sized Enterprizes. In its broadest applied form, this term
refers to firms having less than a specific number of employees, usually lim-
ited to 250. The European definition applied by European policy makers de-
fines this as ”enterprises which employ fewer than 250 persons and which
have an annual turnover not exceeding 50 million euro, and/or an annual
balance sheet total not exceeding 43 million euro” (EC-DG ENTR, 2006).
Chapter 2
YIC Young Innovative Companies. With the revised state–aid rules for innova-
tion support, the European Commission especially reinforces policies towards
potential radical innovators by introducing the concept of Young, Innovative
Companies (YICs) (see EC-DG ENTR, 2009, for an overview). By the Euro-
pean definition, these companies are less than six years old, have less than
250 employees and are highly R&D intensive, that is, have an R&D intensity
larger than 15% as measured by R&D spending relative to total operating ex-
penses. Article 35 of the General Block Exemption Regulation (GBER) defines
advisory conditions for aid to YICs (European Commission, 2008) by defining
specific categories of state aid for which no notification to the Commission is
necessary. The support granted to YICs should be compatible with articles 87
and 88 of the EC Treaty, declaring certain categories of aid compatible with
the common market.
SYI Small Young Innovators. A firm type introduced by the author to designate
firms having all characteristics of YICs, except for the R&D intensity thresh-
old, which should only be above 0.
SY Small Young firms. A firm type introduced by the author to designate firms
having the same size and age criteria as YICs, but should not be R&D active.
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Chapter 3
NTBF New Technology Based Firms. This concept was initially introduced by the
Arthur D. Little consulting group (Little, 1977) and points to young indepen-
dent firms engaged in innovation activities involving substantial technologi-
cal risk. Although these firms are often discussed in academic literature, there
is no univocal definition of this concept (Storey and Tether, 1998). Chapter 3
defines these firms as small (< 250 employees), young (< 10 years old), inde-
pendent firms active in high-tech sectors.
GNTBF Group New Technology Based Firms. The group, i.e. non-independent, coun-
terparts of NTBFs.
LTBF Low Technology Based Firms. The low-tech counterparts of NTBFs.
GLTBF Group Low Technology Based firms. The group and low-tech counterparts of
NTBFs.
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Appendix 2.A
Table A2.1: Industry structure
Industry Description # obs in the sample
1 Manufacture of food products, beverages and tobacco 935
2 Manufacture of textiles 555
3 Manufacture of wood and wood products; manufacture of pulp,
paper and paper products; publishing and printing;
530
4 Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear
fuel; Manufacture of chemicals, chemical products and man-
made fibres; Manufacture of rubber and plastic products
982
5 Manufacture of basic metals and fabricated metal products 964
6 Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c.; Manufacture of
transport equipment
1070
7 Manufacture of electrical and optical equipment 693
8 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products; Manufac-
turing n.e.c.
607
9 Research & Development; other business services 1078
10 ICT and related services 474
Total number of Observations: 7888
Table A2.2: Table of correlations
Emp
Growth
YIC SYI SY EMP AGE RDint FOREIGN EXPORT
Emp Growth 1.0000
YIC 0.0676 1.0000
SYI 0.0315 -0.0383 1.0000
SY -0.0169 -0.0349 -0.0416 1.0000
EMP -0.0210 -0.0487 -0.0191 -0.0512 1.0000
AGE -0.0559 -0.1871 -0.2227 -0.2130 0.1880 1.0000
RDint 0.0314 0.4360 -0.0045 -0.0612 -0.0346 -0.1458 1.0000
FOREIGN 0.0242 -0.0076 0.0213 -0.0127 0.2220 0.0392 -0.0128 1.0000
EXPORT -0.1444 -0.0377 -0.0045 -0.0099 0.0035 0.0804 -0.0504 0.0557 1.0000
GROUP 0.0214 -0.0300 0.0511 -0.0562 0.2365 0.0532 -0.0178 0.5586 0.0276
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Appendix 2.B: Extensions
Two year lead of the growth variable
In chapter 2, we analyzed the growth of the Young Innovative Companies in t+1.
However, we can question whether we can still find a superior growth in t+2. In
other words, we question the durability of the growth of YICs. Coad and Rao
(2006) state that it is difficult to specify a correct time lag, especially for sales
growth to be visible. As a consequence, a wider time horizon could capture the ef-
fects on sales growth better. Unfortunately, a larger time horizon than 2 years was
impossible to implement due to data limitations. In order to evaluate the growth in
a later time period, we adjust the growth definition of both sales and employment
in the following way: [(TURN(EMP)it+2 − TURN(EMP)it)/TURN(EMP)it ×
100]. Subsequently, we estimate the growth equations again, with the adjusted
growth variable.
Table A2.3 presents the results of these adjusted estimations. Columns 1 and 3
present the growth results when only the YIC dummy is included, while columns
2 and 4 show the results with SYIs and SY firms included in the regression. We
find that sales growth approximately doubles over a two-year period when com-
pared to annual growth. This indicates that the growth of YICs, at least in terms of
turnover, is persistent. For employment growth, we also almost find a doubling of
the coefficient of the YIC dummy. Consequently, the growth of Young Innovative
Companies also seems to be persistent in terms of employment.
The inclusion of the SYI and SY dummies in the sales and employment growth
equations does not change the results of the YIC dummy. In addition, both the SYI
and SY dummies remain insignificant. The results for the other control variables
also hold in general. The only difference is that being an exporter has an insignif-
icant effect on sales growth over a two-year period, while we found a negative
significant effect on sales growth over a one-year period.
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Table A2.3: The 2-year growth of the Young Innovative Companies
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables Sales Growth Sales Growth Emp Growth Emp Growth
YIC 18.554 ** 18.244 ** 7.929 * 8.408 **
(7.693) (7.758) (4.063) (4.108)
SYI 0.303 2.121
(2.946) (1.904)
SY -4.437 0.311
(4.048) (2.443)
ln(EMP) -1.319 ** -1.334 ** -1.196 *** -1.206 ***
(0.544) (0.545) (0.342) (0.342)
ln(AGE) -1.644 ** -1.846 ** -1.590 *** -1.323 ***
(0.722) (0.890) (0.428) (0.506)
RDint 0.266 0.256 0.126 0.125
(0.163) (0.163) (0.085) (0.085)
RDint2 -0.004 ** -0.004 ** -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
FOREIGN 1.108 1.128 0.825 0.849
(1.526) (1.525) (0.969) (0.969)
EXPORT 0.080 0.016 -2.554 *** -2.597 ***
(1.565) (1.564) (0.821) (0.819)
GP -1.362 -1.395 0.698 0.664
(1.496) (1.497) (0.855) (0.854)
Constant 11.149 *** 12.087 *** 0.368 -0.538
(3.850) (4.369) (2.235) (2.531)
R2 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.07
N 4821 4821 6409 6409
F statistic 14.687 *** 13.721 *** 13.334 *** 12.525 ***
F-test on joint significance of
- industry dummies 8.19 *** 8.21 *** 4.72 *** 4.76 ***
- time dummies 36.07 *** 36.04 *** 22.21 *** 22.22 ***
- region dummies 0.83 0.77 0.76 0.79
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Note: Cluster-robust standard errors are given in parentheses.
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Thresholds of R&D intensity in the YIC definition
The definition of YICs used in this dissertation is based upon the official defini-
tion provided in article 35 of the General Block Exemption Regulation (GBER),
i.e. firms being less than 6 years old, having less than 250 employees and with an
R&D intensity of more than 15%. It would be interesting to assess to what extent
results are sensitive to the R&D intensity threshold in the definition. This is exam-
ined by lowering the R&D intensity threshold to 10% and 5% respectively in order
to assess the sensitivity of R&D intensity in the YIC definition and the effect on
growth.
Table A2.4 shows robustness checks on this. Columns 1 and 2 show results when
the R&D intensity threshold is lowered to 10%, both for employment growth in
the first column and sales growth in column 2. Columns 3 and 4 show the growth
equations for employment and sales growth respectively when the R&D intensity
threshold in the YIC definition is lowered to 5%. Results show that when this
threshold is gradually lowered, results become less significant. This confirms the
relevance of this threshold, next to the evidence on complementarity effects with
respect to SYI and SY shown in chapter 2 itself.
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Table A2.4: Thresholds of R&D intensity in the YIC definition
(1) (2) (3) (4)
emp10 sales10 emp5 sales5
YIC 4.467** 6.288* 3.197** 3.391
(1.959) (3.255) (1.540) (2.557)
SYI 1.284 0.382 1.779 1.613
(1.065) (1.727) (1.215) (1.861)
SY -1.788 -2.179 -1.753 -2.069
(1.410) (2.891) (1.410) (2.892)
ln(EMP) -0.332* -1.085*** -0.343* -1.104***
(0.185) (0.285) (0.185) (0.286)
ln(AGE) -0.682** -1.512*** -0.667** -1.471***
(0.302) (0.524) (0.303) (0.526)
RDint 0.047 0.139 0.055 0.162*
(0.051) (0.094) (0.052) (0.093)
RDint2 -0.001 -0.002** -0.001 -0.003**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
FOREIGN 0.776 0.744 0.800 0.791
(0.561) (0.880) (0.561) (0.880)
EXPORT -2.724*** -2.046** -2.730*** -2.052**
(0.490) (0.864) (0.490) (0.864)
GROUP 0.608 -0.968 0.597 -0.992
(0.509) (0.832) (0.511) (0.836)
Constant -2.750* 5.267** -2.792* 5.105**
(1.434) (2.286) (1.437) (2.292)
N 7888 6110 7888 6110
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Note: Regressions include time, industry and region dummies.
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Appendix 3.A
Table A3.1: Industry structure
Industry Description NTBF group
NTBF
1 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products ;Man-
ufacture of pharmaceuticals, medicinal chemicals and
botanical products
88 61
2 Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c.; Manu-
facture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers; Man-
ufacture of other transport equipment; Building and re-
pairing of ships and boats ; Manufacture of aircraft and
spacecraft;
235 132
3 Manufacture of office machinery and computers; Manu-
facture of electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c.; Manu-
facture of radio, television and communication equipment
and apparatus; Manufacture of medical, precision and op-
tical instruments, watches and clocks;
272 141
4 Research and development; Other Business activities 465 179
5 Computer and related activities 168 96
Total number of Observations: 1288 609
LTBF Group
LTBF
6 Manufacture of food products, beverages and tobacco 42 23
7 Manufacture of textiles 61 21
8 Manufacture of wood and wood products; manufacture of
pulp, paper and paper products; publishing and printing;
65 35
9 Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nu-
clear fuel; Manufacture of rubber and plastic products
89 48
10 Manufacture of basic metals and fabricated metal products 179 59
11 Fishing; mining and quarrying; Mineral products; Furni-
ture; other industries; Waste collection, treatment and dis-
posal activities; materials recovery; Other services
243 132
12 Wholesale and retail trade and repair of motor vehicles
and motorcycles
133 50
13 Transportation, storage ; Financial and insurance activities 137 89
14 Communication services 16 13
Total number of Observations: 965 470
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Appendix 3.B: Extensions
Table A3.2 presents some descriptive regression results on financial constraints.
As introduced in chapter 3, the literature suggests that independent and high-tech
small young firms are more financially constrained than those that belong to a
group or are active in less technology-advanced areas. In one of the survey waves,
MIP 2005, there is an explicit distinction made between the extent to which on
the one hand internal (intcon) and on the other hand external (extcon) financing
sources constrain innovation activities of firms. These two dummies serve as de-
pendent variables in a probit regression on the dummies referring to the different
firm types (with GLTBF as reference category) next to additional control variables
such as size, age and region. These results suggest that high-tech small young
firms in general are more financially constrained than the low-tech firms. Within
the group of high-tech firms, the difference between group and independent firms
is not that obvious. Note that we present these results solely for descriptive rea-
sons, and do not claim to prove any causal relationship.
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Table A3.2: Financial constraints
(1) (2)
Intcon Extcon
NTBF 0.729*** 0.981***
(0.245) (0.279)
GNTBF 0.721*** 0.949***
(0.230) (0.268)
LTBF 0.069 0.539*
(0.252) (0.281)
ln(EMP) -0.044 -0.150**
(0.071) (0.076)
EAST 0.053 0.047
(0.176) (0.184)
ln(AGE) -0.127 -0.205
(0.185) (0.193)
Constant -0.615 -0.607
(0.413) (0.434)
N 279 279
test on equality of NTBF, GNTBF and LTBF 9.98*** 17.19***
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table A3.3: Treatment effects after matching with propensity score based upon full
sample probit
NTBF
Matched subsidized firms: 583
R&Dint 13.449***
R&DEint 19.774***
R&D 0.521***
R&D emp 5.448***
Group NTBF
Matched subsidized firms: 260
R&Dint 8.278**
R&DEint 13.426***
R&D 0.450
R&D emp 8.586***
Small Old firms
LTBF
Matched subsidized firms: 302
R&Dint 3.087***
R&DEint 4.079**
R&D 0.073**
R&D emp 1.637***
Group LTBF
Matched subsidized firms: 99
R&Dint 0.743
R&DEint 2.243*
R&D 0.036
R&D emp 1.413**
Large young
firms
Large old firms
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Appendix 4.A
Table A4.1: Industry structure
Industry Description ]OBS
1 Manufacture of food products, beverages and tobacco 245
2 Manufacture of textiles 109
3 Manufacture of wood and wood products; manufacture of
pulp, paper and paper products; publishing and printing;
105
4 Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nu-
clear fuel; Manufacture of chemicals, chemical products
and man-made fibres; Manufacture of rubber and plastic
products
263
5 Manufacture of basic metals and fabricated metal products 231
6 Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c.; Manu-
facture of transport equipment
311
7 Manufacture of electrical and optical equipment 127
8 Fishing; mining and quarrying; Mineral products; Furni-
ture; other industries; Waste collection, treatment and dis-
posal activities; materials recovery; Other services
254
9 Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and
motorcycles
320
10 Transportation, storage 175
11 Research & Development; other business services 182
12 ICT and related services 150
Total Number of Observations: 2,472
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Table A4.2: First stage : Subsidy regression
(1)
IWTSUBINT
APPSTOCK 4.669**
(2.304)
SRATE OTHER 0.105***
(0.033)
SRATE FIRM 0.864***
(0.256)
DEBT 0.004
(0.003)
lnEMP -0.018
(0.015)
PSnew -0.566
(3.340)
PSnew2 13.893*
(8.426)
PSold -3.698
(4.130)
PSold2 23.002
(20.562)
EXPORT 0.044
(0.039)
GP -0.058
(0.037)
FOREIGN 0.073*
(0.039)
lnAGE -0.028
(0.019)
Constant 0.014
(0.082)
N 2472
Test on joint significance of
Industry χ2(11) = 45.12***
Time χ2(2) = 1.99
Region χ2(4) = 18.14***
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table A4.3: CDM innovation output equations: IV estimations
RDint RDtot
(1) (2) (3) (4)
RDint 2.323*** 3.715***
(0.642) (1.303)
RDtot 1.998*** 3.553**
(0.541) (1.567)
IWTSUBINT -3.860 -5.105
(3.288) (4.501)
lnEMP 1.158*** 0.864* 1.142*** 0.744
(0.410) (0.518) (0.418) (0.607)
PSnew 18.071 -23.282 11.899 -46.294
(48.781) (58.735) (48.207) (63.799)
PSnew2 -94.094 -5.890 -69.059 65.873
(82.541) (108.496) (81.490) (124.500)
EXPORT 3.283*** 2.433* 3.376*** 2.353
(1.048) (1.320) (1.013) (1.489)
GP -1.089 -1.570 -1.136 -1.800
(1.066) (1.222) (1.064) (1.372)
FOREIGN -1.482 -1.031 -1.704 -1.288
(1.148) (1.388) (1.141) (1.487)
lnAGE -1.131* -0.765 -1.166* -0.723
(0.632) (0.722) (0.633) (0.843)
Constant 3.538 3.779 3.715 4.188
(2.664) (2.937) (2.669) (3.048)
N 2472 2472 2472 2472
Hansen J statistic χ2(6) = 6.709 χ2(5) = 6.346 χ2(6) = 5.670 χ2(5) = 4.250
- p-value 0.349 0.274 0.461 0.514
Test on joint significance of
- Industry χ2(11) = 42.90*** χ2(11) = 37.86*** χ2(11) = 42.89*** χ2(11) = 35.35***
- Time χ2(2) = 3.10 χ2(2) = 2.28 χ2(2) = 3.14 χ2(2) = 1.99
- Region χ2(4) = 2.35 χ2(4) = 1.87 χ2(4) = 2.40 χ2(4) = 1.79
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Appendix 4.B: Extensions
’Naive’ OLS estimations
Table A4.4 in this appendix elaborates upon what could be labeled as ’naive’ esti-
mations, representing OLS regressions of the output equation.
Columns 1 and 4 of this table show OLS results for the output equation when
RDint and RDtot respectively are inserted in the output equation without tackling
the endogeneity of this component. Results show that both R&D input measures
are significantly positive in the output equation. The same exercise could be done,
but now taking into account the heterogeneity of the R&D input itself. Columns
2 and 5 show results for the output equation when a dummy variable indicating
whether a firm received subsidies or not (DSUB) is added to the output equation,
as well as its interaction with the R&D input terms (RDintDSUB and RDtotDSUB).
Results show that the interaction term is negative, which would be in line with the
findings of the CDM output equations presented in chapter 4, the latter neverthe-
less presenting an insignificant discount. Columns 3 and 6 present another ’naive’
estimation which inserts (RDintnosub = RDint - IWTSUBINT) and (RDtotnosub
= RDtot - IWTSUBINT) respectively next to IWTSUBINT in the output equations.
This estimation, next to disregarding any endogeneity, also disregards the fact that
a part of the ’private’ R&D might be induced by subsidies (matching grants). Re-
sults show that while the simplified private R&D is positive and significant, the
subsidy variable does not seem to have an effect on output.
Application and granting stage
In this section, the application and granting equations will be outlined. As already
mentioned in the main text, it is impossible to integrate these estimations in the
sequential stages. Nevertheless, it is informative to show results from these esti-
mations as they add to our understanding on how firms apply and how agencies
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Table A4.4: ’Naive’ OLS innovation output equations
RDint RDtot
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RDint 0.841*** 0.985***
(0.128) (0.197)
RDintnosub 0.782***
(0.143)
RDtot 0.732*** 0.868***
(0.114) (0.179)
RDtotnosub 0.673***
(0.128)
IWTSUBINT 1.739 1.720
(1.077) (1.061)
DSUB 6.252*** 6.275***
(1.590) (1.591)
RDintDSUB -0.499**
(0.247)
RDtotDSUB -0.452**
(0.222)
lnEMP 1.299*** 1.105*** 1.345*** 1.293*** 1.103*** 1.344***
(0.388) (0.396) (0.389) (0.390) (0.397) (0.391)
PSnew 74.257* 57.176 73.662* 71.650* 56.034 71.303*
(41.736) (42.594) (41.587) (42.124) (42.881) (41.897)
PSnew2 -145.870** -108.381 -157.744** -136.385* -103.402 -150.224**
(73.335) (75.245) (73.093) (74.614) (76.141) (74.070)
EXPORT 4.608*** 4.300*** 4.564*** 4.634*** 4.325*** 4.585***
(0.858) (0.863) (0.857) (0.857) (0.862) (0.857)
GP -0.665 -0.708 -0.627 -0.685 -0.742 -0.641
(1.011) (1.011) (1.012) (1.012) (1.012) (1.012)
FOREIGN -1.885* -1.567 -1.919* -1.963* -1.640 -1.995*
(1.075) (1.080) (1.069) (1.076) (1.081) (1.070)
lnAGE -1.761*** -1.702*** -1.730*** -1.770*** -1.700*** -1.736***
(0.563) (0.564) (0.562) (0.566) (0.566) (0.565)
Constant 4.199* 4.612* 4.012 4.260* 4.612* 4.051
(2.537) (2.533) (2.547) (2.543) (2.535) (2.553)
N 2472 2472 2472 2472 2472 2472
Test on joint significance of
-Industry F(11) 4.74*** 4.53*** 4.75*** 4.78*** 4.56*** 4.80***
-Time F(2) 1.47 1.79 1.61 1.49 1.77 1.63
-Region F(4) 1.44 1.48 1.32 1.44 1.47 1.31
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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grant subsidies.
In a first step, the application decision of firms is analyzed. This is based upon
a dichotomous variable indicating whether a firm filed an application at IWT, the
granting agency, or not (DAPPLIED). This variable is fairly unique in subsidy eval-
uation studies as the IWT Icaros database covers all firms that ever applied for a
subsidy, independent of the eventual outcome (positive or negative granting deci-
sion).
Conditional upon applying, IWT evaluates the projects and decides upon the sub-
sidy. The subsidy amount and duration of the project is determined at the granting
stage. One of the subsidy outcome variables used in the model is the logarithm of
the amount of subsidies granted at the starting period of the project in thousands
of euros, denoted by ln(IWTSUBTOTSTART). The granting agency always allo-
cates a grant relative to the firm’s proposed budget for a project. Next to the info
on and the eventual amount granted, the Icaros dataset also contains detailed in-
formation on the proposed budget by the firm based upon which the subsidy rate
can be constructed. This subsidy rate can vary depending upon several project
characteristics but can never exceed 70%. This subsidy rate is measured by the
variable SR (the amount of subsidies granted relative to the requested budget of a
specific firm in a specific year).
Most of the variables inserted in the models are also presented in the ’Variables’
section in the main text. Some variables are introduced here as they only determine
the subsidy granting decision. In order to encourage smaller firms to perform
R&D, a special program for SMEs has been put in place (the ”KMO programma”).
In order to assess the impact of this program, a dummy, dKMO is constructed
in order to reflect whether the IWT allocated the specific to a KMO program or
not. Furthermore, IWT classifies its projects according to whether it is research
(dBASIC) of development (dPROTO). A last category is dMIXED, a category that
is rather difficult to define, but reflects projects that cannot be classified as either
research or development. Note that these dummies are not mutually exclusive at
the firm level as a single firm can have multiple project applications in a single
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year.
Only for firms that did apply for a subsidy, we can observe whether there were
any subsidies granted to the firm and the amount of subsidies granted. Therefore,
the system of the application and granting equations is estimated by the maximum
likelihood Heckman selection model (Heckman, 1979). The results of this estima-
tion are presented in table A4.5 for different outcome variables, granting rate (SR)
and the log of starting subsidy amount ln(IWTSUBTOTSTART) in columns 2 and
3 respectively. The selection equation is always based upon a dummy indicating
whether a firm applied for a subsidy or not and results of this equation are pre-
sented in column 1.
Column 1 presents results for the application decision. The patent stock has an
inverted U-shaped relationship to the probability of applying, indicating that hav-
ing a larger patent history only increases the probability of applying up to a certain
point. The stock of former applications and former successful applications of the
firm positively influences the probability of applying again, just like the lagged
success rate of all other firms within the same industry, region, year and size class.
The larger firms are also more likely to apply, as well as exporters, rooted in the
premise that firms exporting to other countries might be more innovative than
other companies and are thus more likely to apply for a subsidy. Foreign owned
firms, on the other hand, are less likely to apply. It is often expected that both
group firms and foreign-owned subsidiaries might have a lower incentive to apply
for subsidies as they usually do not qualify for the larger subsidy rate programs of
the granting agency, irrespective of the incentives of the agency who could actu-
ally have high expectations of group firms in terms of knowledge generation and
spreading.
The remaining columns, 2 and 3 present the subsidy granting outcomes condi-
tional upon applying. The dummies pointing to whether at least one of the re-
quested projects is categorized by the agency as basic, mixed or applied are posi-
tive and significant in all equations. The effect seems to be higher for mixed and
basic projects compared to prototype projects in the subsidy rate equation, which
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is in line with expectations. This is also confirmed by the test on the equality of
these coefficients, revealing that only the differences between either basic and pro-
totype or mixed and prototype are significant (χ2(1) = 19.11*** and χ2(1) = 24.24***
respectively). In the case of the log of the amount of subsidies granted in the be-
ginning period, a different picture emerges. In that case, it are especially the firms
with prototype and mixed projects that receive more subsidies (only the differ-
ences between either basic and mixed and basic and proto are significant: χ2(1) =
17.83*** and χ2(1) = 22.20*** respectively). Thus, while the more basic projects do
get more subsidies relative to the requested budgets, in line with agency policies,
the actual amount received is higher for firms having prototype projects. Similarly,
the subsidy rate is higher for firms that have projects under the KMO program, but
this is not reflected in significant higher amount of subsidies, suggesting that the
KMO projects are the smaller projects. The other general economic indicators are
not influencing the agency decision to a large extent. This coincides with the fact
that the main focus of the agency is on project characteristics.
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Table A4.5: Application and Granting estimations
(1) (2) (3)
Dapplied SR ln(IWTSUBTOTSTART)
APPSTOCK 2.264 ***
(0.826)
PS 8.257 ***
(1.979)
PS2 -14.768 **
(6.678)
SRATE FIRM 0.597 ***
(0.138)
SRATE OTHER -0.245 **
(0.103)
SME -0.01
(0.155)
dBASIS 0.21 *** 1.558 ***
(0.030) (0.374)
dMIXED 0.245 *** 3.478 ***
(0.028) (0.417)
dPROTO 0.088 *** 2.873 ***
(0.026) (0.354)
dKMO 0.155 *** -0.332
(0.034) (0.363)
lnEMP 0.174 *** -0.015 -0.029
(0.054) (0.010) (0.123)
EXPORT 0.312 *** 0.06 * 0.571
(0.115) (0.035) (0.442)
GP -0.025 -0.034 -0.141
(0.102) (0.027) (0.269)
FOREIGN -0.338 *** 0.041 0.501
(0.108) (0.027) (0.397)
lnAGE -0.146 *** 0.004 -0.003
(0.056) (0.013) (0.166)
DEBT -0.003 0.001 0.022
(0.009) (0.001) (0.013)
Constant -2.003 *** 0.054 1.552
(0.370) (0.108) (1.615)
N 2472 2472 2472
uncensored Na 221 221
ρ 0.180 -0.197
(0.205) (0.350)
Test on joint significance of
- Industry χ2(11) = 32.22*** χ2(11) = 7.28*** χ2(11) = 2.72
- Time χ2(2) = 10.27*** χ2(2) = 23.30*** χ2(2) = 12.62***
- Region χ2(4) = 8.25 χ2(4) = 2.91 χ2(4) = 4.22
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
a: Note that the number of subsidized firms is lower than the number suggested in chapter 4. This
is entirely due to the fact that this estimation can only take into account the beginning period of
the subsidy granting.
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SME’s
In the context of this dissertation, it is also interesting to restrict the sample to
young small and medium sized enterprizes (SME’s). Restricting the sample to
firms which have less than 250 employees and that are at most 20 years old, we
are left with 1,135 firms in our sample. Re-estimating the whole subsidy-topped
CDM model for these firms shows that results also hold for this subset of firms.
When solely looking at input additionality results in table A4.6, results on input
additionality for the whole sample are confirmed.
Table A4.6: Innovation input equations
(1) (2)
RDINT RDTOT
IWTSUBINT 2.391*** 2.851***
(0.425) (0.619)
N 1135 1135
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
note: This table only presents the coefficient for IWTSUBINT, but all other coefficients as inserted
in the basic input equation are also inserted here but not shown. Both the magnitude and the sign
of the other coefficients are in line with results found for the basic model, i.e. with the full sample
of firms.
As can be seen in table A4.7 , the discount of subsidized R&D would be 58% with
respect to private total R&D intensity in terms of innovative output. With respect
to private internal R&D intensity, the discount is suggested to be 48%. However,
these discounts are again insignificant and there is thus no evidence that there
would be a productivity loss due to subsidized R&D. These results are in line with
what was found for the full sample of firms.
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Table A4.7: Innovation output equations for sample of SME’s
Output Equation
(1) (2)
RDint 3.788**
(1.787)
RDtot 3.810**
(1.926)
IWTSUBINT -4.384 -6.307
(4.037) (4.674)
residfirst -0.694 1.014
(2.980) (3.009)
residsecond -3.058* -3.202*
(1.798) (1.930)
lnEMP -1.281 -1.624
(0.963) (1.138)
PSnew -4.487 -39.654
(112.546) (114.342)
PSnew2 -31.068 69.087
(403.465) (432.732)
EXPORT 1.181 0.367
(2.572) (2.942)
GP -2.100 -2.517
(1.946) (2.187)
FOREIGN -1.800 -2.149
(2.656) (2.721)
lnAGE 0.430 0.852
(1.699) (1.935)
Constant 7.560 8.383
(5.721) (6.023)
N 1135 1135
Bootstrap replications 200
β2 1.954** 1.599**
(0.987) (0.729)
γ2 (=discount/premium) -0.484 -0.580
(3.149) (3.922)
Test on joint significance of
- Industry χ2(11) = 29.45*** χ2(11) = 31.17***
- Time χ2(2) = 1.06 χ2(2) = 0.52
- Region χ2(4) = 9.56** χ2(4) = 8.03*
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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